Curzon and the Limits of Viceregal Power: India, 1899-1905 by Anjaria, Dhara
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Curzon and the Limits of Viceregal Power: India, 1899-1905. 
 
 
 
Dhara Anjaria 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy (PhD), Royal Holloway College,  
 University of London.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own and is not the result of 
plagiarism or collusion.  
 
 
 
 
D. D. Anjaria   
 June 2009.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
A B S T R A C T 
 
 
 
George Curzon was post-Mutiny India‟s most imperialist, zealous and 
youngest Viceroy. From 1899-1905, he attempted to single-handedly 
implement a 12 point reform programme designed to optimise the 
efficiency of administration, eliciting fierce opposition and support 
from the divers other constituents of the Government of India. This 
thesis examines two basic, intersecting themes that defined the course 
of George Curzon‟s Viceroyalty of India: executive power and the 
checks upon it.  It analyses the degree to which the major constituent 
components of the Government of India successfully delineated and 
fenced in the boundaries of Viceregal power by their own, and the 
extent to which they collaborated with each other to do so, with 
reference to internal administration. The clashes over polity in the 
seats of power had roots in the past intimacies of the dramatis 
personae; impressions gained at Eton were carried over, and 
influenced relationships in Whitehall.  Cross-disciplinary theories of 
power are used to explain Curzon‟s relations with his provincial 
governors in Madras and Bombay Presidencies, the United Provinces 
and Punjab, and the Indian Army, the senior Indian Civil Service, the 
Viceroy‟s Council, the nascent Indian National Congress and public 
opinion in India, the British Cabinet, the India Office, the Secretary of 
State and the Council of India in London. The factors that helped and 
hindered Curzon in his quest to integrate these disparate elements into 
an efficient administrative framework run along the lines he wished 
provide clarity to the ambiguities present in official motives and 
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actions.  Underpinning the thesis as a secondary theme are Curzon‟s 
relations with Lord Ampthill, his longest serving Governor (in 
Madras) and locum in 1904, which illustrate the evolution of a 
relationship that started off in expected acrimony, but evolved into a 
partnership of mutual respect and administrative collaboration.  
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Introduction 
 
 
By all ye cry and whisper,  
By all ye leave and do, 
The silent, sullen peoples, 
Shall weigh your Gods and you. 
 
                                              - Rudyard Kipling, The White Man’s Burden. 
 
 
 
George Curzon
1
 was Viceroy of India from 1899-1905, a post to which he was 
appointed because of his brilliance and resigned because of his intransigence and 
political naiveté. Curzon can be very conveniently slotted into very many interlocking 
sections of what Mary Fulbrook calls „historical units of analysis.‟2 The Conservative 
Viceroy with a passion for strong control of his administration, the aristocratic 
Victorian globe-trotter, the Imperialist (for both his detractors and admirers); partly 
because of his well –defined ideological and societal placement, Curzon‟s Viceroyalty 
has attained legendary status as being symbolic of the operation and functioning of the 
British in India, and also as being expressive of the ideal of the same.  
Curzon of Kedleston was born in Derbyshire in 1859.
3
 A consciously, if 
sincerely, nurtured interest in parliamentary politics, so suited to a person of his birth 
                                                          
1
George Nathaniel Curzon, Viscount Scarsdale, Baron Ravensdale, Earl and Marquess Curzon of 
Kedleston (1859-1925), Parliamentary Under-Secretary, India Office 1891-92 and Foreign Office 1895-
98; Viceroy of India 1899-1905; Lord Privy Seal 1915-16; Lord President of the Council and member 
of War Cabinet 1916-19; Foreign Secretary 1919-24. 
2
 Mary Fulbrook, Historical Theory (London: Routledge, 2002), 79.  
3
 The Curzons were of Norman descent and had come over with William the Conqueror. They had held 
the estate of Kedleston in Derbyshire for 800 years when George was born. While Kedleston Hall was 
architecturally renowned, the estate was by no means as prosperous as those held by many of Curzon‟s 
contemporaries. The lack of belonging to the highest echelons of titled Victorian society may have 
spurred Curzon on to even greater eminence than he might otherwise have tried for. For a relevant 
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in Victorian Britain, coupled with a passion for the imperial ideal and the foreign 
policy that forged it, sustained and furthered the interest in India which was 
crystallised when he heard Sir James Fitzjames Stephen address an Etonian audience 
in 1876. This was exceptional in that contemporary parliamentary front-benchers did 
not usually become outstanding career colonial administrators, and vice-versa. 
Curzon‟s Viceroyalty is an illustration of the difficulties of reconciling the two, both 
in the Viceroy‟s own persona and in the area of administrative co-ordination. His 
Conservative political career and the Viceregal office did not always sit easily with 
each other; the clashes between the two form a substantial part of this thesis.  
As a person, Curzon was devoted to the puritan work ethic. In this he epitomised 
the Victorian worship of self-discipline.
4
 His assessment of the Viceregal office was 
that it was a project „calling for great knowledge of the country, administrative 
experience, unflagging energy, and almost imperious power.‟5 His preparations for 
Viceregal office, which took the form of travels (and resulting monographs) around 
the conglomeration of states and empires that ringed British India, have been too well-
chronicled by all his biographers to be reproduced here yet again. He came to the 
office in 1898, succeeding the Earl of Elgin, and continuing the long tradition of 
Conservative Etonian Viceroys who had also been the pupils of Balliol master 
Benjamin Jowett.  While his extensive knowledge of the Indian Empire was 
concentrated in foreign affairs and diplomatic policy, his stated aim when he took over 
the Viceroyalty was to spruce up and streamline Indian administration, and this was 
exactly what he effected, while simultaneously clarifying border policies.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
assessment that links Curzon‟s background to his political life, see Kenneth Rose, Curzon: A Most 
Superior Person (London: Macmillan, 1985 [1969]), 1- 8.  
4
 Iain Pears, “The Gentleman and the Hero: Wellington and Napoleon in the Nineteenth Century,” in 
Leadership: Classical, Contemporary and Critical Approaches, ed. Keith Grint (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 232.  
5
 Curzon to Balfour, 05 February 1903, Balfour Papers, Add. Mss 49732.  
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Here is Curzon in 1903, the noon-tide of his Viceroyalty, writing to his Prime 
Minister, A. J. Balfour, with a request that his term be extended so that he could stay 
on and see his programme of reforms through to successful execution. In justification, 
he lists the achievements of his Viceroyalty thus far, and it serves as an excellent 
summation of his time in India, much more concise and accurate than those put 
forward by any of his biographers.   
 
The number of things that I have originated… is almost terrifying… It is a 
commonplace that I have undertaken a work of reform in India in almost every branch 
of the administration such as has not been attempted at any period during the past half-
century…The new Frontier Province is working smoothly and well, and the new 
frontier policy is supplying cohesion and consistency to our relations with the tribes. 
My endeavour to stimulate the energy as well as the loyalty of the Indian Princes, and 
to make working bees of them in the Imperial hive…is everywhere bearing fruit (as 
their contented and happy participation in the Delhi Durbar showed); the Imperial 
Cadet Corps is already an assured success…I have settled the Berar question with the 
Nizam of Hyderabad…I have pretty well covered the whole of the native states in my 
tours, undertaken with the deliberate object of bringing the head of the administration 
into personal contact with the Chiefs… 
[In] the field of internal policy and administration….The new Currency Policy has had 
nearly four years of successful working, and the stability of Exchange seems to be 
satisfactorily assured. For the first time in Indian history our railways 
have…presented…a continuous and increasing surplus. Laws to prevent the alienation 
of land and the indebtedness of landholders have been passed in the Punjab and 
Bombay, and will shortly be passed in the United Provinces. We have dealt by 
legislation with the principal labour questions that I found unsettled. The growing 
Coal-mining industry and the Coolie labour in Assam have thus been regulated by 
statute. Trade and industry are on the upward gradient. Steel and ironworks are 
springing into existence. Outside capital and private enterprise are being attracted to 
our shores…I hope to announce to India the first great relief of taxation that it will 
have enjoyed for 20 years. Our Plague policy and our Famine policy have been finally 
evolved and…have taken a definite and accepted form. Agriculture, Education, 
Scientific research, Archaeology, which I found to be nobody‟s children, have all been 
systematised….and the work that is now being accomplished throughout India for the 
preservation, repair or restoration of ancient monuments…will probably be 
remembered long after other things are forgotten. The new rules for secretariat 
management, and for the reduction of reports and official writing, are in working 
order, and are not likely to be ignored. The Leave Rules, with their pernicious results 
in the frequency of official transfers, have been reformed. The Land Revenue Policy of 
Government… has been exhaustively analysed and explained in a state paper of 
importance; reforms have been introduced in its administration, and the principles of 
future working have been authoritatively laid down. The Telegraphic rates to Europe 
have been reduced; our sugar industry has been protected by countervailing duties 
against foreign bounties… These are some of the things that have been done, and for 
which some finality or stability may perhaps be claimed. 
6
 
                                                          
6
 Curzon to Balfour, 05 February 1903, Balfour Papers, Add. Mss 49732.  
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This was in 1903. Some of the most important reforms were yet to come. 
Among these were the Irrigation reforms, the Police reforms, which are widely 
endorsed as having been one of Curzon‟s most enduring reforms, and which, as he 
said, „deal[t] with a subject more closely affecting the everyday life and happiness of 
the millions than any other aspect of administration,‟7 and the University Education 
Bill, as also a further consolidation of foreign policy on the Afghan frontier, and the 
most controversial of all – the „Partition‟ of Bengal. 
Yet this impressive track record did not prevent the Home Government 
accepting his resignation with alacrity after he failed to convince them that he, not 
Kitchener, was right about the issue of military reform in India. This raises questions 
as to the actual potency of this undoubtedly brilliant and committed Viceroy. This, 
then, is the line of enquiry this thesis follows, and the main question that it seeks to 
answer:  How much power was exercised by Curzon as Viceroy of India? How much 
of it was untempered? How was it modified by competing wills-to-power and 
administrative exigencies? To what extent was Curzon‟s own Viceregal authority 
influenced by his dealings with his colleagues? How much influence was Curzon able 
to exercise over the Government of India and the Home Governments? Where can 
Curzon be ranked in the pantheon of colonial administrators who exercised so much 
influence that they because almost synonymous with the countries they ruled? 
Curzon and the Limits of Viceregal Power: India, 1899-1905, therefore, seeks to 
understand „how key individuals were able to shape, constrain and transform the field 
of historical forces in which they operated,‟8 and, reflectively, had their own actions 
shaped, constrained and transformed by these forces. It explores the power balances in 
                                                          
7
 Curzon to Balfour, 05 February 1903, Balfour Papers, Add. Mss 49732. 
8
 Fulbrook, Historical Theory, 78.  
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the Viceroy‟s administrative relations with various sectors and persons within the 
British Government of India and those who moved on its fringes or were co-opted into 
its hegemonic framework.   
Superficially, there appears to be no need to debate as to whether Curzon 
exercised power and influence in India, whatever negotiations he might have been 
compelled to make with London. He was, after all, the head of the administration, and 
could be assumed to be invested with a certain amount of ex-officio power. But just as 
studies of his predecessor underscore Elgin‟s inability to make an impact upon the 
administration of India, it follows that the holding of office does not necessarily 
translate into the ability to utilise the powers afforded by that office. Did Curzon 
utilise his?  More pertinently, was he able to? 
Contested power and authority reveal themselves through friction in working 
relationships; when people recognise and accept their respective places in a known 
hierarchy, they tend to conform to the status quo.  Curzon‟s assumption of the 
Viceroyalty caused considerable tumult within the established patterns of deference in 
the Indian administration; the civil servants found that bureaucratic administration, 
formerly their sole preserve, was being minutely examined and modified by the 
Viceroy; the Secretary of State was confronted (though not without some inkling of 
what was to come) with a Viceroy who staked out a separate identity for India, the 
Indians found a zealous champion for their rights, who was yet more unwilling than 
most to accord them a measure of administrative autonomy- for these functionaries, 
Curzon upset their boundaries of authority. But to what extent, if at all, did they resist 
or comply with what they could potentially view as un-called for infringement upon 
their spheres?  
14 
 
The question of how much power was exercised by proconsuls in general has 
been explored by Mark Francis.
9
 Zoe Laidlaw
10
 has considered this issue further by 
looking at the networks which helped colonial administrators gain influence both in 
their own colonies and with the government in London. Laidlaw notes how being part 
of a network, i.e. knowing people, helped colonial administrators gain access to the 
right places for achieving their objectives. How relevant is this argument in the case of 
Curzon, a man who biographers allege lost out precisely because of the pressures and 
expectations old connections placed on official relationships?  While there has not 
been much cross-pollination between works dealing with Imperial history and scholars 
working on Curzon in India, especially in terms of methodology-the extant work on 
Curzon in India being largely empiricist,- Curzon‟s early biographer, Kenneth Rose, 
takes a step towards examining the effect of state politics carried on by a small elite 
circle upon the social relations of the persons concerned.
11
 Rose analyses how these 
same social networks functioned as channeling factors and delineated Curzon‟s 
political fortunes, especially his Viceregal relationship with Whitehall. He also posits 
the social and cultural background of the age as a strong influential factor in the way 
Curzon‟s life unfolded. Rose‟s work, however, stops short of actually spelling out the 
effect Curzon‟s personal relationships with Cabinet members had on their reception of 
his plans as Viceroy, and is also confined to Home politics. This thesis takes on from 
Rose‟s work, expanding upon this theme, while adding a colonial dimension to it, as 
well as reversing Rose‟s methodology and looking at the effect social relations had 
upon the execution of state politics.  
                                                          
9
 Mark Francis, Governors & Settlers: Images of Authority in the British Colonies, 1820-60 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992). 
10
 Zoe Laidlaw, Colonial Connections (Manchester: MUP, 2005). 
11
 Kenneth Rose, Curzon: A Most Superior Person (London: Macmillan, 1985 [1969]). 
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Curzon‟s principal biographers tend to deliver a uniform verdict when it comes 
to assessing his time in India. Penderel Moon notes that with Curzon as Governor-
General, the „Government of India became for a while very nearly an autocracy… [but] 
the outcome of his seven years of office was politically not at all what he intended.‟12 
S. Gopal, who has produced some of the most insightful Indian scholarship on Curzon, 
explains this by stating that „the essence of [successful administration] is an easy 
command of men, and of this Curzon was incapable.‟13 Other have theorised that 
Curzon was disinclined to teamwork rather than being incapable of it; David Gilmour 
observes that „Curzon never tried to delegate,‟14 and also that he did not listen, or 
rather, engage with people in a position to advice him about anything.
15
 While 
Gilmour does not assess Curzon‟s ability to convince people in India, this point is not 
taken up by David Dilks,
16
 either, whose sympathetic biography does not really 
engage with Curzon‟s dealings with his Indian colleagues in detail. Thus the 
negotiations, the deliberations and the ups and downs that Curzon experienced in his 
efforts to get Mackworth Young, Antony MacDonnell, Arthur Havelock, Lord 
Ampthill, Lords Sandhurst and Northcote to agree to his reforms, go un-explored.  
This may be, in part, due to the assumption that because these functionaries were 
anyway Curzon‟s subordinates, how they interacted with him would not affect him 
politically; but, as Peter King has shown, a perceived slight to any individual could be 
crucial in turning that person against the Viceroy.
17
 King, however, confines his 
discussions to the Kitchener Affair, whereas this thesis expands that theme to include 
the rest of the Government of India. 
                                                          
12
 Sir Penderel Moon, The British Conquest and Dominion of India (London: Duckworth, 1989), 911.  
13
 S. Gopal, British Policy in India, 1858-1905 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 225.  
14
 David Gilmour, Curzon: Imperial Statesman (London: John Muray, 1994), 216.  
15
 Gilmour, Curzon, 256.  
16
 David Dilks, Curzon in India, Vol. 1: Achievement and Vol. 2: Frustration (London: Rupert Hart 
Davis, 1969). 
17
 Peter King, The Viceroy’s Fall: How Kitchener Destroyed Curzon (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 
1986), 98-102. 
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 These blanket statements, and often the particular historiographic approach 
adopted,  - for example Gilmour‟s biographical narrative leaves little room for in-
depth analysis or the application of inter-disciplinary concepts to seven years of an 
action packed life-  mean that neither Curzon‟s team-building skills, nor his skills at 
political manipulation, have been explored, because the assumption is that he did not 
listen to anyone‟s opinions (or opposition), which of course precludes the possibility 
of  arguing with, and persuading, or coercing, them into seeing his side of the matter.   
In fact there are many questions relating to the level of authority exercised by 
Curzon in India that have either not been explored in detail, or not explored from a 
particular angle, or overlooked by scholars, the most glaring omission being that of  
Curzon‟s relationship with Lord Ampthill,  Governor of Madras 1900-1906 and 
Curzon‟s locum  in 1904. The exploration of this relationship and the questions it 
throws up about power and influence forms the secondary theme of this thesis, and is 
explored in detail in Chapters 2, 3 and 5.  
The question of how Curzon engaged with, and persuaded (or not) people to 
support the legislation he pushed through has also not been explored.  It is true that his 
contretemps with the India Council over its refusal to accede to some of his requests 
has been cited as proof of his intractability and inability to persuade through 
negotiation, but this analysis has never been extended to include his provincial 
governors, the Indian Civil Service and the Indians. Also unexplored is the degree to 
which, if at all, his influence over his colleagues waxed and waned throughout his 
term in office; if such were the case, it would suggest that his influence throughout his 
Viceroyalty was not uniform, rather subjective and  dependent on time, and place, and 
the person he was dealing with.  
17 
 
There are assumptions about Curzon in India, too, germane to the question of his 
authority and influence, which have gained popular currency even when there is a case 
for refuting them through historical evidence, a prime example being the popular 
contention that he was simultaneously ineffectual and autocratic, and that he did not 
have the influence, nor leave the legacy, he sought, precisely because of his autocracy. 
This assumption, along with Curzon‟s well-known penchant for doing everything 
himself, has led to a tacit understanding among scholars of Empire that Curzon was 
not a team player. Winston Churchill, a contemporary who observed Curzon in India, 
states that the ultimate transience of Curzon‟s legacy lay in the fact that he could 
never, because of his lack of knowledge of handling men, found a dedicated band of 
followers. 
18
  
This thesis attempts to address, and refute, this contention as well. This thesis 
examines the above questions using Curzon‟s relationship with various significant 
components of the then political landscape of the Government of India, devoting a 
chapter to each of the significant areas where Curzon‟s impact needs further 
elucidation. It deliberately explores these questions in the context of Curzon‟s 
domestic, or internal, administration, because this was the area he was least 
knowledgeable about when he assumed office, and also the area where current and 
former Indian administrators, and of course the Indians themselves,  could pose, by 
virtue of their long experience, the strongest challenge to his primacy.  
It consists of seven chapters, this introductory section that sets out the aims and 
methodology of the thesis, as well as providing a guideline to its format, and a 
concluding summation. Most of the thesis is derived from interpretations and 
deductions from primary material, and these derivations are listed out in Aids and 
                                                          
18
 Winston S. Churchill, Great Contemporaries (London: Leo Cooper, 1990 [1932]), 173-184. 
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Constraints to the free functioning of Viceregal Power.  This chapter, split into two 
and sited at the start and end of the core chapters, lists the operative factors that 
determined to what extent the Viceroy was able to exercise untrammeled power, as a 
prelude to understanding the dynamics set forth in the later chapters. The factors that 
helped, and those that acted as a check, were both of a specific as well as generic 
nature. At times something that was a source of support could also, simultaneously, 
not endear the Viceroy to those who were his partners in governance. A simplistic, 
descriptive list of both, with clear cut bullet point style analysis, will be a reference 
chapter for the core parts of the thesis. The factors so far identified as aids to Curzon‟s 
hegemony over Indian decision making are a mix of the personal, the collective, and 
the abstractions of the offices of power: his authority as derived from expert 
knowledge of Asian affairs and his enthusiasm for reform, along with the prestige 
accorded to the office of Viceroy („Everyone here is in mortal funk of the august 
being‟)19  helped him gain the confidence of what was then alleged by his detractors to 
be a compliant Viceroy‟s Council.  But the traditionally hierarchical structure, even in 
a federal Raj, ensured that Curzon automatically gained the following not only of his 
Council, but also the Indian Civil Service at large; no matter how they grumbled, they 
were undoubtedly stirred by his hands-on approach as they were themselves products 
of a system that prided itself on the personal touch. The growing trend towards 
centralisation in India also did much to ultimately pull the provincial governments into 
line. Finally, Mary Leiter, by many accounts, charmed much of British in India. But 
not all of them; the very things that helped the Viceroy be an absolute executor of 
Indian polity could serve as obstacles to the same.  Many of Curzon‟s political 
colleagues did not think Mary a suitable person to be a Viceroy‟s wife, and certainly 
                                                          
19
 Mary Leiter to Brodrick, n.d., in Nigel Nicolson, Mary Curzon (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
1977), 129.  
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not Curzon‟s; one of those who was of this opinion was St. John Brodrick, whose role 
in the Kitchener affair highlights how British Cabinet and Party Politics impinged 
upon what was not really their prerogative at all. In this Curzon‟s political rivals at 
Home roped in, by virtue of their offices, the Secretary of State and the India Office‟s 
India Council members; and since these were old Indian Civil Service (ICS) hands as 
well, they had very decided views on what Indian policy should be. Past Viceroys, on 
the other hand, tended to be supportive, having possibly faced the same mires. Not so 
the senior bureaucrats and Governors in India; they could be obstructive, especially 
the ones in charge of the major Presidencies, as the chapters below will illustrate. 
Finally, the Cabinet, personal equations aside, was also impelled to constrain the 
Viceroy, given that they had to assess the fallout of his perceived excessive 
championing of Indian affairs on the Empire at large, as well as domestic and 
diplomatic opinions. An old India hand critiquing the Viceroy would definitely get an 
ear, given that he had an on-the-spot experience of Indian administration that no 
incumbent Viceroy usually had; they were essentially detached from the Indian scene.  
 The third and fourth chapters look at the struggles over the sharing of power 
within the administrative corpus of British India, i.e. among the expatriate British.  
Chapter 3, The Ordering of Subordination in the Presidencies, examines the power 
equations between Simla and the presidencies of Bombay and Madras, as they fought, 
in the face of Curzon‟s centralisation plans, to uphold their „ancient autonomy,‟ and 
how, despite this, eventually forged a strong bond with the Viceroy.  The chapter will 
use Curzon‟s relationship with the Second Baron Ampthill as a central case study, as 
Ampthill was Governor of Madras for all of Curzon‟s Viceroyalty and also acting 
Viceroy when Curzon went Home on leave in 1904, and focus on the Viceroy‟s less 
intense engagement with the Governors of the Bombay Presidency (as opposed to his 
20 
 
administrative work in the same presidency) as a means to highlight the flaws in the 
functioning of the administration of these two presidencies. This chapter contends that, 
despite Curzon‟s unrelenting interest in Indian affairs even when on leave, Ampthill‟s 
acting Viceroyalty was a case of empowering a subordinate by delegating authority to 
him, allowing him discretion as to how he would use the powers conferred upon 
him.
20
 The major sources utilized are the private papers of the major figureheads, 
specifically the sections which contain their official correspondence with each other, 
the  contention being that there is much to be revealed in the language of diplomacy. 
But below this was a layer of Indian rulers functioning under the regulations of 
paramountcy, whom Curzon was interested in guiding along the paths of correct 
governing habits. There was also an emerging, if somewhat struggling, Indian 
intelligentsia, who were striving towards participation in governance. At this stage, 
however, they rarely clashed on equal terms with the British, and remained only 
subjects of discussion. The princes participated in governance more equally, but they 
were still not co-opted seamlessly into the Raj corpus, much as Curzon would have 
liked them to be. In a sense, these three spheres operated largely independently of 
each other. Where these disparate elements that together constituted the Indian Empire 
did come together was in London, where the Indian Empire was viewed in 
dispassionate entirety. But the coalescing was again not seamless; power struggles in 
London meant that the fragmented nature of the constituents in British India came 
ever more to the fore as each was variously backed by its proponents. However much 
of an expert on Asiatic affairs Curzon might have been in himself, without the 
sanction of the Government his knowledge did not confer upon him the right to 
exercise power. As Weber notes, authority derived on rational grounds could be said 
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to be „ resting on a belief in the “legality” of patterns of normative rules and the right 
of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands.‟21 In other words, 
being appointed as Viceroy by the British Cabinet endowed Curzon with the authority 
to run the administration of India within the parameters of the powers allocated to the 
Viceroy.  To this end Chapter 2, Constitutional Subordination to London?,
 
explores 
how the Viceroy was ultimately bound to subordination to London. In the earlier half 
of Curzon‟s term, there was no obvious power block in London; the Secretary of State 
George Hamilton liaised between Curzon, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, 
and the British Cabinet and India Council. How this delicate balance of power was 
maintained is the core of this chapter, which also seeks to analyse why, post-1903, 
Curzon‟s relations with Whitehall became increasingly acrimonious and why he 
chafed indignantly under their attempted control. As stated elsewhere, it explores the 
triangle of Curzon-George Hamilton- Arthur Godley, against the backdrop of an 
increasingly tempestuous Viceregal equation with the British Cabinet. It looks at the 
conflation of personal and constitutional struggles for supremacy and how this 
affected Viceregal ability to legislate freely.  As noted here, as well as in Chapter 5, 
Ampthill could be considered to be acting as a „delegate‟ of Curzon‟s, given that it 
was him he had replaced, and his line that he followed. But since the Viceroy was 
constitutionally subordinate to the Secretary of State and the India Office, could not 
Brodrick rightfully assume that Ampthill as a delegate was answerable to him, not to 
the person he was replacing, and should therefore do his bidding as opposed to 
Curzon‟s, if it came to the choosing?  It is the first of the core chapters because the 
India Office was supposed to be the place where all loose ends were tied up.  
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The Kitchener Affair has been exhaustively speculated on and worked on; 
however, as a study in backroom intrigue and the importance of the „political‟ as also 
„intangibles,‟ it has few parallels in the administrative history of the British in India. 
Chapter 5, An Officer and a Gentleman? English hiatus, Ampthill and the 
Kitchener Affair therefore explores this; albeit looking closely at the negotiations 
Kitchener employed to swing opinion against the Viceroy. It also explores the extent 
to which the Kitchener affair was used as a smokescreen by people who would have 
been only too happy had Curzon resigned on some other pretext. This chapter  also 
examines intensively the „Ampthill angle‟- the degree to which Curzon‟s England 
hiatus and Ampthill‟s acting Viceroyalty enabled Kitchener and the Home 
Government to cement a web of intrigue around the Viceroy. Delegation here proved 
costly to Curzon, and for Ampthill, sticking up for Curzon while being his locum cost 
him the succession to the Viceroyalty. To what extent was the India Office used by 
Kitchener as a pawn to induce Curzon to resign? Was Ampthill‟s acting Viceroyalty, 
an exemplary  illustration of what may be termed „downward delegation,‟22 the one 
phase of Curzon‟s time in office where he managed to do what people said he was 
incapable of- delegate authority effectively and constructively? 
As mentioned above, the Princes and the emergent Indian intelligentsia also had 
pretty intense relations with Curzon.  Authority can only be said to be exercised if 
there is someone, or something, to exercise it over. Thus, „authority is in some sense 
conferred by those who obey it.‟23 If the people, (or even Curzon‟s subordinates), had 
chosen to protest and abstained from carrying out his orders, he could not be said to 
possess any hold, any authority or power over them- a principle which the Mahatma 
was to apply with so much success almost three decades later. Chapter 6, 
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Communalism, Imperialism and the Dialogue of Inequality: Curzon and the 
Indian Intelligentsia, explores the Viceroyalty as it touched on the following points: 
The Congress in Western India, Indian Muslims, the Partition of Bengal, and the 
Punjab Land Alienation Act. These will be explored to find out what view Curzon 
took of India‟s religio-political landscape, and assess the reactions of Indians to 
Curzonian polity, insofar as it touched upon their ethnic identities.  
Finally, Curzon also had other sources of power at his disposal, instruments that 
would help him carry out what he wanted to do.  Paramount among these was the 
Indian Civil Service, the steel frame of India, the bureaucracy. The ICS was what was 
supposed to be holding the Indian administration together. As Weber notes,  
 
„as an instrument for “societalizing” relations of power, bureaucracy has 
been and is a power instrument of the first order- for the one who controls the 
bureaucratic apparatus…the official is entrusted with specialised tasks and 
normally the machine cannot be put into motion or arrested by him, but only from 
the very top.‟24  
 
And Curzon always viewed himself as the privileged head of the ICS. This 
chapter uses this opportunity to delve into how the ICS received Curzon; he was 
generally held to be carrying out an impossible programme of reforms, and general 
accounts picture him as having little patience with civil servants. Contrary to the well-
hinted at view that he was resented, research done for this thesis has not come across 
any active evidence of strained ties with that body. Chapter 4, The Provinces: Head 
of the ICS? addresses this issue by exploring how the relationship between Centre 
and Provinces expressed itself over matters of a] administration; e.g. Punjab, (the 
creation of) NWFP, United Provinces, and over issues of b) „paramountcy.‟   So while 
Chapters 1 and 3-7 deal with specific issues, personalities and incidences that posed a 
                                                          
24
 Weber, On Charisma, 75.  Italics mine.  
24 
 
challenge to Curzon‟s authority in India, the first half of Chapter 2 takes a more 
diffused look at the same, opting for a generic analysis of the reasons why Curzon and 
the India Office battled for supremacy, and utilises the conclusions to further analyse 
London‟s role in Curzon‟s relationships with the other parties examined in this thesis.  
As noted, this thesis is also a refutation of some of the contentions laid out by 
Curzon‟s principal biographers; Kenneth Rose, David Dilks, S. Gopal and David 
Gilmour, all of whom gain legitimacy because their conclusions are based on readings 
of the personal papers of the principal actors; this thesis counters their contentions 
about Curzon‟s poor personnel management skills limiting his clout using largely the 
same sources. Most biographies and studies of Curzon in India are largely the product 
of empiricist research, and that method -„scientific history, based on the rigorous 
investigation of primary sources‟-25 therefore lends itself best to making a counter-
point to the already extant corpus.  
This thesis is, therefore, almost exclusively based on close readings of the 
private papers of the major players in the administration of Curzon‟s India; indeed, it 
seeks to bring out original interpretations from these hackneyed sources for the study 
of the British in India. With regard to the private papers, it is often only Curzon‟s – 
and others‟- more flamboyant pronouncements contained therein that are quoted in 
historical monographs.  The thesis has instead utilised, and thus set in an academic 
context, many of the unused parts of the relevant primary sources, thus making a 
move away from the oft-quoted principal sections of the Curzon Papers. This is the 
rationale behind choosing the specific chapter contents, because they offer scope  to 
delve within the hitherto apparently  unexplored portions of the Curzon papers, and 
other relevant satellite documentation. It is axiomatic that, adjunct to the official 
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correspondence of Curzon and the leading administrators of British India, the private 
correspondences of these very individuals would provide a second, possibly tangential 
interpretation of the politics of power and decision making. In line with the empiricist 
approach followed throughout the thesis, however, private correspondence is 
understood to mean non-official correspondence with relevant individuals, as opposed 
to more domestic or social interchanges.  
The major collections sourced from the British Library‟s India Office Private 
Papers are necessarily those of Curzon, Hamilton, Godley and Ampthill. The Curzon-
Hamilton correspondence may be considered to be of great value, not only because of 
the revelations it contains about the dynamics of a vibrant official relationship, but 
because of the detailed discussions over matters of policy, sans rancour, that give a 
glimpse into how the ideals and intentions of Indian polity evolved and the reasoning 
they were based upon. The Curzon Collection [Curzon Papers] is the one that has been 
most extensively mined, in part because of its centrality to the thesis, and also because 
all official and demi-official Viceregal correspondence to and from most individuals 
of note was always printed in full by the Government of India, thus giving the 
researcher access to an exhaustive chronological database of comprehensively 
categorised primary documents. In addition the Curzon Collection contains copies of 
the major reports and findings produced by various investigating bodies throughout 
his Viceroyalty, which are essential for understanding the background against which 
administrative power was contended for. The summaries of his administration by the 
many departments of the Government of India, and the government notes he 
produced, are the best and most comprehensive source for his Viceroyalty, and they 
even provide some pointers as to how his ideas were received by the ICS. 
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In addition to these are the records of the India Council; the India Council 
records are not of great importance to the study of the hypothesis propounded in 
Curzon in India, primarily because it is a thesis that examines personal linkages 
between the prominent politicians, statesmen and governors of the time. The aim of 
Chapter 2, devoted in part to the Council of India is to highlight the individual 
personalities of the Councillors, and these were expressed through the public speeches 
and correspondence with other politicians.  
This thesis also relies heavily on the memoirs and diaries produced in such 
profusion by the Victorian governing classes, and India hands in particular. To 
complement analyses of officials whose correspondences and minutiae are scattered or 
patchy, especially in the case of fringe players, it also draws upon the many Lives, 
produced by members of the inner circle for each other.  In addition to being 
biographically informative, and pointers towards primary sources, these Lives, being 
contemporary insights from social peers, provide an ideological point of retreat that 
enables one to rationalise an individual‟s actions as an administrator.  
In sum, the thesis seeks to examine the challenges mounted against Curzon‟s 
authority in India, and the means by which he surmounted – or failed to- these 
challenges. 
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Chapter One 
 
The Viceroy’s Aids to Power. 
 
 
For the strength of the Pack is the Wolf, and the strength of the Wolf is the Pack. 
 
                                                                              -Rudyard Kipling, The Jungle Book.  
 
 
 
 
Power  and its exercise are not stand alone phenomena; they are supported by 
other, possibly independent, factors, which may be termed „instruments for the 
exercise of power.‟1  The history of British India from Clive to Curzon finds a glory in 
the fact of a coterie of traders single-handedly conquering an entire sub-continent; and 
Curzon‟s claim that if one wanted a thing well-done, it was best to do it oneself, is 
quoted by old India hands not without a sense of the romance of its misguided valour; 
but Plassey was won in conjunction, and with the support, of what may best be 
described as a sidekick. Similarly Curzon was aided by a host of factors which helped 
him exercise his ex-officio power. This chapter will examine factors that helped him 
wield the kind of influence he wanted to over the administration of India and the 
people responsible for assenting the policies of the Government of India.  
 Nigel Nicolson notes that Curzon started out with very many advantages as 
compared to other recent incumbents of the Viceregal chair; „the respect of the House 
of Commons, his intimate friendship with leading men in Government and 
Opposition, their conviction that only Curzon was capable of reforming Indian 
administration from top to bottom.‟2 While the precise advantages may be subject to 
question, and indeed have been refuted by other research, there is no denying that 
Curzon benefited vastly from a set of factors which colluded to ensure he ran the 
Government of India as much his own way as possible. Some of these factors helped 
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him clinch his appointment and launch out smoothly; some came to light and 
developed over the course of his term.  The very fact of his succeeding the incumbents 
he did ensured that he was viewed as a welcome change. His predecessors counted 
among themselves the languid Elgin,  of whom it was said that he should never have 
left his Scottish estate, Lansdowne, not really very outstanding, and Lytton, whose 
foreign policy was largely dominated by Salisbury in London. Given this, a Viceroy 
with boundless zeal, who had already circumnavigated the globe- and produced a pile 
of authoritative volumes on geo-politics out of it- was a viewed with a sense of relief 
that India, in India, would have the benefit of an interested administrator.  
Sociology has greatly enriched history as a discipline; a cross-disciplinary study 
of the dynamics between Curzon and the people he worked with provides the 
formatting, and the main theme of the thesis- executive power and its limits.   
In the context of the thesis, the term power is used to denote an individual‟s 
ability to influence, the ability to administrate and have an administration run 
according to one‟s wishes. Though different types of power have been identified by 
social scientists, perhaps the most relevant in assessing the dynamics of Curzon‟s 
relationships with his fellow statesmen and administrators are Dowding‟s „outcome 
power‟ and „social power.‟ Dowding identifies the former as the „ability of an actor to 
bring about or help bring about outcomes,‟ which can be applied to Curzon‟s 
enormous determination to see through every one of his 12 planned reforms.
3
 The 
second, social power, according to Dowding, is the „ability of an actor to deliberately 
to change the incentive structure of another actor or actors to bring about or help to 
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bring about outcomes.‟4 Though Dowding does not mention it, the two types of power 
have the potential to clash, and affect the actions brought about by each other. This 
was patently obvious in Curzon‟s case; his notorious lack of people skills negated 
much of his administrative brilliance, simply because he rubbed up people the wrong 
way while pushing through much needed legislation. A third type of power relevant to 
Curzon‟s administration has been identified by Foucault as „pastoral power,‟ power 
wherein the „aim of government is to promote the well-being of its subjects by means 
of detailed and comprehensive regulation of their behaviour,‟ and which is, thus, 
„concerned more with the welfare of its subjects than with their liberty.‟ 5  No 
contemporary statesman could have been more zealous than Curzon in planning 
famine relief, plague sanitation and stamping out race-related crimes, yet he would not 
entrust a modicum of autonomy to the very people whose welfare he was so solicitous 
about. And, in conclusion, power has to be exercised over someone, made manifest, 
before an individual can be said to possess it: „others must also accept his power and 
thereby confirm it; it becomes the common meaning of a relationship between the 
individuals. Power…requires reciprocal recognition…‟ 6  Was this the case with 
Curzon? 
* 
 
For the sociologist, Nicolson‟s list of the advantages he perceived Curzon to 
have started out with transmute into underlying causes that contributed to Curzon‟s 
exercise (successful or otherwise) of Viceregal power. These underlying factors are 
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instrumental in understanding the differing nature of power exercised by different 
individuals. Robert Dahl identifies them as being  
„an individual‟s own time, money, credit and wealth; control over 
information; esteem or social standing; the possession of charisma; popularity; 
legitimacy; legality…the rights pertaining to public office; solidarity; the 
capacity of a member of one segment of society to evoke support from others 
who identify him as like themselves…‟7  
 
Assessing the particular  factors that aided and hindered Curzon‟s running of his 
Indian administration demonstrates that Dahl‟s list, in fact, tallies very neatly with the 
setting of Curzon‟s office.  
Curzon‟s world view was defined by sets of attributes he possessed, by 
ideologies he adhered to, by the people and ideas he came into contact with. For 
instance, it is safe to assume that Curzon‟s righteous and rigidly mapped out views 
about the running of the administration were congruent with a „less-the-better‟ 
approach towards uninformed opposition.  He candidly professed that he knew more 
about the problems of India than anyone else, by virtue of having expended his adult 
life studying them, and this in fact was one factor that earned him the right to do what 
he liked, largely, as regards governing the country.  A large part of  Curzon‟s authority 
was, in fact, derived from his expert knowledge of Asian affairs. To start with, this 
was the factor which, overriding all other concerns, was the one which ensured that 
Curzon was appointed as Viceroy, In fact, it may be said that it was solely on the 
strength of this one virtue that he applied for, and was granted, the Viceregal office, 
and this was no mean achievement considering that the trend then was towards 
proconsuls who knew little about India and were much too intimidated to learn more. 
Curzon‟s knowledge gave him an edge. As noted in Chapter 4, it was this which 
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enabled him to override the objections of Mackworth Young, Governor of Punjab, 
when carving out the NWFP from that Province.   
This section, drawing upon the events analysed in the core chapters, examines 
what factors enabled Curzon to exercise as much power and authority as he liked, 
unfettered and unhampered. It lists the people and  phenomena responsible for 
helping, or supporting him, push through and execute legislation, planning and 
pronouncements that tallied with his self-styled plan for governing the Indian Empire. 
Two factors need to be gauged: the lack of opposition he was confronted with, and the 
level of support he was given, each of which would have very different implications 
on the outcome of his actions, even though they might have enabled the same thing: 
letting Curzon have his way. As Dowding states, „political power is qualified by the 
fact that the people who exercise it make, [consciously], the decisions they do after 
weighing the underlying factors. It is a rational exercise.‟8 From this one may infer 
that it is not the individual‟s sole and unfettered will which he himself, even, takes 
into account when making political decisions. 
What, then, were the well-springs of support that Curzon drew upon? There are 
two kinds of resources of power; „bases of resources that make possible its exercise‟9 
and „resources [the individual] brings to the power relation that enable him to exercise 
power.‟10 People could be classified as the former; but unless the individual wishing to 
exercise power makes some effort to co-opt them, they would remain an unutilised 
resource. Thus, ultimately, it is the individual‟s own will-to-power that is crucial in 
determining, at the very least, his efforts to exercise authority. Thus, there are factors 
intrinsic to the individual‟s mental make up, factors circumstantial to his setting, and 
factors totally extrinsic- for example, other people, who may have their own – often 
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conflicting- self –interests in aiding the individual who seeks to attain power. This 
chapter divides Curzon‟s „resources of power‟ into two main categories; the people 
and the circumstantial.  
Superficially, it would not appear that people could be an asset to Curzon in his 
quest for power and authority, as it has been assumed by even his admirers that „a 
Curzon kindergarten…a band of younger men who gave him total allegiance and 
implemented his principles and policies with full understanding… was 
inconceivable.‟11 But, as shall be demonstrated below, this was in fact what happened. 
Curzon may have tossed away some of the advantages his prodigious skills afforded 
him by alienating a great many of the people who were best placed to help him 
maximise his impact upon Indian administration, but nevertheless, there were certain 
people who smoothed the path of the Viceroyalty greatly, and their roles will be 
examined in subsequent chapters. They were: 
 
George Hamilton: George Francis Hamilton had been Secretary of State for 
India for three years when Curzon was appointed Viceroy, an appointment Hamilton 
regarded with some circumspection, given Curzon‟s reputation for Russophobia.12 But 
the Curzon-Hamilton relationship was one of the more successful partnerships of 
Curzon‟s time in India; as Dilks notes, had Curzon agreed to have, in 1905,  the 
investigating committee over the issue of the Military Supply Member out, the 
outcome would almost certainly have gone against Kitchener, because Hamilton was 
to have been on the committee.
13
  Of course, the most important reason that Hamilton 
backed Curzon was because he – Curzon- could be trusted to know what was what in 
relation to India, and Hamilton knew this.  It is noteworthy that Curzon‟s most 
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significant legislation came in when Hamilton was at the India Office; but Hamilton‟s 
value did not only lie in being a more accommodating Secretary of State than 
Brodrick (he colluded with Curzon over leaving out Mackworth Young from the 
deliberations over creating the NWFP);- in himself, George Hamilton actively backed 
Curzon‟s measures; his actions helped deflect criticism of Curzon from others in the 
India Office or the Cabinet.  The relationship between Curzon and Hamilton, in fact, 
was one of collusion, somewhat like the rapport the heads of two otherwise mutually 
hostile states might share. The reasons put forth by Curzon‟s biographers are that 
Hamilton agreed with many of Curzon‟s ideas in principle, and also that he had 
occupied his post long enough to assert this, and that finally, he had no incentive to 
prove himself against Curzon, unlike his successor and Curzon‟s schoolmate St. John 
Brodrick. But one needs to theorise about the self-incentives available to Hamilton via 
this support for Curzon- what did he stand to gain? 
Hamilton, whatever his personal inclinations were, ultimately derived his power 
by being part of the machine that was the India Office. He held constitutional power 
over Curzon, but his own power was not autonomous; it was derived from something 
extrinsic to himself. In a large organisation, Foucault noted, „one doesn‟t have …a 
power which is wholly in the hands of one person who can exercise it alone and 
totally over others. It is a machine in which everyone is caught, those who exercise 
power just as much as those over whom it is exercised.‟14 Thus is not unreasonable to 
expect that the two parties might collude to protect their interests from the power that 
is superior to both of them. Hamilton, who liked to keep the peace, lived in fear of a 
parliamentary investigation into Indian affairs.
15
 Curzon, who did not particularly care 
about the peace, had no such inhibitions, and unwittingly made the burden of pouring 
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oil onto the troubled water over to Hamilton, who readily assumed it. This may have 
been, because, as can be evidenced from the many times Hamilton tried to reason with 
Curzon,  while he had „power to‟ over Curzon, but he did not have „power over‟16 to 
make him do things Curzon was disinclined to doing.  This can be attributed to 
historical circumstances- Hamilton‟s position was cramped at the India Office. 
Brodrick could attempt the carrot-and-stick method with Curzon (that Curzon did not 
take notice of it being quite another matter) because he was part of a close-knit ruling 
cabinet. But Hamilton was prevented by circumstances from using incentive structures. 
As long as Salisbury was alive and in power, Hamilton was not in a position to make a 
conditional incentive, given that this could be over-ridden by a directive from 
Salisbury, whose protégé Curzon was. Nor could he make an unconditional threat 
because he was ultimately subject to the censure of Godley, the permanent Under-
Secretary who wielded tremendous influence.  Also, as noted above, he did not have 
„power over‟ Curzon because Curzon knew – and Hamilton knew, and admitted, that 
he knew- more than he did about India. In this instance Curzon‟s prowess won out 
over Hamilton‟s. He was able to put down enough unconditional incentives – or 
threats- ensuring that these were successful by pre-committing himself to carrying 
them out (in his case this meant resignation) in the event of non-compliance to his 
wishes from the India Office and Whitehall. 
17
 All this meant that Curzon enjoyed the 
support of the Secretary of State, and thus had a voice in London while in India. 
Hamilton was, in every sense, a mediator. 
Finally, Hamilton also appears to have known how to handle Godley and the delicate 
subject of sharing Curzon‟s correspondence with him.   
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Lord Ampthill: When Curzon expostulated against the absurdity of a man of 
thirty-four being handed the Viceroyalty while he himself went on leave, Hamilton 
observed that at least Ampthill would keep up the ceremonial side of the Viceregal 
office very well.
18
 But there was substance behind Ampthill‟s self-assured façade; it 
was not the only point where he resembled Curzon. Indeed, one of the major themes 
of this thesis is the assertion that Ampthill‟s backing was Curzon‟s major support 
during the intrigue ridden final months of his Viceroyalty.  
Ampthill in his capacity as Lieutenant-Governor of Madras has been more 
often utilised by historians to demonstrate the friction laden relationship between 
Simla and the presidencies, but as Chapters 2, 3 and 5 demonstrate,  having a 
Governor like Ampthill greatly aided Curzon in the later stages of his Viceroyalty. It 
was not just over the major incidents that Ampthill supported his chief; their views on 
many aspects of administration tallied. This enabled the creation of a uniform 
characteristic of administration across India, enabling the ruling British to present a 
homogeneous façade before the governed. As in the case of Hamilton, it helped that 
Ampthill, when not considering solely the parochial interests of Madras Presidency, 
had much the same political views as Curzon. For instance he was the Governor who 
most closely matched Curzon‟s attitudes towards Indians. He seems to have shared 
Curzon‟s dislike of the „hybrid university educated mule,‟ stating that „the unofficial 
native
19
 of the Madras Presidency, who is competent to serve on a big Commission or 
to pronounce opinions worth having on any big question, is practically non-existent. It 
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is a sad fact that we have no prominent men outside the ranks of Judges, Barristers 
and officials.‟20 Yet he was also, as shall be seen in Chapter 3, one of the first to 
institute affirmative action for Indians from the depressed classes, much as Curzon 
strove for a humane treatment of all Indians. As an instrument for the delegation of 
political power, thus, Ampthill was eminently suitable for Curzon‟s preferred style of 
administration. One only wonders whether, had Ampthill instead of Sandhurst or 
Northcote, been Governor of Bombay, the intellectual seat of the nationalist 
movement, the said movement would have survived his term of office.  
But it was as Acting Viceroy in 1904 that Ampthill really helped Curzon keep a 
hold over Indian polity, by the simple process of sticking, in the face of increasing 
opposition from the India Office, to Curzon‟s line of thought. That he did so 
demonstrates that Curzon exercised a certain amount of authority over Ampthill. 
Ampthill‟s acting Viceroyalty was an example of the successful delegation of power. 
Ampthill also helped Curzon by refusing to be taken, or to act, lightly because of the 
temporary nature of his term in office. The connection between power and 
responsibility can be said to be „essentially negative: you can deny all responsibility 
by demonstrating lack of power;‟21 but Ampthill did not resort to this tactic. He did 
not give in to the demands of the India Office once he had decided to follow Curzon‟s 
line in administrative affairs, even though it would have been beneficial for him to do 
so. Ampthill goes against the accepted model seen by theorists; that it is safe to stick 
to one ideology because it affords protection within the group and also requires less 
effort than changing it. 
22
 He not only turned around his initial working relationship 
with Curzon, (which, following the best of centre- provincial tradition, started off 
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acrimoniously), but did not return to his initial position even when explicitly 
encouraged by the India Office to do so. It was found  by French and Synder that 
„opponents who changed their opinions (as Ampthill did about Curzon) toward the 
leader…were more certain of their new opinions. Within groups there was a trend in 
the same direction.‟23 This latter statement is also true of Curzon‟s Viceroyalty; his 
relationship with Ampthill settled down just as his relationship with the Governor of 
Bombay, Northcote, blossomed. This, is, however, in line with accepted theoretical 
models. The increasing degree of willing followership that Ampthill assumed in 
relation to Curzon can also be vindicated by the same study: „the more the group 
leader is accepted by another member of the group, the more effective will be his 
attempts to influence this member.‟24 Ampthill, thus, is the refutation of Gopal‟s claim 
that Curzon never gathered any followers. 
 Mary Leiter: Curzon‟s biographers have universally noted that it was at 
variance with his character that he married an American, their justification for this 
stance being that a person so rooted in English patriarchal modes of being would 
prefer to source a wife from a similar background, to supplant his cementing within 
that sub-culture. But as other observers have pointed out, Anglo-American alliances 
were rather popular in the late Victorian period,
25
 and Curzon, as has been 
demonstrated earlier, was very much in tune with contemporary social nuances; in fact 
he moulded himself, consciously or unconsciously, upon what he perceived an ideal 
young man of that age should be like, and therefore it is not uncommon that with 
respect to matrimony too, he should have chosen a wife in accordance with what was 
commonly taking place among his peers and contemporaries.  
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Of course, Curzon‟s primary motive in marrying the Chicago born Mary Leiter, 
it has been hypothesised – and dismissed- by Nicolson, Gilmour and Kenneth Rose,  
was not social conformity, but money. This brings us to the first and most concrete 
way in which Curzon‟s marriage facilitated his having an easier time as Viceroy; 
financially, it enabled him to take up the Viceroyalty, which it is doubtful that he 
would otherwise have been able to do. As Mary‟s biographer observes, Levi Leiter 
made a marriage settlement of £140 000 and in addition granted Mary an allowance of 
£6000 per annum. Even after Joseph Leiter‟s disastrous attempt to corner the 
American grain market just as Curzon was taking up the Viceroyalty, Levi helped out 
with £3000.
26
 As Kenneth Galbraith noted, the “power of property” was extremely 
high in the later years of the nineteenth century. By this he meant that property – 
wealth in the form of cash, land, and other assets- accorded power to its possessor. 
Drawing upon this, it may be argued that in Curzon‟s case, property – his, via his 
wife‟s- was the integument that held his Viceroyalty together.27   
Observers have also noted that Mary helped his Viceroyalty in a very politically 
tangible way by making efforts to reach out to official and non-official sections of the 
populace and the British in India, something Edwina Mountbatten was to achieve with 
a good deal more success forty-seven years later. She seemed more accessible than 
Curzon, (she was at her most effective when people sought her intercession, and not 
when she tried to change the course of political relations), and there probably existed a 
feeling that she could change his stance on certain issues, which of course, she self-
admittedly could not. The perception of accessibility may have evolved simply 
because she was not actually vested with formal office and the distance such office 
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instils between the office holder and the lay public. Still, even Curzon‟s estranged 
Punjab governor wrote to her seeking to normalise relations,  
„you have always been very kind to me and I can‟t tell you how much I 
have valued your friendship…it is through no act of mine that the cessation of 
friendly relations between Viceregal Lodge and Barnes Court has come about. 
Someone has evidently carried false reports about me to H.E. the Viceroy, 
and he actually believes that I have „vilified and abused‟ him all over 
Simla.‟28 
 
The third and final way, and one for which we have Curzon‟s strongest admission, in 
which Mary helped Curzon‟s Viceroyalty was by being his wife, and by her way of 
carrying this out. If being undemanding and supportive fits rather too well into the 
modes of classical wifehood, it should be remembered that this was what Curzon 
wanted and expected from a wife and Vicereine, and possibly because he felt that this 
did indeed provide him with the best possible support than a wife who typed his letters, 
it just might have done so, mostly because of the mental solace it afforded him.  
While this thesis does not seek to analyse Mary Leiter‟s role in making or 
breaking Curzon‟s political fortunes, it is worth a mention. While that was an age in 
which boudoir conspiracy was the norm- one has only to look at Lady Salisbury‟s part 
in the Kitchener Affair, or the concern over Margot Tennant marrying H.H. Asquith, 
to understand the much larger role backroom scenes played in that era- it was not what 
Curzon wanted, and while he always told Mary she was good for his political fortunes, 
he would have scorned any suggestion that she actively use her guile to help him. It is 
also true that Mary was seen as something of a political lightweight by Curzon‟s 
contemporaries, and how this affected his Viceroyalty will be examined later.  
As noted above, people do not operate out of context to the circumstances they 
find themselves in; nor do the circumstances take shape autonomously. It was the 
unique interaction of events on the political stage, the people behind the events, and 
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Curzon‟s approach to these that determined the level of influence he exercised as 
Viceroy. He has been criticised for his seeming attempt to run the Government of 
India as a one-man show; but even this attempt shaped its own impact. The qualities 
for which Curzon was appointed to office and how he brought these to bear upon the 
interactions that office required are discussed below.  
  
Expert Knowledge of Asian Affairs: There is no direct correlation between 
knowledge and power; in fact, „seen from the perspective of power, the problem of 
ideology or knowledge revolves around its capacity to achieve results, especially 
through forms of ideological incorporation or hegemony.‟29 Thus, as will be illustrated 
at the close of the thesis, Curzon‟s expertise can only be considered an asset insofar as 
it helped him convince others to follow his schemes. But, in 1899, the fact of his being 
a well-travelled scholar-explorer was the reason Curzon was awarded the Viceroyalty; 
indeed, it was the basis upon which he had begged for it. There was, in fact, no other  
justification for him being appointed Viceroy; his abrasiveness was well-known, there 
were other, better connected claimants for the post, and he had only held one major 
posting before this one- as Undersecretary for India. But for someone whose view of 
the rest of Empire was that it merely constituted the „toll-gates and the barbicans‟ of 
The Empire, India, he had prepared himself thoroughly for the Viceroyalty by 
inspecting every one of those edifices, as well as India itself. From 1887 to 1895, 
Curzon traversed Persia, the Far East, the Straits Settlements, Afghanistan and India to 
study the layout of Imperial authority in relation to the Indian Empire. His writings on 
these remain authoritative works today; in 1898, they were considered sufficient for 
Salisbury to appoint someone who was otherwise just an Undersecretary for Foreign 
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Affairs to the most important colonial posting the Empire could offer. (Not that 
Curzon saw it as a colonial, in the sense of marginal,  position). 
 If, then,  there were no murmurings apart from those of the disgruntled Punjab 
governor when Curzon put through the creation of the NWFP, it was because it was 
known he had spent years travelling on the frontier and could be expected to gauge its 
temper accurately. This would approximate to Max Weber‟s concept of „charismatic 
authority,‟ which, resting, as it does, in part, „on devotion to the specific and 
exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person,‟30 would 
have enabled Curzon to deny the established forms of authority.31 As Edward VII 
commented, „the reason Curzon is making so good a Viceroy is that beside his great 
personal ability he has personal knowledge of the country.‟32 
Coupled with his knowledge, Curzon brought a good deal of enthusiasm to the 
task of over hauling the administration. This inspired devotion for reform made him 
drag out and finish long standing and complex projects. He did not confine his 
knowledge to the realms of pedagogy; as Denzil Ibbetson observed,  
„It has not only been a pleasure to work under Your Excellency. It has also been an 
education. Your splendid energy, your, if possible, still more splendid courage and confidence 
in the right, your single –minded devotion to the good of India and her people, and your 
wonderful power of mastering every detail while never losing sight of broad principles  and 
the end in view, have made you the most stimulating chief conceivable…I decline to 
contemplate the event of your not returning to us. There is so much still to be done: and it is 
such a stimulus to work, to feel assured that whatever may be decided on will be carried 
through with an unfaltering hand…‟33   
 
Thus Curzon, according to his officers, inspired people to work with his own 
work ethic and determination to do good. Even his detractors conceded that his 
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fractiousness was brought about by overwork, and were therefore inclined to overlook 
it. Also it led him to press his suit with a degree of vehemence and persistence that 
could not be ignored – for example the salt tax reduction; a lesser Viceroy might have 
quailed under the rebuff, but Curzon extracted concessions.  
In all this Curzon‟s undoubted charisma was helped along by the non-reputations 
of his relatively lackadaisical predecessors, Lansdowne and Elgin. His abilities were 
estimated rather more highly than they might have been had he succeeded an 
outstanding Viceroy. Nor, unlike Wavell, did he have to contend with a rising star on 
the horizon; with Selborne having taken himself off for South Africa, the imminent 
prospect, in 1903, of having St. John Brodrick as the next Viceroy (he had just 
endured a horrendous run at the War Office) ensured that Curzon greatly went up in 
the estimation of British official opinion.  
There were stray grumblings about Curzon‟s relative youth when appointed 
Viceroy, but he managed to turn this fact into a celebration of his extraordinary 
abilities. And once he became Viceroy, the factor was discounted; what mattered was 
the fact that he was the highest British official in India.  This was the effect of the 
traditionally hierarchical structure of the Raj, which enabled people to tolerate his 
bossing them around; the expectation was that people would pull around to doing 
what he wished. It was a matter of cohesiveness- Kipling‟s great lumbering machine 
prompted a degree of obedience and conformity; „the individual [in this case 
individual officer] submits to the common purposes of the organisation, and from this 
internal exercise of power comes the ability of organisation to impose its will 
externally‟- i.e. being able to run India efficiently. Thus, from strong internal 
organisation came external power, a concept which was probably at the core of 
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Curzon‟s Viceroyalty.34 This structure, with its minute gradations of seniority, earned 
Curzon the default following of the ICS. As Walter Lawrence observed, once the ICS 
noted his prodigious capacity for work, they grudgingly began to acknowledge his 
self- proclaimed extra-ordinariness.
35
 This may be evidenced in Ibbetson‟s 
acknowledgement of Curzon above.  
Obviously having the backing of his officers counted, because, in the 
final analysis, „Groups, not individuals, are the major political actors, the 
collective makers of history. Collective resources are superior to individual 
resources and also more enduring when possessed by relatively stable groups 
and organisations. Tasks that are clearly beyond the powers of individuals, no 
matter how rich in resources, can be carried out by organised groups.‟36 
 
But this argument brings the reader back full circle to the previous paragraph-
British India‟s 77 place Warrant of Precedence. If the ICS followed Curzon because of 
the strong culture of respecting seniority of office, and this benefited Curzon, it can 
also be argued, again, that he was able to command the allegiance of this pool of talent 
because of the prestige of his office. Colonial historians tend to dismiss the pomp, 
circumstance and exaggerated respect that surrounded high administrative office in 
Victorian times as the folly of an age that still saw deep crevasses between the rulers 
and the ruled; but there was more to the elephant rides than over-awing the resentful 
rabble.
37
 That Curzon was anointed Viceroy, head of the administration, did not hurt 
at all. It conferred upon him that what sociologists refer to as legitimate authority, and 
identify as one of the most important appurtenances of power; Dahl, Wrong, Sennett, 
Weber all rank it, along with cash, as somewhere near the apex of an „importance-
pyramid.‟ And in the rigidly hierarchical environment of British India,  it probably can 
be placed higher than cash or material assets. Thus, the prestige accorded to the office 
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of Viceroy was not merely constitutional or ceremonial. The fact of being Viceroy 
endowed Curzon with the powers to be a leader, to exercise his authority over other 
people in India, who were made necessarily, and legally, subordinate to him. 
Legitimate authority is in fact one of the major resources of power, and is mostly 
always utilised in full.
38
 Curzon achieved this not only by highlighting the fact that he 
was Viceroy, but, where this placed him lower than a colleague in official hierarchy- 
as in his dealings with the Secretary of State- he always emphasised how fortunate the 
office was to have so capable and able an incumbent as himself.  It enabled him, in 
theory, to cut down all opposition even if the opposition could be held equally, if not 
more so, well-informed on a given subject; obviously, „in an ongoing game, a piece 
like the Queen would start in a more privileged position than a pawn, simply because 
the extant rules…enable her to begin the sequence with more potential moves to 
make.‟ 39   Very simply, Curzon could remove a bureaucrat from his post if he 
disagreed with him as a matter of course; the same course of action was not open to 
the bureaucrat. 
The Viceregal office endowed Curzon with the authority to do the things he 
wanted to; without the benefit of the Viceregal chair, his proclamations on India 
would have remained those of a pamphleteering politician, to be received with a 
degree of annoyance by the establishment- which, indeed, was the case after his 
resignation in 1905.  Thus, his knowledge and expertise were legitimised ex-officio.  
The Viceregal office, therefore, may also be said to approximate to Max Weber‟s 
concept of „traditional authority- where obedience is owed to the person of the chief 
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who occupies the traditionally sanctioned position of authority…‟40 This was what 
enabled indifferent Viceroys serve out their terms without any trouble; it was also the 
cloak behind which an over-zealous Viceroy might mask his zeal and yet be implicitly 
obeyed. Curzon‟s position was stronger while backed by Hamilton, because that was 
an indication that his actions were endorsed by his constitutional superiors in London; 
„the perception of illegitimacy would eventually erode the strength seen in an 
authority.‟41 It also meant that there was one less avenue of complaint left open to 
anyone disgruntled with Curzon‟s policies.  Thus, this one fact of Curzon‟s official 
existence in India incorporated many levels and forms of authority and power.  
Growing trend towards centralisation: Curzon‟s detractors may not have liked 
his tendency to attempt a concentration of the reins of administration in his hand, and 
it was this battle over centralisation that soured a good many relations (Curzon-
Havelock and Curzon-Whitehall, for example) but it meant that more decisions were 
taken at the centre with a pan-Indian impact in mind, as opposed to becoming purely 
local concerns. Obviously this let Curzon exercise his love for detail. It also ensured 
that the governors became rather more answerable to him- he wanted collaboration 
and this was one way of ensuring that it was achieved. It was not possible for a 
Presidency governor under Curzon to assume the sort of independence exercised by 
Bartle Frere and Mountstuart Elphinstone; the governors‟ symbolic as well as real 
power diminished as the Viceroy’s stature increased correspondingly.  Also, that 
period marked a growing centralisation towards London, which shows that the India 
office was not opposed to the concept of centralisation per se. What they did object to 
was it being exercised by someone who was not doing it their way.  
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Centralisation per se has many benefits; it means a „good chance of achieving 
and maintaining concentrations of resources, speed and consistency of decision 
making, high visibility and orientation for their clients looking for service.‟42 
Indian Public Opinion: Up until the disastrous Calcutta Convocation speech 
and the  Partition of Bengal – and even censure of this last measure was not universal 
among Indians-  Curzon‟s measures were very well received by most sections of the 
Indian press. Such accolades helped him carry off stuff without fear of Indian 
reprisals, and also bolstered his conviction that he was going the right way about 
ensuring the contentment of the governed.  In this his crusade against racial 
discrimination helped. As will be explored in Chapter 6, Indian public opinion across 
India was extremely favourable, right up until the Partition of Bengal.  In those days, 
Indian public opinion could hardly be said to be based on common nationalistic 
grounds, and Anglophone public opinion largely expressed itself through the press, 
letters and representations made to the Viceroy and other officials. Even Curzon‟s 
uncompromising opposition to Indian self-representation had a silver lining: it had the 
effect of keeping them quiet as according to C. Friedrich‟s rule of anticipated 
reactions, viz., people will not press for demands if they feel they will not get 
anywhere.
43
  
Indian approbation and Curzon were cyclical. It must be remembered that, in 
1899, the nascent nationalist movement was not necessarily anti-British, but more 
concerned with securing equalitarian treatment under British rule. If, then, they got a 
Viceroy who kept the scales even, it fulfilled their expectations from British rule.  A 
large section of the Indian press reflected the interests of the many sections of the 
populace who were rather more concerned about the impact government legislation 
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might have on their lifestyles, as opposed to fighting for a concept they did not yet 
feel had reached them- i.e. Indian nationalism. This is most starkly illustrated in the 
case of the Punjab Land Alienation Act; while the Congress campaigned against it, 
Punjab‟s local Indian press overwhelmingly supported it, and those papers that did 
oppose it opposed specific terms that they felt might inadvertently hinder them in 
carrying out their business.  
This chapter, then, has set out the advantages which Curzon enjoyed as he began 
his term. He started off with a formidable battery of the tangibles and intangibles of 
power. When he landed in Bombay on 30 December 1898, however, he landed in 
enemy territory. The Governor of Bombay, Lord Sandhurst, and his counterpart in 
Madras,  Sir Arthur Elibank Havelock, did not subscribe to the view that they should 
subordinate themselves, or their provinces,  to his authority at all. This rather tended 
to render irrelevant the many ways by which exercising that authority was made easy 
for Curzon.  While Chapter 3 explores Curzon‟s relationship with the part of British 
India that sought autonomy as an „ancient privilege,‟ and the lobbying for whose 
Lieutenant-Governor-ships went on, if at all, in London and not amongst the top brass 
of India‟s civil service: the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay, the next chapter 
looks at the entities they appealed to in the battle for autonomy from Simla- Curzon‟s 
constitutional superiors, the India Office. 
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Chapter Two 
 
The India Office: Constitutional Subordination to London? 
 
 
An insider on the India Council: 
 
„Godley: His only fault is that the Treasury Prig creeps up in him. 
 
Alfred Lyall: Love of exercising power, which makes him love to intervene in a controversy…Flattery, 
works wonders with him. 
 
Sir James Peile: Hopelessly conventional…his maxim is that the most crusted Civil Service view is the 
right one. 
 
Sir Charles Crosthwaite: Very great energy and ability, but most hostile. 
 
Sir Steuart Bayley: an old dear, but indolent…sees the unreasonableness of the routine view of India… 
 
Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick: A walking embodiment of all that you have ever said about the Punjab 
Government….entangled by precedents of his own making.  
 
Sir J. Mackay: a great authority on finance and very able…. Amused [at] the crack he perpetrated when 
he assured you the Finance Committee were ignorant of your personal interest in certain proposals. 
 
Sir John Edge: very wise and able.  
 
Sir P. Hutchins: most liberal minded of the lot after Bayley.  
 
Sir J. Westland…is Sir J. Westland.‟1 
 
-Sir Richmond Ritchie to Curzon, 23 August 1901.  
 
 
  
Aims 
The India Office was by far the greatest constraint on Curzon‟s freedom of 
action as Viceroy. This was due in part to the fact of its being Curzon‟s ultimate 
superior, and due in part to its sheer size, consisting as it did of the Secretary of State, 
the Permanent Undersecretary, the Council of India and the fact that, during Curzon‟s 
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time, it had evolved close links with the British Cabinet.  This chapter explores how 
the Viceroy was ultimately bound to subordination to London. The placing aims to 
highlight the final authority of the India Office and its diktats over polity decisions 
made by other parties sharing administrative power in the governance of India; it was 
the office which had the final say, and tied up all loose ends in Indian administration. 
Apart from the obvious focus on policy as it was built up from Viceregal lodge, 
studies of British policy in India tend to place  an emphasis on pan-Empire politics, or 
the Imperial ideology as shapers of polity, especially in the period under scrutiny, viz., 
the late nineteenth century.  „The manner in which Indian governmental business was 
processed and evaluated by Whitehall has been by and large ignored.‟2 
„London‟ or „Whitehall‟ in the context of the governance of India and with 
regard to constitutional authority over the Viceroy of India, had two major 
components; the Home Government  (or more properly the  British Cabinet) and the 
India Office and its internal divisions and departments.  As Copland has observed, 
„the effectiveness of Whitehall as an arbiter of Indian policy largely depended on the 
capacity of the Secretary of State, and on the experience and local knowledge [of 
the]…Council of India.‟3 But the “India Office” was not a homogenous entity either, 
and this chapter seeks to highlight the individualistic character of its various 
constituent offices, individuals and councils and committees. Principally, the chapter 
explores the triangular equations between Curzon, the successive Secretaries of State 
(George Hamilton
4
 and William St. John Brodrick
5
) and the long-serving Permanent 
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Under-Secretary of State for India, Sir Arthur Godley, later Lord Kilbracken.
6
 
Hamilton‟s tenure in office is used to portray how the Secretary of State could liaise 
between Curzon, the Permanent Under-Secretary and the British Cabinet, interposing 
his vouchsafing of the Viceroy‟s prowess to maintain a feel-good balance of power 
between these often competing blocks of government. Co-terminously, St. John 
Brodrick‟s time in office showcases Curzon‟s relations with his constitutional 
superiors against the backdrop of an increasingly tempestuous Viceregal equation with 
the then British Cabinet.  
A would be- excellent source for assessing the dynamics of the Curzon-Balfour 
relationship with respect to India throughout the length of their parliamentary careers 
would be Balfour and the British Empire: A Study in Imperial Evolution 1874-1932.
7
  
Unfortunately the most important section, that of Curzon‟s Viceroyalty and Balfour‟s 
premiership, 1902-1905, is not written as being a dialogue between the two; it relies 
extensively on Curzon‟s letters home to prove the point that he was a peevish Viceroy.  
It would gain in scholarly value if Balfour‟s own initiatives towards Indian policy at 
the time were highlighted.  There are also the standard biographies of Balfour, both 
poised, relatively, mid-way between being near-contemporary accounts produced by 
historians who would have lived through the age, and more retrospective accounts, 
closer to the immediate present.
8
  The balance of power within the India Office post 
1903 also evidences how underlings might wield behind -the- scenes influence and 
thus tailor the public image of individuals so as not to bring about any rapprochement 
between antagonistic parties.   
                                                          
6
 Sir (John) Arthur Godley, 1st Baron Kilbracken (1847-1932), Permanent Under Secretary of State for 
India 1883-1909. 
7
 Denis Judd, Balfour and the British Empire: A Study in Imperial Evolution 1874-1932 (London: 
Macmillan, 1968),  223-267.  
8
 Kenneth Young, Arthur John Balfour: The happy life of the politician, prime minister, statesman and 
philosopher, 1848-1930 (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1963) and Max Egremont, Balfour: A Life of Arthur 
John Balfour (London: Collins, 1980).  
51 
 
In sum, this chapter looks at the conflation of personal and constitutional 
struggles for supremacy and how this affected Viceregal ability to legislate freely. 
Generally speaking, the chapter maps out the broad equations of power within the 
British Government of India using certain well-known issues as a illustrative base, as 
opposed to examining specific incidents that reveal how power was exercised within 
the parameters of Indian governance. The chapter will be divided into two major parts; 
part one, which will primarily asses the reasons behind the prickly Curzon-India 
Office equation, and part two, which will look at the views of the India Council in 
relation to Curzon‟s Indian policy. The thesis will be taking a lateral, rather than 
chronological view, in opposition to the narrative style most favoured for Curzon‟s 
Viceroyalty. 
Curzon and George Hamilton‟s relationship over crucial matters of 
administration is set out in detail in P. Bandyopadhyay‟s study of Hamilton‟s famine 
policy.
9
  The work confirms Curzon‟s image as always standing up for Indian interests  
and  also reveals the tension between the needs of the Empire at large and those of 
India, which ultimately spilled over into power tussles between the Govt. of India and 
the British Government. India under Hamilton is covered in M.S. Tyagi‟s British 
Administrative Policy in India: June 1895-September 1903.
10
  Arthur Godley‟s long 
tenure as Permanent Undersecretary for India, coinciding with probably the most 
poster-perfect days of the Raj, is set out in Arnold Kaminsky‟s erudite work on the  
India Office, 1880-1910.
11
 It is obvious that the period setting, notwithstanding a very 
articulate section as to the constitutionalisms of power in the governance of India,  is 
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merely a cloak for the discussion of Godley as permanent Under-Secretary, but the 
book does not portray him as an apolitical mandarin; in fact,  his political dalliances 
are sharply pointed out, as is the extent to which his fortunes were affected by changes 
in the British Government. The author very emphatically sets out Godley‟s political 
ideology, and the natural inference from it is that he was undoubtedly one of the 
villains (or heroes) in the Kitchener affair.  
 
The Constitutional Setting 
Constitutionally, the divisions and hierarchies, spheres and levels, of power, 
were clearly demarcated. The conflicts as to who would have the final say arose 
largely as the result of a divide between „man on the spot expertise‟ versus the desire 
to appropriate constitutionally sanctioned rights to superiority. The Viceroy was the 
Representative of the British Monarch in India. As Governor-General he ruled India 
on behalf of the Crown. But, as Curzon himself pointed out, „the latter title has no 
statutory sanction, and is the result merely of usage and convention.‟12 In practical 
terms, ruling India on behalf of the sovereign meant doing so on behalf of HM‟s 
Government of Great Britain. But the Viceroy was not directly responsible to the 
British Cabinet; he was instead answerable to the person of the Secretary of State for 
India, who liaised between the Viceroy and the Cabinet. The Secretary of State may 
have been the ultimate arbiter on India policy, and possessed all the powers conducive 
to autocratic rule, but the existence of the India Council checked this untrammelled 
exercise of authority, and supplied him with a „constitutional obligation to conduct 
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Indian business as a corporate entity- the Secretary of State in Council.‟13 He was also 
constrained in his responses to a Viceroy‟s concerns after taking into account how his 
response would be perceived by his superiors, the British Cabinet; as Clinton Dawkins 
opined about George Hamilton, „ Lord George [Hamilton] and Godley are properly 
enthusiastic about your great work in India, and are determined to back you up, 
though in the case of Lord George the determination is qualified by an apprehensive 
eye on Parliament and the PM.‟14  For the Secretary of State, as an appointee of the 
Prime Minister, did not operate either by himself or in a political vacuum; he was part 
of the body politic of the British Parliament.   
The rather convoluted practice of a  (usually) member of the aristocracy 
appointed by a popularly elected British government administering a colony on behalf 
of the sovereign may have worked very well for the white dominions, where it gave 
the incumbent Governor-General a degree of autonomy from Whitehall, which 
presumably allowed him to listen more to that Dominion‟s government, and it may 
also have worked excellently in places like Egypt, Sudan and much of Africa, where 
proconsuls in relatively recently acquired colonies tended to be soldiers as opposed to 
statesmen. But in late Victorian India, which was ruled without the Indians being 
enfranchised, the former principle did not apply.  And putting a parliamentarian, one 
moreover fluent in constitutionalisms, into the proconsul‟s seat, and that too someone 
who had specialised in his charge, set the stage for a clash of authority between 
Whitehall and Simla.  As Curzon pointed out, „the real friend of India will aim at the 
co-ordination of these powers‟15- the Secretary of State and the Cabinet, the India 
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Council and the Viceroy and his Council. But the process of co-ordination was not 
always smooth.  
The Viceroy‟s position in this set-up, whereby there existed two distinct streams 
of the Government of India, the administrative and the political, was anomalous. Both 
streams were concentrated in his persona. Additionally, he also had to handle the role 
of being the representative of a constitutional monarch. The dichotomies thus 
engendered were all the more pronounced in a Viceroy like Curzon, who was part of 
the parliamentary elite but chose not to conventionally participate in it by going off to 
the colonies. It is unsurprising that he appeared, alternatively, as a „divinity addressing 
black beetles,‟ and a breaker of ranks among those who put the Empire, as opposed to 
India, first. 
The Government was also idealised as functioning independently of the entities 
who ran it. Godley urged Ampthill to recognise that the government „is immortal, and 
incapable of “suspended animation,” and that we cannot officially recognise the 
absence of any individual as a sufficient reason for postponing business or modifying 
decisions.‟16 
In Practice 
When Curzon was Viceroy, the already unwieldy tiers of authority built around 
the Viceroy gained a further volatility given the intrusion of interpersonal equations. 
Clinton Dawkins wrote a succinct and fascinating account to Curzon about how the 
various elements in power judged him as Viceroy, basing their judgements not only on 
their analysis of his performance, but also on how their co-judges viewed him.
17
  As 
Kenneth Rose has shown, the ruling class in late Victorian Britain came from an 
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extremely close knit circle, carrying over impressions from relationships forged at 
Eton.
18
  For the first four years of his Viceroyalty, however, the Secretary of State was 
Lord George Francis Hamilton, who brought over three years experience in his office 
by the time Curzon came to the Viceregal office, but it was more than that; Hamilton 
was interested in the India Office for its own sake; for his successor St. John Brodrick, 
whom Curzon was to accuse of always trying to „assert an untimely and inconsiderate 
exercise of superior power,‟19 it was a colourless political appointment like any other, 
and he could not share Curzon‟s passionate devotion to Indian affairs, over and above, 
of course, the frictional intrusion of their long running personal relationship. In the 
earlier half of Curzon‟s term, there was no obvious power block in London; the 
Secretary of State George Hamilton liaised between Curzon, the Permanent Under-
Secretary of State, and the British Cabinet and India Council.  How this delicate 
balance of power was maintained is the core of this chapter, which also seeks to 
analyse why, post-1903, Curzon‟s relations with Whitehall became increasingly 
acrimonious and why he chafed indignantly under their attempted control.  The India 
Office‟s view of their status regarding the administration of India vis-à-vis the 
Viceroy was as follows:  
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The India Office thus not only assumed its constitutional rights over the Viceroy, 
ultimately deriving its legitimacy from “the people” but also endorsed several entities 
within its structure to exercise that right, at different levels. At least three bodies –the 
India Office (i.e. Godley), the Secretary of State, and the India Council- could directly 
override the Viceroy independently of each other.  Curzon‟s view, understandably, 
was rather different. 
Thus, as the Viceroyalty progressed, the core issue between Curzon and the 
London team actually became the balance of power and who would or could exercise 
more influence over Indian polity, and not, as in Hamilton‟s time, how declamations 
57 
 
of authority could best be worked around to ensure the smooth functioning of 
government. Because of all the complex relationships of official and personal 
commingling, the issues discussed between the India Office and Simla, as between 
Simla and the provinces (though rather less so), centred around power and money, as 
opposed to legislation, especially of the welfare variety. The debate over centralisation, 
after all, should merely have been a means to decide how best India should be 
governed, and not made an end in itself. This tended to overshadow actual questions 
of polity, as happened with the Kitchener affair.  
Chief among the issues fought over was Centralisation. It is often said that 
Curzon‟s Viceroyalty was „perhaps the last time British policy in Asia was initiated 
not from Whitehall but from Calcutta;‟ 20 but this was tenuous. It is probable that 
India‟s foreign policy was initiated (against opposition) from Calcutta, but the 
domestic policy, especially the financial side, came increasingly under the purview of 
Whitehall.  To digress, this is one reason why the thesis chooses to focus on the 
amount of autonomy afforded to (or carved out by) Curzon solely with regard to 
domestic policy.  In any case, the rationale for this strict scrutiny was that the Viceroy 
was too intent on a programme of centralisation, or “over centralisation” as it was 
dubbed by its detractors. The India Office opposed centralisation because it would, 
according to them, concentrate too much power in the hands of the Viceroy, and not 
because of any impact it may have had on the efficiency of administration in India.  
The India Office was against it, the India Council was against it
21
 quite as much as the 
Governors of Bombay and Madras were against it, perhaps more so, a great many 
other personages were against it given that the initiative stemmed from someone 
generally acknowledged as not being a good team player, and thus this chapter wants 
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to principally see how power struggles between London and Simla expressed 
themselves in debates over centralisation. This would involve examining how the 
Governors tried- or did not try- to „play politics‟ and use India Office endorsement to 
get their way over the Viceroy‟s preferences.  Centralisation crops up early in the 
Curzon-Godley correspondence, in just Godley‟s fourth letter to the Viceregal team of 
Curzon and Lawrence. But he chose to put it in a roundabout way, weaving it in with 
concerns over Bombay‟s lack of communication to London and Simla; „No one, 
except myself, can be much less anxious than Lord Elgin was that the Supreme 
Government should grab the powers of the local governments, and, if he complained, 
we may be pretty sure that matters had gone too far;‟22 – in the provincial autonomy 
direction, that is.  Of course, emphasising the India Office‟s status as the ultimate law-
maker on Indian affairs, and making it the point of reference for all government 
bodies in India was the apex of “centralisation,” but this point seems to have been 
overlooked by Godley, Brodrick and the anti-centralisation members on the India 
Council. 
The view in London seems to have been that by taking a contrary line the 
government policy on “centralisation,” Curzon was insufficiently subordinate and not 
respectful of the constitutionalisms as to his ultimately underling position with regard 
to the Secretary of State, I do not think this was the case. In fact, it may be that he 
recognised early on how a Viceroy could be thwarted by the Secretary of State and the 
India Council, and the subsequent need to co-opt them into any decision making 
process early on. As he saw it, these two entities were what bounded a Viceroy‟s 
otherwise unfettered power: „the head of the Government of India has more power 
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than any other British subject.
23
 He has the check of the Secretary of State and India 
Council, of course; but if he is a wise man (and Curzon very patently did not perceive 
himself as being other than wise!), he works with, and not in independence of them. 
There is no other official, or quasi-official check…‟24  
This, of course, was not quite the view taken by the India Office. They in turn 
viewed themselves as being trust holders for the British Cabinet, Parliament, and 
ultimately the British people, and answerable to them as regards Indian Affairs, a 
point Godley never failed to reiterate over and over again to Curzon. In addition to 
which Godley thought the Government of India too was not supportive of „us‟ i.e. him 
and the British Government:  „ Our policy would be greatly enhanced if you in India, 
instead of looking with jealousy upon the schemes which are submitted and taking 
up….an obstructive position, were to facilitate and encourage the work…‟25 It may be 
observed that the India Office, by this attitude, ultimately wished to actively 
emphasise, beyond all doubts, India‟s subordinacy  to the machinery of British 
Government. 
This goal was imperative for both Balfour and Brodrick. The base issue was 
power. It must be remembered that towards the end of Curzon‟s first term, he was 
seen as a hero not only in England, but also in India, by the Indians. His political 
rivals in England therefore bruited about „that I have become too powerful, that I do 
not fall in readily enough with the views of the Cabinet, who would prefer a more 
docile Viceroy and a more slavish Council (i.e. a more slavish Viceroy‟s Council; 
though at this time London‟s chief complaint was the Viceroy‟s Council was much 
too complaisant with the Viceroy‟s wishes, and therefore slavish to the wrong 
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authority; see Chapter 4) that I am regarded with jealousy and dislike by an India 
Council in England, who are conscious of a derogation from their former authority; 
and that I am even a source of disquietude to a Secretary of State who is anxious to 
assert his own individuality.‟26 They could not be personally upstaged by Curzon, lest 
it affect their political fortunes. This interesting viewpoint throws up the contention 
that it was not merely a case of personal equations misfiring; but rather clashing lusts 
for power. It is possible that both Balfour and Brodrick viewed Curzon‟s Viceroyalty 
as merely a prelude to the English premiership, and suspected that a glowing 
reputation in India might feed his success at Home. Hamilton was not possessed of the 
same over-arching political ambition, and was thus untroubled by the fact that a 
successful Viceregal tenure would enhance Curzon‟s political stature at Home.  This 
highlights the fact that people bring their own personalities, perceptions and hopes 
into the exercise and equations of power, and their responses to a person in a position 
of authority are rarely untempered by self-interest. 
Furthermore, as the people responsible for the ultimate direction of Indian 
affairs in Parliament, Balfour and his office were probably justified in fearing that 
ultimate control of India was being wrenched away from them, even though it was 
their prerogative; in theory this should not have mattered, given that Curzon was from 
the same political affiliation as the ruling government. It was here where Curzon‟s 
championing of the Indian cause began to play a part.  Neither Balfour nor Brodrick 
was an expert in Indian affairs, and both had their reasons for wanting a smooth 
political ride. Balfour was leading a shaky government, and Brodrick was looking for 
a chance to redeem himself after an error-prone stint at the War Office. Indian affairs 
did not enthral the public, and moreover, Curzon‟s enthusiastic drives for justice and 
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fairness only suggested that the government had hitherto been letting things slide in 
India. Moreover, it was the Army that Curzon‟s very public justice campaigns went 
after (since inter-departmental memos as to improving the extant work culture stayed 
internal and did not leak out to the press in England) and  this had the ability (as 
demonstrated at the Durbar) to strike a chord with a public not overly sympathetic to 
Indian rights. 
But, as pointed out above, neither of them had Indian backgrounds, or long 
experience in running Indian affairs and they needed a front man who could negotiate 
through the labyrinthine links between Indian administrators, returned and former, to 
rein in Curzon.  And they, especially St. John, had always been conscious of their 
having plodded their way into government as opposed to Curzon‟s diametric rise. 
Brodrick was still acutely aware of his “intellectual inferiority,” and tried to validate 
himself on that count, thus seeking to justify to himself and to Curzon, the 
circumstances by which he had become Curzon‟s constitutional superior. It was 
widely known that he did not have any specific interest in India, unlike his 
predecessor, but he claimed that his previous stint at the War Office was more than 
germane, especially under the contemporary circumstances. „You think me wholly 
lacking in Indian experience,‟ he wrote to Curzon at the height of the Kitchener affair, 
„whereas having spent nearly fifteen years dealing directly with soldiers, I…have…a 
greater knowledge of their idiosyncrasies…than any Civilian.‟27  Curzon, it was well 
known, had nothing but contempt for the military. The twin bases of effectual power 
and its exercise may be said to be (germane) knowledge and superiority, and Brodrick, 
understandably, tried to claim both.  
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 What was indubitably Balfour‟s and Brodrick‟s  to command, however, was 
Godley, often described as the power behind the thrones of successive Secretaries of 
State, and the hand who controlled how the Viceroys would be judged in England.  
Godley was a major obstacle in Curzon‟s winning over the India Office, not only 
because he exercised an out-of-proportion influence within it, but also because he 
used his considerable clout to swing opinion around.  He seems to have craved power- 
not power in the absolute, but influence over those who occupied the highest posts.  
At the same time he does not seem to have wished to jeopardize his political careers 
by criticising those he saw to be in comparative favour with his own superiors. But he 
was reluctant to expose himself to positions of unfamiliar responsibility; in 1903 
Curzon asked him to take up the post of Finance Member of the Council of India, but 
Godley refused, noting however that  „the fun [of the offer] consist[ed] in the fact that 
the appointment was not in the Viceroy‟s gift, but in that of the Secretary of State.‟28 
This pinpoints just how much he valued his behind-the-scenes post, and regarded 
others as mere pretenders when it came to the exercise of authority and the patronising 
of high office. Certainly the division of Indian responsibilities and the place of the 
Viceroy in the hierarchy of Indian government began to be more and more scrutinised 
by Godley only in the post-Hamilton era: 
 
 „The relations between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy are peculiar, 
and, if they are to be maintained on an agreeable footing, it is very desirable that 
both of those high officials should be endowed with an adequate amount of tact and 
of what Matthew Arnold called “sweet reasonableness.” For in India the Viceroy is a 
sublime autocrat,…and yet he is under the thumb of the Secretary of State, who has 
absolute power over him….‟29 
 
The implication, of course, being that the Secretary of State was more powerful than 
the most powerful person in the Indian Empire; Godley‟s comment betrays a sense of 
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gloating at his boss‟ having power over the person who had power over 300 million 
people; hence, power over 300 million + 1 souls! Not to speak of the administrative 
apparatus of British India (which at that point did not include any of the 300 million 
Indian souls, but was almost exclusively British) that existed to carry out the orders of 
the Viceroy! 
In addition, Godley seems to have regarded Curzon much as one might regard 
an over-enthusiastic novice.  Over and over again he reiterated that because the  
Secretary of State, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet had „absolute and unshared 
responsibility‟ for every one of Curzon‟s acts, there must be a corresponding right of 
control, absolute and unshared, over Curzon‟s actions by these personages. 30 While 
Godley is often portrayed – with some justification- as the villain behind the scenes 
who was responsible for leaving Curzon politically isolated over the Kitchener affair 
by most Viceregal biographers,
31
 it would seem that, towards the close of the 
Conservative government‟s time in office, he, and his known anti-Curzon views, were 
used by Balfour and Brodrick to voice hard truths to the Viceroy, matters which 
would have been unpleasant for them to communicate.
32
 It may of course be that 
Godley may have nursed similar views all along, and only repressed them when 
serving under George Hamilton, a staunch supporter of Curzon; certainly he was 
effusive in his praise of Brodrick, something he did not accord to Hamilton; „With 
Brodrick my own relations were most agreeable throughout the two years that he 
spent with us….I found him…remarkably easy and pleasant to work with.‟33 Certainly, 
towards the spring of 1905, when Curzon‟s relations with Balfour and Brodrick were 
collapsing, Godley became ever more hectoring and openly disapproving of the 
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Viceroy: „I also …dissociate myself from any censure which you might be inclined to 
pass upon the way in which Members of Council have used their powers… as to the 
general iniquity of their conduct I am quite sure that we should not agree.‟34 Or it may 
just have been self- preservation; either way, Godley shows up as an agile political 
chameleon.  He even tried to take credit for the “partition” of Bengal, writing to 
Curzon that „This is a tremendously big thing that you have achieved, and I am only 
sorry that you will not be there yourself to carry the scheme into actual effect and 
practical working.
35
 As you know I have myself from the first believed in your 
scheme, and felt sure that it would be carried, but without the vigorous help of the 
Secretary of State (blatant toadying to Brodrick) it might easily have been longer.‟36 It 
was not that Curzon was unaware of Godley‟s growing, and increasingly active, 
hostility. As relations between himself and the Cabinet deteriorated, and Godley 
fanned the flames, the Viceroy tried to point out how Godley himself had not always 
been uncritical of the Home establishment, writing to him  that „ a good deal of my 
evidence as to their attitude has been supplied (at any rate in earlier times) by 
yourself.‟37 Godley had in fact sympathised at times with Curzon‟s struggles with the 
India Council, agreeing that that body needed an overhaul; but he had also 
sympathised with the Council over Curzon, and never tried to gloss over possible 
avenues for a breach between Curzon and his Secretaries of State. Godley‟s idea of 
ministering political support seems to have been expressed in depreciating those he 
felt would be regarded as threats or obstacles by his correspondents.  
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Brodrick‟s alleged mental stolidity may have played a greater part in 
determining the course of Curzon‟s Viceroyalty than merely setting him up to feel 
resentful towards his school friend; it may have prevented him from introspecting and 
contextually weighing Godley‟s opinions. It is possible he was sucked into Godley‟s 
view of Curzon as the reckless young man in a hurry because of the respect he 
accorded Godley on account of his long Indian experience. Godley was acutely aware 
that Curzon, though a part of the ruling establishment, was not regarded 
unambiguously by them at all and would thus never back the Viceroy, but always the 
India Council, because they at least were confirmed experts, and anyway not inclined 
to ruffle the feathers of the Government, as they were not rivals for current or future 
political pre-eminence. He said this to Curzon. „ I told [Curzon]…that I was “not 
much surprised” (I certainly was not) at his being vexed by the occasional obstacles… 
placed in his way [by the Council]…my expressions of sympathy were …preliminary 
to remarks intended to bring this truth home to him….he must not expect to get his  
way in everything. But he has a gift for reading …the meaning that he wants to 
find.‟38  
Being the recipient of these confidences, Hamilton of necessity had to play a 
balancing act, acting as an intermediary between Godley, the Council and the Viceroy, 
of whom he was genuinely fond. He seems to have succeeded admirably; it was after 
his departure as Secretary of State that relations between Curzon and Whitehall went 
steadily downhill; „Since you left the India Office, I have met with little sympathy or 
support: and this has been the more galling when it has rested upon an ignorance of 
Indian Government and Indian conditions that is truly startling.‟39    
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But it was not just Hamilton‟s superior knowledge of Indian affairs that 
contributed to Curzon‟s uncomplicated relationship with Hamilton - and the 
harmonious Viceroy – Secretary of State equation this established. Gopal further 
asserts that this was established largely because of Hamilton‟s „unquestioning assent‟ 
to everything Curzon did, did not pave the way for a similar camaraderie with 
Balfour
40
 and Brodrick, both of whom were „not indifferent to the exercise of 
power.‟41 In other words, Hamilton‟s acquiescence in Curzon‟s superior wisdom! And, 
while both Hamilton and Brodrick were Conservative Secretaries of State, appointed 
by a Conservative Government, and liaising with a Conservative Viceroy, their 
periods in office were characterised by two very different political climes at Home. 
Hamilton had been Secretary of State for three years when Curzon became Viceroy, 
and thus did not run the risk of being called a rubber stamp Secretary of State even if 
he unhesitatingly endorsed every decision of Curzon‟s. Appointed by Salisbury, he 
was dealing with an old favourite ideological counterpart of the old Prime Minister, in 
what was the Conservative high noon. Brodrick came to office when the government, 
headed by Salisbury‟s nephew, and his and Curzon‟s long-time friend Balfour, was 
increasingly shaky and he was sandwiched between two old school friends who had 
risen to eminence. Hence, it was not just due to personality clashes and ego issues that 
the Curzon-Brodrick relationship was much less smoother than the Curzon-Hamilton 
one. 
The other major difference between the Secretary-ships of Hamilton and 
Brodrick, and perhaps a key to why they turned out so differently, may lie in the long 
association between Curzon and Brodrick. Hamilton approached the new Viceroy, 
whose enthusiastic forward policies contrasted sharply with his own advocacy of 
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moderation,
42
 with a degree of trepidation, and thus probably trod softly. It is possible 
that both Curzon and Brodrick, when in office, did not feel the need to infuse much 
„officialdom‟ into their relationships; their frequent allusions to their schoolboy bonds 
hint that they may have relied too much on those bonds to forge an easy official 
relationship, envisaging it as an extension of their youth; and Curzon was probably 
also lulled by the confiding and confidential  relationship he‟d had with Hamilton, and 
assumed a process of transference would see it continue with Hamilton‟s successor. 
But, as Kenneth Rose notes, „informal diplomacy, conducted rather in a code of 
common understanding than in the precise language of a state paper, is un-fitted for 
the determination of high policy.‟43 Further, when people known to each other clash in 
official capacities over questions of polity, „a sense of betrayal poisons official 
relationships; whereas the chance acquaintances of a more democratic society can 
debate their differences on an austerely intellectual plane.‟44 The Curzon-Brodrick 
equation was weighted down with misguided expectations from both men even as it 
was formed.  
And finally, the Curzon-Brodrick equation included a third party- their old 
fellow-Soul
45
 and then Prime Minister, Arthur James Balfour. Balfour was 
inextricably linked with Curzon‟s rocky relationship with St. John Brodrick.  
Balfour‟s biographers uniformly (in a holding pattern the diametric  opposite of their 
„others,‟ the Curzon biographies) lay the blame on Curzon for the abrupt termination 
of the Curzon Viceroyalty and the strained relations with Balfour and Brodrick that 
followed. But they do bring into significance that Balfour, unlike Brodrick, had to 
consider the overall Government side of the picture. But ultimately, of all Curzon‟s 
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political superiors who turned into his opponents over the Kitchener affair, Balfour 
was the one who maintained his regard for Curzon‟s abilities throughout, also 
showing himself to be in some sympathy with the Viceroy‟s frustrations. For one, he 
did not take kindly to the India Council, stating that he did „not believe in the 
elaborate system of check and counterchecks‟46 that the existence of the India Council 
inevitably engendered, and claimed to fully endorse the Viceroy‟s sense of being 
thwarted when plans long-thought out by the Government of India were quashed 
promptly by the Council.  But, ultimately, Balfour had no say in the matter because 
the India Council, and Indian affairs generally, were the parliamentary provenance of 
St. John Brodrick. And as Prime Minister, while he pondered on the possible fall-out 
of Curzon‟s diplomatic missions, Balfour also had to contend with dissension with 
Curzon‟s domestic policy from the India Office. Freed from the moderating influences 
of George Hamilton, and guided by an increasingly sycophantic (towards St. John 
Brodrick) Arthur Godley, the India Council lost no opportunity to record its 
dissatisfaction with the Viceroy‟s centralisation programmes and his alleged over-
riding of the ICS. 
Certainly very different impetuses prompted Balfour and Brodrick‟s very 
different reactions towards Curzon. Many biographers have attributed Brodrick‟s non-
support of Curzon to a secret jealousy at an old friend‟s greater success; but this 
motive cannot be supplied in the case of Balfour. It was Curzon‟s aggressive foreign 
policy that most seemed to irk Balfour, having inherited something of his uncle‟s 
latter-day caution and holding together a precarious Government. Balfour definitely 
did not share all of Curzon‟s enthusiasm for strengthening the imperial ideal, as his 
chief concern was holding on to power at Home, without risking it through gambles 
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abroad. Dawkins‟ observation on how Balfour differed from Salisbury over Indian 
polity has already been reproduced above.
47
 Dawkins‟ identification of Curzon‟s 
second bug bear was not to prove crucial to wrecking his Viceroyalty; Salisbury might 
or might not think Curzon was  going too fast down the path of reform, and over 
centralising,
48
 but  Dawkins‟ informant [of Salisbury‟s views] certainly would. 
However much St. John Brodrick passed on the gist of his conversations with his 
friend Balfour‟s uncle to Dawkins, his own views would be remarkably similar as 
Secretary of State. It, is, of course, highly possible that both  Balfour and Brodrick 
were persuaded as to the brinkmanship of Curzon‟s Indian foreign policy by Balfour‟s 
uncle and political mentor, the Marquess of Salisbury; Balfour was always quoting 
Salisbury‟s comments about Curzon‟s advocacy of an aggressive Russian policy, as 
though his uncle‟s comments legitimised his own views about the Viceroy. 
Balfour appeared to feel that an Indian Viceroy should be the instrument who 
carried out Whitehall‟s foreign policy instructions pertinent to the region; Curzon, if 
he had had his own way, would have pursued  any independent line he thought was 
best for India‟s interests, and would have „raised India to the position of an 
independent and not always friendly power.‟ 49   It was this „insubordination‟ that 
Balfour and the Governmental establishment raged against: „the Government 
condoned Curzon‟s shortcomings respecting Tibet and Afghanistan by sending him 
back to India, and on the other points by declining to accept his resignation (in 
June) …[even when] they and he disagreed on the question of the Military Member of 
the Council…‟50 It would appear that the government expected Curzon to be grateful 
for having been given a rein freer than that had been given to most other Viceroys; but 
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on the contrary, according to Balfour, „no such public exhibition of disloyalty to the 
Home Government has ever yet been made by an Indian Viceroy.‟51  
 
* 
A great deal of the debate between Curzon and the India Office was 
characterised by protestations as to which of them had to do the most compromising 
and give in to the other‟s ideals, as well as which had the task with the greater gravity 
before them. Curzon may have thought that the Viceroy had his task cut out, 7000 
miles away from being able to justify his opinions in person to a Secretary of State 
always accessible to a hostile (to himself, according to his perception) India Council, 
but Brodrick was convinced it was the Secretary of State who carried the greater 
burden. „I honestly think,‟ he lost no time in pointing out to Curzon,  
„The position of Secretary of State much more difficult in his relations with the Viceroy 
than those of the Viceroy with the Secretary of State… the Viceroy, under present conditions, 
monopolises all initiative. The Secretary of State consequently has to deal with 
subjects…brought to him by a very able body…with whom discussion is, for physical reasons, 
impossible. [he also]…has at his elbow…the Council [who]…are always less likely to agree 
with the Viceroy….he has also to deal with the Cabinet [who can] take a line perfectly 
independent of [the Viceroy‟s] opinion.‟52 
 
In turn, Curzon pointed out to Brodrick the desirability of listening to the 
[presumably] expert man on the spot: „Hamilton once wrote to me that he would be 
most averse from overruling the unanimous opinion of the Viceroy and his Colleagues 
[sic] on any purely Indian matter, i.e. on any matter which did not present an Imperial 
aspect- in which case of course the Home Government must be supreme. ‟53 It is 
evidence of how, by 1905, it was high politics rather than Indian polity that was 
foremost in the minds of those governing India from London, that they assumed even 
Curzon was fighting the military member modifications out of a desire to retain 
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personal control over the system; to reassure him, Balfour wrote to him that „one thing 
I am sure it [the new system] will not do; it will not diminish the authority which the 
Governor-General has over matters of army as well as of Civilian administration.‟54 
 
* 
It is therefore apparent that there was no unanimous consensus as to Curzon‟s 
status among the highest echelons of power in Whitehall. This was starkly manifested 
after he resigned. With no communication from the ex-Viceroy, opinions were cleanly 
divided as to how he should be treated on his return. Brodrick (and Godley) did not 
want Curzon to get an honour (the peerage customarily bestowed on retiring Viceroys) 
because such an act might be read by the public as implying that the King‟s 
sympathies were with Curzon and not the British Government (for by this time they 
spoke of themselves as opposites).
55
 Balfour, however, was strongly in favour of the 
move; he could „not agree with those (if there be any such) who think that any 
differences he may so far have had with the Government, cancel his claims to their 
regard.‟56  
But Brodrick‟s writing to Knollys, quoting excerpts from the press which 
vilified Curzon, was more than a pitched attempt to have him denied a peerage and so 
( according to Brodrick‟s line of thinking) embarrass the Government. Brodrick, 
deliberately or otherwise, sought to actively undermine a source of power that Curzon 
might have clung to on his return; without it, he was out of politics for the next six 
years.  
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The India Council 
Thus far, the chapter has addressed the relations between what were the most 
visible sections and players within the India Office. Behind these was the India 
Council, traditionally portrayed as  an identikit body of the retired heaven-born, 
nursing crabbed jealousies of an incumbent Governor-General who had risen higher in 
India than they ever did or could ever hope to.
57
 According to Clinton Dawkins the 
India Council was one of the two major forces from which Curzon would meet 
opposition for his reforms, even though Hamilton managed to neutralize or evade their 
[the India Council‟s] opposition most of the time. But the Council was not just 
antagonistic to Curzon on its own behalf; its „tendency to oppose [was] stimulated by 
hints and correspondence from …people in India…who dislike change and dislike the 
pain of new ideas.‟58 The council, under the leadership of Alfred Lyall, of course 
looked upon these missives as proof that their policies and legacies were still going 
strong among those who might have served under them during the course of their 
Indian careers. This is not to suggest that the Council was homogeneous; Councillors 
held vastly differing opinions, and aired them with unequal degrees of 
conspicuousness and effect. This chapter does not aim to do more than separate the 
views and stances of the individual Councillors; part of the reason for this being that, 
while they were a major bone of contention between Curzon and Godley, the final 
explosive break-up of the Viceroyalty had nothing to do with the Council or the 
Councillors, and everything with the nature of the Curzon-Godley-Brodrick triangle. 
The reason for this, of course, is that the termination of Curzon‟s Viceroyalty owed 
much to high politics, and over appointments not within the sphere of the ICS/ 
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traditionally not within the purview of the India Council, who dealt with matters of 
civil administration only. But, as evidenced, many Councillors were very vocal about 
it. However, by the time 1905 rolled round, the Council of India was undergoing a 
major change in composition, most of the established members- Lyall,
59
 Crosthwaite, 
Bayley, MacDonnell, Peile, having retired, and Barnes
60
 having only just assumed 
MacDonnell‟s place. It was probably at its weakest in terms of political clout than at 
any other point during Curzon‟s Viceroyalty. This curious fact, that a Council whose 
alleged over-interference had been the major source of conflict between Curzon and 
Godley (and perhaps ultimately turned Godley away from Curzon) did not play any 
part in the summer of 1905 (why?), has been over looked by most biographers. It is as 
though after being pinpointed as a „relationship breaker‟ up to 1903-04, the Council 
subsides quietly into the dust as the Kitchener affair gathers steam. The minutes of the 
Council with regards to the Kitchener Affair are made important by their silence- they 
provide an understanding of how the civilian –military conflict between the Viceroy 
and the Commander-in- Chief (C-in-C) played out in London. As the thesis speculates, 
the role of the Council of India in the Kitchener-Curzon dispute has yet to be fully 
investigated; why did they, arguably one of the major thwarters of the Viceroy‟s plans 
for administrative reforms, apparently stay silent when confronted with an issue of 
great political and administrative magnitude?  The only apparent notation about the 
controversy is a minute regarding it as closed, as of 25 July 1905- at which time it did 
appear that Curzon and Kitchener had reached a working compromise. It is also 
possible that the Minutes of the Council do not reveal what went on. As a Council the 
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Councillors functioned as a block, and if one or more dissented over a move, the 
Minutes note the dissension, but are silent as to its cause. Thus, Sir H. Barnes‟ 
sympathy for Curzon over the issue of Military administration, for instance, is 
apparent only from his personal correspondence; as a Member of Council his 
individual voice is not on record.  The minutes of the Council of India, thus, as stand 
alone sources, cannot provide the necessary information to support a dissertation on 
the Council‟s role in Curzon‟s Viceroyalty. But the records do complement, and can 
be used to cross check, the private correspondence. They are useful, for instance, for 
understanding why a Secretary of State might have endorsed a move that he knew 
would not go down well in India, because he had taken the advice of the Council upon 
it and prioritised that over feedback from India. But we still don‟t really know why, or 
why not (especially the latter) the Council refused to endorse certain reforms. For this 
one must explore a combination of sources, over and including past polity on that 
particular subject, the Councillors‟ personal papers, their public speeches and writings 
on the subject, and examine extant political scenarios and how they would have 
appeared to individuals with differing administrative visions. Therefore, the records of 
the India Council are most useful for understanding the domestic workings of the 
Government of India; for example, we get detailed insights into the exact process and 
procedures through which the 6000 miles of rail were added to India during Curzon‟s 
time, especially a sense of the planning that went into deciding where best to allocate 
resources. 
 But the Council‟s relative silence over the Kitchener affair may also be because 
the handling of the Kitchener Affair was supervised, and largely conducted by, the 
Imperial Defence Committee instituted by A. J.  Balfour, and also because the Council 
as such was responsible for civilian affairs of administration only. But the Council, 
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because of its very role as an advisory body, could have demanded a through 
discussion of the Kitchener controversy as it dragged on, and did not. From their 
comparative silence one can assume that the centre of power in this affair was 
elsewhere.  
While such an approach negates the fluid dynamics that operated within the 
India Office, the situation was entirely in keeping with the class dynamics through 
which the government of Great Britain was organised, as well as the divide between 
civil and military administration. Kitchener‟s appointment and the subsequent 
intriguing involved the War Office, the British Cabinet and the Secretary of State and 
Godley merely represented the India Office‟s views, because it was an Indian affair. 
The India Council, being civilians as well as socially and politically largely un-
connected to the business of  Home British government, might express their views 
insofar as they wanted to support or criticise the Viceroy‟s policy, but they had very 
little access to the sources of power and decision making at Whitehall. It is true, 
however, that some of the more prolific Councillors, such as Alfred Lyall and Sir 
William Lee-Warner,
61
 made very public pronouncements on Curzon‟s policies and 
relations with the British Government, but the weight given to these was more due to 
their prominence in their Indian careers, than by virtue of the Councillor‟s offices they 
held. Thus, in the end, it emerged that any decisive turns and shifts in Indian polity 
would be dependent on political events to do with the Home Government, not with 
any of the constituent departments of the Government of India. The India Council was 
barred from the highest echelons of decision making in Indian polity. 
The first Council of Curzon‟s Viceroyalty was headed by George Hamilton as 
Secretary of State, and otherwise consisted of Sir S. Bayley, Sir J. Peile, Sir C. 
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Crosthwaite, Sir F. Le Merchant, Sir D. Fitzpatrick, Sir J. Mackay, Sir J. Edge and Sir 
P. Hutchins. As Secretary of State Hamilton presided over the Council whenever it 
met; they met regularly at weekly intervals. In the event of the Secretary of State 
being unable to attend, one of the Council presided; at one time it was Sir S. Bayley, 
and Sir P. Hutchins took the chair over the meeting that assembled after Curzon 
resigned as Viceroy- Brodrick was conspicuously absent. It is worth noting here that 
the Minutes of this meeting do not contain any references to Curzon‟s resignation; 
either it was not discussed, or left off the record. In general,  the India Council  appear 
to have taken up issues as they came up before them, and do not seem to have devoted 
a specific block of time to one agenda. The issues, headed „Papers on the Table,‟ 
would be discussed, and it would be „resolved‟ to take a particular course of action- 
this mostly took the form of a telegram to the Viceroy telling him of the Council‟s 
views and what he should do.   A glance at the index shows that they discussed all 
matters of administration that would have been similarly discussed by the Viceroy‟s 
Council in India, and even by the specific departments of provincial administrations in 
India; issues about infrastructure, decisions on local affairs, etc. They also discussed 
issues such as the settlements of claims for expenses and maintenance, extensions of 
tenure: basically decisions on the prospects sent up to London by the Government of 
India. They could also decide as to which papers and issues could be referred back to 
the originating departments for further work.  It could thus be said that the Council of 
India was something of a clearing house crucially involved in the managing of the 
communication stream from India to London and back.  This immediately blasts aside 
the popular assumption that the Council of India was merely a formal body constituted 
to advise the Secretary of State on large issues of polity. As a matter of fact, because 
of the heightened pace of contemporary politics, matters of large administrative issues 
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appear to have been debated upon in the British Cabinet as opposed to the India 
Council or even India Office.  
It is apparent, however, that the Council minutely scrutinized and took an active 
interest in every aspect of Indian administration- something, of course, that Curzon 
was given to greatly deploring. The Council discussed topics as wide ranging as the 
appointments and careers of the senior administrators of India, to the railway system 
in Bengal (they did not accede to Curzon‟s proposal for railway reform in 1903, which 
was a major factor in the souring of relations between Curzon and Brodrick, the then 
Secretary of State) to the extant political situation on Tinnelvely District, which was, 
to say the least, disturbed. They discussed Burmese affairs, as well as Indian affairs. 
But it is difficult to understand how the India Council could effectively contribute 
constructively on matters as to which contractor was suitable for the Simla-Kalka rail 
at a 7000 mile remove.  
The Council of India was also responsible for having communications from the 
Government of India conveyed to other departments which might need to be involved, 
mostly the Colonial Office. For instance, the mistreatment of Indians in South Africa 
was one of the issues Curzon vigorously pursued, and enquiries and directions as to 
the resolution of the matter were directed to the High Commissioner for South Africa 
via the Colonial Office via the Council of India/India Office. In this case the Council 
of India functioned as a liaising body for the Government of India and a link to 
departments in London which it would have been cumbersome to establish a separate 
line of communication with. This was undoubtedly useful but it did mean that the 
Council of India‟s status as a channel through which information flowed dictated that 
they could control that flow- something that the Government of India was perhaps 
right to resent. A body merely constituted for advisory purposes, supposed to hold no 
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legislative power, and moreover, having no checks upon its deliberations, should not 
really have been placed in such a  strong position vis-à-vis  the Government of India- 
after all, the Council of India should not have been in the position of a rival claimant 
for access to power in London when it was intended to make the Government of 
India‟s task easier, not harder, which is what both Curzon and the people on the 
Council of India during his time seemed to wilfully set out to do. 
* 
While Curzon‟s coming to office, and the specific circumstances that 
surrounded it, did much to precipitate a crisis in smooth relations between the Viceroy 
and the India Council, these tensions had a base in past polity. The violent clashes 
between Curzon‟s predecessor Elgin, and the India Office would in themselves have 
provided enough impetus to increase the said office‟s guardedness towards its 
proconsuls. The lingering distaste of Elgin‟s perceived ineptness, coupled with the 
general alarm with which an enthusiastic Curzon‟s appointment was regarded, meant 
that the India Office was doubly wary by 1898. The uneasy relationship was 
exacerbated when Curzon made it very clear that he did not care for the India Council, 
the favoured advisors for the India Office. Unfortunately for all concerned, Curzon‟s 
immediate predecessors had revelled in their roles as Great Ornamentals, and the India 
Council had got used to having Viceroys who were suitably subservient to the 
specialists- the old India Hands. The India Council did not, of course, exercise much 
power in its own right. As regards Indian matters, it could be overruled by the 
Secretary of State. As to its members exercising power in the British governmental 
apparatus, this was not very likely as they did not mostly come from the ruling class, 
and were in any case, specialised Indian administrators as opposed to politicians. But 
they could, of course, change the way a Viceroy was perceived by his contemporaries 
79 
 
in Parliament, by backing (or not) his policies. By dropping hints to the Council via 
the Secretary of State, a Government could, therefore, dictate Indian polity if it was so 
minded to do.  And when a Viceroy clashed with the Council, as Curzon did, 
whichever could prove themselves in the right to the Government would have the 
upper hand. 
This section looks at the relations between Curzon, Godley and Hamilton via the 
India Council principally because it was the powers assigned to this Council that 
became the major bone of contention between Curzon and Whitehall. For the 
Secretary of State, and especially Godley, who had never been to India, the views of 
the India Council were a back up that could be used to vindicate abstract government 
policies a Viceroy might bridle against, given that the India Council was supposed to 
consist of „experts‟ – moreover of the type that would have had more direct 
experience of India than any Viceroy. For the incumbent Viceroy, on the contrary, the 
same reasons would make the Council a meddlesome irritant. 
Thus,  Curzon‟s relations with this body, while they do not seem to have greatly 
affected the administration of India – the Council had a  veto vote in matters financial- 
did affect his relations with the Secretary and Permanent Under-Secretary of State for 
India. Since the latter functionaries worked in close proximity to the India Council, 
and their own relations with it were often delicately balanced-
62
 Curzon‟s fulminations 
against the India Council affected them too. Further, the extent to which the Council‟s 
stamp was discernible on Indian polity reflected on the prowess and influence (with 
the Councillors) of the Secretary of State; Clinton Dawkins remarked to Curzon that 
one of the reasons for the Council, which was, after all, merely an advisory body 
intended to assist the Secretary of State in forming opinions, being so restive was that 
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Hamilton could not exercise proper dominance over it,  and when he did, often 
downplayed triumphs to keep the councillors from breaking out in rage.
63
 But 
Hamilton‟s successor Brodrick seemed to have the Council behind him, and used the 
Councillors‟ public clout to swing opinion away from Curzon. But even Brodrick, 
generally disposed to back the Council over Curzon, admitted, however, that the 
Council of India, consisting as it did of „several men with strong personality besides 
long Indian experience…were disposed to scrutinize with special care the changes and 
problems which Lord Curzon showered upon them…‟64 It would seem that even those 
actually serving on the Council of India did not wholeheartedly approve of the nature 
of its functions: as Sir Alfred Lyall, one of the more eminent councillors, whom 
Curzon had wanted for the Governorship of Bombay,  put it; „one can prevent some 
mischief, but do little good, on the Council.‟65 The Council, of course, did not have 
the power to initiate new legislation! 
A less „political‟ reason behind Curzon‟s tempestuous relationship with the 
India  Council may be the possibility that the Secretary and Permanent Under 
Secretary of State relied thoroughly on advice from the Council, while the Viceroy felt 
his word should be the final one. Curzon‟s zeal for overhauling the administrative 
machinery may well have been viewed as too ambitious or unfounded by India 
veterans, and after all he did not have long experience of colonial governance to back 
up his claims- and this meant that the Council of India, for reasons aforementioned, 
would be listened to. 
Curzon himself very firmly saw the Council of India as being diametrically 
opposed to the Government of India, writing to Godley of „your Council,‟ and the 
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obstructions it put up against „our policy.‟ Curzon insinuated that the Council was 
being used as a front to wrest control of Indian affairs away from India: „Under the 
new theory of Indian Government, internal affairs, popularly believed to be the main 
function of the Government of India, are also controlled by the majority of the India 
Council in London.‟ 66  Brodrick in turn felt this approach only served to further 
alienate the Council, and induce them to throw obstacles towards the realisation of the 
Viceroy‟s vision for India; „because Curzon and the India Council did not get on, the 
Council started discussing things with greater freedom than they would otherwise 
have done.‟ 67  He expected the Council to be much more complaisant with  the 
Government of India‟s demands once Ampthill had been installed as Acting Viceroy; 
but by then the Council was out of the equation  insofar as the power stakes in the 
governance of India were concerned.  
It must not be assumed that the India Council was merely an anachronistic body, 
whose differences with Curzon were used as a clout-manipulator by the rest of the 
India Office and the British Cabinet. Hamilton was outspoken in his criticism of the 
Council‟s ways, and even Godley admitted in the wake of the 1882 famines that „there 
was a strong inclination on the part of the Council…to be parsimonious and to higgle 
[sic] over unimportant details in the making of contracts…‟ 68  Chief among the 
Council‟s faults was the propensity – widely but probably not disapprovingly noted- 
of the Councillors to be somewhat reactionary and proprietary of Indian 
administration. Railway expansion was one of Curzon‟s pet- and most successful- 
schemes, but the India Council did not initially take too kindly to it. As Clinton 
Dawkins explained apologetically to the Viceroy, „Lyall is the great obstacle to more 
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generous treatment of Railway enterprise…he is the old Qui [sic] Hai….and reflects 
the old attitude against interlopers.‟ 69  One wonders who the interlopers were-
presumably the 43 year old Viceroy, who had by then held office for three and a half 
years. Godley termed the all –round attitude to railway reform „unsatisfactory,‟ 
blaming the India Council for not backing it; „members of the council…have the whip 
hand of the Secretary of State, and it is extremely difficult to get them to take a broad 
or statesmanlike view.‟70 According to Hamilton‟s private secretary, the „real blot on 
the system is that the Council has power without responsibility…but…they 
understand the importance of things, and are only too glad to say, “We are powerless,” 
when their knowledge of affairs tells them that to act on their prejudices would 
involve really serious consequences.‟71 
The heavyweights in the India Council during Curzon‟s time were William Lee-
Warner and Sir Alfred Lyall. Since they were old India Hands, it was obvious that 
they would have decided views about the administration of India, which clashed with 
the Viceroy‟s. Curzon attributed this to professional jealousy. There were also Sir 
Charles Crosthwaite, who got on well with Lyall and was, as Lyall was at times, also a 
keen opponent of Curzon‟s policies, but a favourite of Godley‟s,72  Sir Steuart Bayley 
and Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, ex –Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, whom Curzon 
singled out as being a keen critic of his policies, in the mould of Sir Lee-Warner, 
again an eminent old India hand but by no means a Curzon supporter. There was also 
Sir A. MacDonnell, freshly back from India. 
Sir William Lee-Warner is one Councillor whose personality shines through the 
Council‟s minutes as a fierce and public opponent of Curzon‟s “centralisation” plans. 
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He was a complex man; he did not approve of Kitchener‟s military reform plans, but 
nevertheless backed his proposal to station three British battalions in India, especially 
in Western India, which he correctly surmised was the political mainspring of nascent 
Indian nationalism; on the other hand, Sir I. Finlay objected to this proposal, because 
the thought that devoting the budget surplus to military expenditure would be less 
constructive in terms of keeping the Indians happy than announcing a tax revision. 
Thus, we can reach conclusions about the extent to which the various individual 
Councillors participated actively in the proceedings and discussions of the Council 
and to what extent they employed their specialisms to this end. 
The person who dissented the most, in fact, was Sir Denis Fitzpatrick, ex 
Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, which rather vindicated Richmond Ritchie‟s 
assessment of him as being mired in Punjab politics. He also rather bore out Curzon‟s 
assessment that the councillors wanted to keep their hands in on the governance of an  
India they had left. One especially useful volume is that which details the dissensions 
made by various councillors over the years. Dissent by a particular councillor of 
course did not mean that that particular piece of legislation did not go through; in fact, 
the minutes of dissent record the views of those opposing legislation that had been 
passed through. It is in these minutes that the individualities of the councillors truly 
shine through, and it is also possible to discern how individual councillors felt about 
contemporary politics in Asia. From this volume we see that Fitzpatrick was 
responsible for 11 of the 23 non-consensual decisions handed down by the Council of 
India in Curzon‟s time, and 9 of those related to the Punjab- 3 pertaining to the Punjab 
Land Alienation Act, and the other 6 to the proposed railway expansion of the 
Frontier- while being ready to acknowledge that the policy of the Punjab Government 
had at times been wanting with regard to Frontier administration, Fitzpatrick, 
84 
 
nevertheless, could not resist a swipe at Curzon‟s „forward‟ policy, which was 
resented by those who preferred to train greater focus on securing the internal 
administration of India, nor did he approve of what he perceived as the Viceroy taking 
sole control of frontier policy. 
Until Sir Hugh Barnes took up his place on the Council, Lyall appears to have 
been the only one to carry on a regular correspondence with Curzon; not, of course, 
that the Councillors were obligated to do so. Curzon obviously regarded him as a 
capable administrator, offering him the Governorship of Bombay, but his views, on 
matters of comprehensive policy direction, were very different from those of the elder 
statesman. As Lyall wrote to the Viceroy,  
„The foreign relations of India are regulated by a kind of unwritten Monroe 
doctrine…we maintain over all the countries immediately adjacent the policy of 
allowing no intervention by other European nations, and the predominance of no 
influence except our own. [This] gives us such incessant occupation abroad in Asia, and 
brings us into continual contact or collision with European rivals.‟73  
 
This was exactly the line taken by most of the British Government, their 
apprehensions about unleashing Curzon in India revolving around the possible 
diplomatic fallout with the rest of the world. While Curzon‟s aggressive imperialism 
might have reflected the spirit of the age, it did not reflect the spirit of the tottering 
Conservative Government in the closing years of the Victorian era. Nor would it 
endear him to administrative veterans who had come through the Mutiny and did not 
want to rock the boat again.  That Curzon wanted Lyall in India when the latter was 
known not to support all his ideas is just another illustration of how he did not care 
about personal compatibility, but merely efficiency, when choosing people. 
The others, barring Crosthwaite, do not seem to have roused themselves to write 
at all; and by 1902 (which was when he declined, for the second time, the offer of 
Bombay) even Lyall‟s energies were flagging. As he admitted, „I am now so near the 
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end of my time [at the India Office] that my interest….is languishing.‟74 A Viceroy- 
especially one of Curzon‟s energy- could not have been faulted had he construed this 
as proof that the Councillors only hung on to their seats for pecuniary benefits, not out 
of any real interest in India.   
 
To some extent this was true; the Councillors used their positions to claim prime 
posts for their families. Both Lyall and Crosthwaite used the Viceroy‟s intercession to 
obtain appointments for their sons in India; Crosthwaite in the Central Provinces 
Commission and Lyall in the Political Service. In addition, Lyall‟s son-in-law was 
appointed as a Secretary to the Viceroy‟s camp. While this was very much accepted 
practice at the time, it would prove that the Councillors were not averse to put in 
requests for favours from a Viceroy they were allergic to.  But Curzon had the 
pleasure of informing Crosthwaite that clearance for his son‟s appointment lay with 
Hamilton; he could comment with ironic satisfaction that „I doubt not your colleagues 
in the India Office will be equally ready with myself to forward the career of the 
young man.‟75 
It was possibly this desire to retain undoubtedly advantageous and influential 
posts, with little attendant consequential responsibility, which engendered the over-
cautiousness that Dawkins was quick to scathingly point out to Curzon; as a rule, he 
said, Lyall, „sees a thing from at least six different points  of view, and leaves his 
hearer to make up his own mind.‟76 It may also have been the result of adjudicating 
many Indian law cases, as any ICS recruit invariably had to do. This indecisiveness of 
the councillors was well-known to all, and thus it came as a big surprise when they 
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unanimously backed so large-scale a reform as the “partition” of Bengal; Lawrence 
wrote to the Viceroy that he had fully expected them to funk it. 
77
 
But, going by the placidly affirmative responses of the India Council to such 
major legislation, including the Punjab Land Alienation Act, the Police Reforms, and 
the creation of the NWFP, it is apparent that they reserved the exercise of their powers 
for relatively minor reforms. As to the Council not interfering in major reforms, 
Curzon remarked that he relied upon „that quite invaluable Godley‟ 78  and the 
Secretary of State (at that time George Hamilton) to ensure that this state of affairs 
continued. It is contentious as to why the Council should pass major reforms if they 
really disliked Curzon‟s style of administration, unless they really did not wish to 
jeopardise the functioning of the Government of India by their petty squabbles.  Nor 
does it explain why Hamilton could not exercise his powers in getting the Council to 
acquiesce in Curzon‟s minor reforms as well. Nonetheless, Curzon‟s claim as to 
Hamilton‟s support is backed up, as we have seen above, by Curzon‟s ex-finance 
member and City executive Clinton Dawkins.   
And while Curzon was undoubtedly thankful that the Council generally only 
„interfered‟ in  smaller, less important pieces of legislation, he wondered how that 
justified their existence, especially when minor modifications were often made in 
response to alterations in the local scene, which the Council would not, obviously, be 
personally cognisant of. For instance, there was the proposal to relieve the Punjab 
Government of the administration of Simla. The Council cavilled. Curzon fumed that 
he did not know what the Council existed for, „if it is to be at liberty to reject in toto a 
scheme, elaborated by the Government of India with infinite labour, on so purely a 
local subject as the future administration of Simla, put forward by a unanimous 
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[Viceroy‟s] Council, and supported by two successive Lieutenant-Governors of the 
Punjab, the very people who are going to be despoiled.‟79 From this it would appear 
that  Curzon chiefly thought that the India Council‟s principal role should be that of a 
guiding body providing experience on major issues of polity using the vast 
accumulated experience of its members as a contextual light. It would also appear that 
he felt it should step in only when a decision was not fully backed by all those in 
immediate power in India, or that it was a likely to raise controversy or people had 
serious objections as to its workability. Curzon was,  in fact, anxious to reduce the size 
of the Council, advocating a paring down by not filling in vacancies as they arose. 
80
 
His vision for the Council appears to have been that of a broad advisory body, 
composed of people having latterly returned from India, which would provide for a 
continuum of policy and a contextual assessment of new legislation as it was 
introduced, as opposed to long –retired specialists who had made their mark in 
concentrated areas of polity. When Crosthwaite retired, he rejected a Colonel Yate to 
fill in the vacancy, because, among other things, the colonel‟s „knowledge [was] 
confined entirely to the frontier and only to certain sections of the frontier.‟81  It is 
possible that Curzon felt that appointing a person who specialised in a narrow area 
would merely lead to that individual insisting on his views being carried out over 
those of the Viceroy‟s, and inducing the rest of the Council to do the same. It was the 
argument for the statesman‟s view of overarching polity as opposed to the 
bureaucrat‟s view of narrow administration. 
Another Councillor was Sir J. Westland, who took his place on the Council 
immediately after going home following a stint as the Finance Member on the 
Viceroy‟s Council. Curzon had found him an agreeable person to work with, barring 
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that fact that his „financial puritanism‟ led him into collisions with the other members 
of the Viceroy‟s Council. It is possible that this “Puritanism” continued when 
Westland became a Councillor on the India Council. He, however, seemed to have an 
astute politico-economic brain, and over the question of the imposition of sugar duties 
observed to Curzon that „we [the Government of India] are wanted as the stalking 
horse, from behind whom the Home Government propose to slay an independent 
quarry.‟82 It would appear that Westland‟s predecessor as Finance Member, Sir J. 
Mackay, was similarly non-troublesome, though so tied up in City finance that he did 
not consider questions from other political angles at all. As Hamilton wrote to Curzon, 
echoing Richmond Ritchie,
83
 Mackay was a „very able man, influenced by a most 
intelligent commercial instinct, but his ideas and views are not those of the Council 
generally. He has none of the esprit de corps of the Indian Civil Service; he is in no 
sense hampered or influenced by the traditions of that service.‟ 84 The notation that the 
Finance Member was not always in tandem with the crusty ways of the rest of the 
council is all the more interesting when one notes that the Council most asserted its 
power over the Viceroy in matters financial as opposed to legislative. In fact, even 
Hamilton and Godley noted that that the Councillors were usually very happy to 
endorse any sort of legislative proposal, but were obstructive on most questions of 
financial legislation. According to Godley this was because blocking finance 
proposals gave them a chance to demonstrate their power over the incumbent Viceroy, 
while not standing in the way of better administration which could affect the mindsets 
of the governed: „in matters in which the public interest seems to them not to be 
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seriously involved, they should be apt to assert their supremacy.‟85 The conscientious 
Hamilton looked further into this propensity of the India Council and remarked that it 
did not bide well, as India did not need as much legislation as was then being applied 
to it (by Curzon) and it would be better for all concerned if the India Council blocked 
some of that.
86
 
In this case there was another aspect to the Council‟s objections; the funds for 
expansion looked likely to be drawn from the English Treasury, not the Indian, and it 
may well have been the possibility of protests from Parliament that made the Council 
proceed warily.  
A more affable Councillor was Sir Steuart Bayley. Like everyone (apart from 
the Finance Member) on the India Council, Sir Steuart‟s views had undoubtedly been 
shaped by his time in the ICS. It was natural that councillors seeking a continuum 
would view contemporary policies in the light of their own times in India. Bayley‟s 
career had followed the classic trajectory of an ICS career, with the additional proviso 
that he had spent most of his time in Bengal; but it is possible that having served there 
through the famines of 1872-73, he understood the need for administrative 
flexibility.
87
 
The above certainly demonstrates how the  India Council was not a monolithic 
body whose members stuck up for each other; certainly it would appear that it took 
new members some time to get into the proper clannish spirit of things! We note from 
the minutes of the Council that Councillors did not always agree or disagree on the 
same issue, nor was any one Councillor responsible for trying to block a course of 
action being decided upon or a directive being issued. But it also does not appear that 
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there were power blocks and cliques among the Councillors, for example, pro and 
anti-Curzon factions, of factions for and against specific lines of polity. Curzon was 
mistaken when he stated that the Councillors seemed to have deliberately ranged 
themselves against him; for example, Lee-Warner and Fitzpatrick were both hostile to 
many of his policies and reforms in India, but they did not collaborate or back each 
other up in Council to create a block of opinion, something that they could have 
brought about had they manoeuvred sufficiently. Sir Hugh Barnes took his seat on the 
Council in May 1905 at the height of the Kitchener affair. The Council in spirit was 
probably supposed to act as a benevolent advisory body, helping run the 
administration of India smoothly, and Sir Hugh professed himself  
 
„much astonished at the… hostility to… Your Excellency… assumed by several 
members of Council. Lee-Warner is of course always controversial and excitable, and 
his chief craze is that you are a terrible autocrat… that the members of the Viceroy‟s 
Council are non-entities ….highly dangerous and unconstitutional [situation].  
Fitzpatrick is the worst…always inputting motives, generally unworthy ones.‟  
 
He went on to hope that his own presence would have some kind of salutary effect: 
„that someone with recent knowledge stands up to…antiquated old members…will 
have its effect.‟88 Barnes himself  had taken his place on the Council straight away 
after returning from Burma; Curzon had wanted him there as a counterpoise to Lee-
Warner, because „his political knowledge will correct many of the vagaries of Lee-
Warner, while he has considerable all-round experience, charming manners, and great 
tact.‟89 Further, a person who was just back from India could provide a very valuable 
continuum of policy, and assess events in a contemporary context, and make the 
transition from Viceroy to Viceroy easier.  
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In conclusion, it may seem strange that a body whose chief grouse against the 
Viceroy was alleged over-centralisation, used their powers to constitutional 
superiority to concentrate, i.e. centralise, Indian administration in London, but this is 
not as paradoxical as it sounds. The problem was the struggle over the „need to 
identify the unit of autonomy,‟90 a process that could be said to be ongoing with 
respect to the provinces and the Government of India as well. But this was not as 
simplistic as deciding whether ultimate power lay with the Government of India or the 
India Office, because „the boundaries [of autonomy] are blurred inside the 
organisations as well as at its boundaries with related organisations.‟ 91 
Constitutionally, who would get ultimate power if ultimate power went to London; the 
India Office, the Secretary of State or the British Cabinet? There were also conflicts, 
as we have seen, between the personal, the political and ideological personae of 
individuals. People like Hamilton, for instance, though officially part of the „London 
clique,‟ sympathised with the Viceroy, even as they valued their positions in an 
official world not always in tune with Curzon‟s aspirations. The keynote here was to 
continually strike and maintain a delicate balance.  
Also, how autonomous was the Council? It was true that, being composed of ex-
India Hands, its members would have decisive views on Indian domestic 
administration, but none of the Councillors in Curzon‟s time had much experience of 
foreign policy, on which lay the greatest points of friction between Curzon and the 
Cabinet. Here, the Council could be vulnerable to political manipulation, persuaded by 
the Cabinet ministers and the Colonial office that Curzon‟s moves were potentially 
damaging to the Imperial fabric. They – or their alleged views- could be used as self-
exculpatory justifications for a move endorsed by the Secretary of State which he 
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knew to be unpopular with the Viceroy; Brodrick cited the Council‟s feelings as proof 
that advancing on Gyantse would be a mistake: „I have seen individually men 
differing so much as Sir Steuart Bayley, Sir James Mackay, Sir John Gordon, Sir 
Charles Crosthwaite…they all of them object to advancing.‟92 
The Council could also be used, more blatantly, as a cat‟s paw. As illustrated 
above, the Council was often used a means of justifying the actions of the Secretary of 
State or Godley. But it could go further; Balfour, wishing to exonerate Brodrick from 
Curzon‟s charge that he was obstructive, explained that the Secretary of State was 
sandwiched between the Council and the Viceroy;
93
- overlooking the fact that as 
Secretary of State Brodrick was head of the Council, with the power to over-rule it, 
and as to the Viceroy, he was his constitutional superior, with the power to overrule 
him as well. And certainly he enjoyed the support of much of the Council! Curzon 
was not above using the Council as a tool to wriggle out of diplomatically sticky 
situations either, writing to Balfour that he had actually wondered whether „Brodrick‟s 
advisers at the India Office,‟94 not Brodrick per se, desired to drive him to resign, thus 
preserving the modicum of a façade of amiability between himself and the two Bs. 
 
* 
So was the India Office right in trying to exercise an increasing degree of 
control over its „prancing pro-consul?‟  
In sum, I think not. The „job for which the Home Government was best fitted 
was that of laying down broad principles of policy for the guidance of the Indian 
authorities. For them to attempt to go further… was neither practicable nor politic.‟95 
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Curzon was not employing hyperbole when he stated that the British 
Government could not treat the Government of India, as though it were a „subordinate 
department,‟ such as, say, Finance, or transport, of itself. Constitutionally, the 
Government of India was not answerable to the Cabinet. The Viceroy was answerable 
to the Secretary of State, who was appointed by the Party in power, but beyond that 
the link stopped. A Viceroy could not be recalled even if the Party he happened to be a 
member of was kicked out of office in England. He was not bound to follow the 
doctrines of the ruling party in England.  
In conclusion, Curzon‟s struggles for autonomy from the India Office were 
much murkier and bitterly fought out than his clashes with anyone else involved in the 
running of the Indian Empire. This may mostly be attributed to the fact that the India 
Office was the final arbiter on all India affairs. But it was also because the constituent 
components of the India Office possessed a greater cohesiveness and integration 
during the latter half of Curzon‟s time in office than they ever did at any other time. 
* 
It would also seem that Curzon was right about the India Council deriving its 
ideas from the ICS days of its constituent members; Lee-Warner‟s description of the 
Bombay Presidency as an essentially politically unstable place echoes that of the 
police chief A.H. L. Fraser in India, as opposed  to that of Curzon‟s, who actually 
seems to have inclined towards a rather positive assessment of the presidency and its 
people; this probably says more about the differing assessments of the ICS and the 
governing elite than it does about Curzon‟s relationship with the India Council per se.  
The Council also tended to take a pan-Empire view of Indian affairs, something, 
which, if the Viceroy did, would be regarded as meddling in affairs out of his sphere.  
This actually underscores the advisory function of the Council, as they would have 
94 
 
been expected to provide broad-based advice after taking into account all possible 
angles of a question.  
The following chapters will examine how Curzon‟s colleagues in India 
responded to his attempts to run the administration his way, and how they and the 
India Office utilised each other to block this. 
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Chapter Three 
The Ordering of Subordination in the Presidencies. 
 
„If you have no objection, and if it would not be a bother to you…I should like to go to 
Bombay and bid you Godspeed. I should not…cause any official inconvenience as I should go 
to the Taj Mahal Hotel, and particularly ask that I might be allowed to come and go without 
any ceremonial attentions’…1 
-Baron Ampthill to Curzon, 05 September 1905.  
 
 
    British India was not the product of a hegemonic drive of conquest. The 
disparate provinces slipping from Mughal grasp had been conquered by a combination 
of British and Indian armies from three different bases; Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. 
While the act of 1858 unified the three „capitals,‟ the rivalry still smouldered, Bombay 
in particular chafing against the reins imposed on its autonomy by Simla.  
This chapter seeks to elaborate on the often hinted at, but never regarded as 
much more than the product of imperialist political gamesmanship, tensions between 
the Government of India and the Governors of its major presidencies, Bombay and 
Madras. These tensions rose to the fore during Curzon‟s Viceroyalty, in part because 
of his own decided views on the provincial contract and the personal fitness of the 
incumbent Governors. Further, as explored in the preceding chapter, Curzon‟s 
Viceroyalty marked an apex in political intrigue within the India Office, and the 
Governors of Bombay and Madras, being senior administrators hand-picked by the 
India Office, were understandably drawn into the fray. Finally, because Curzon was 
the first Viceroy to install a Governor as locum temens while he went on leave, it 
meant that there was a good deal more procedural upheaval than there had ever been 
before.  
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Curzon often complained about his Governors and Lieutenant-Governors being 
non-entities, and the scarcity of monographs about them do not appear to provide 
evidence to the contrary.  There is a single thesis detailing Lord Ampthill‟s acting 
Viceroyalty
2
, and a chapter on the career of Sir A.P. MacDonnell
3
. An interesting 
account of the „independence‟ that the Bombay Presidency arrogated to itself is to be 
found in Ian Copland‟s  study of Paramountcy in Western India;4 even though it deals 
with relations between the Government of India and the western Indian princely states, 
there is enough to come to the conclusion that Curzon‟s lamentations about the 
isolation of Bombay and Madras were justified.  Copland‟s own doctoral thesis, The 
Bombay Political Service, 1863-1924, promises to delve further into this topic, but 
like his magnum opus, largely focuses on Bombay- Government of India relations 
regarding the princely states and overseas charges of the Bombay Government. David 
Washbrook‟s Emergence of Provincial Politics: The Madras Presidency5 details much 
of the administrative legislation made by Curzon and Ampthill and provides some 
startling revelations that help dispel stereotypical  portraits of the pair as arrogant (and 
feuding) imperialists out of touch with the temper of the people.   This impression is 
immediately reinforced by Le Maistre‟s thesis cited above. This thesis is also 
fascinating in that it makes extensive use of Ampthill‟ s private correspondence 
alongside his official letters, fusing them into a complementary whole which helps 
build an engaging picture of Ampthill the man, as a conscientious administrator and 
office-bearer. Even as historians rail against centralisation and the cult of personality 
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in British India, their output is evidence of their own contribution to making this form 
of historiography dominant over all others.  
 
The Simla-Bombay-Madras Status Quo 
The obstacles to a smooth relationship between Curzon and the Governors 
started with the mode of selecting the governors itself. The Governors of Bombay and 
Madras, like the Viceroy, were appointed by the Crown for a term of five years, and 
were usually from the aristocracy. Given the half-way house status of these 
Governorships – being the headships of provinces of British India, they did not confer 
the same prestige or powers upon the incumbent as a proconsular post would- it was 
difficult to find suitable personages, and the appointments often degenerated into 
„society appointments.‟ Because the Governor did not normally have specific Indian 
experience, he had a Council consisting of a team of two members (as opposed to the 
Viceroy‟s six man Council) of the Indian Civil Service of 12 years standing to assist 
him- from that particular presidency‟s secretariat. This, as Curzon perceived, was the 
major flaw in a system where the Governors tended to be parachuted in from the 
outside- it made them susceptible to the depredations of the Bombay or Madras 
cadres. Finally, the Presidency Governor possessed the privilege of communicating 
directly with the Secretary of State,
6
 which put him in a position to carry objections 
about the Viceroy directly to the Viceroy‟s constitutional superior. The Governors 
themselves treasured this mark of distinction because it was not open to the heads of 
other Presidencies and provinces, and they considered that it elevated Bombay and 
Madras to a higher status by comparison. None of this was acceptable to Curzon, who 
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wanted uniformity in administration, and did not like grey areas, or those that could be 
considered as such.  
Thus, on the surface, the extant status quo looks simplistic; an authoritarian 
Viceroy backed by his status as head of the Government of India in India seeking to 
co-opt recalcitrant subordinates into a system of deference to Simla. But there are 
dualistic themes and angles to this; the individual governors and / versus the „temper‟ 
of the presidency; at times converging and at times diverging. In the case of the 
Bombay and Madras Presidencies it was not only a power tussle between the Centre 
and the State, such as that which convolutes India today. It was also rife with 
questions of personal and institutional rivalry. In some cases there might be a 
disagreement with the Governor over issues of personal prestige (as in the case of 
Ampthill who shared Curzon‟s penchant for ceremonial grandeur he thought would 
befit his position) while the administrative side would meet with Viceregal approval, 
as was also the case with Ampthill. On the other hand, the Viceroy (and perhaps the 
incumbent Governor) would come up against the inherent work culture of a particular 
presidency, while approving of the Governor. Thus, there were even differences in the 
approach with which the Presidencies and their Governors sought to negotiate away 
their  „subordinate to Simla‟ status. The only base commonality between both Bombay 
and Madras was that even as the „independent‟ Governors were often backed by 
Whitehall in their quest for greater autonomy (or, more precisely, the Viceroy 
attracted censure for not being gentle with them), ultimately, they were 
constitutionally subordinate to the Government of India, and so were their 
presidencies. Their subordinate position was pre-ordained; what remained were the 
struggles over reducing this subordination to a mere constitutionalism (or not) against 
the backdrop of an inchoate realisation of  the existence of a pan-Indian landscape. 
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Diagrammatically, the framework of the Curzon-Bombay-Madras relationships may 
be expressed as above. As apparent from the diagram, the following operative factors 
were instrumental in determining the nature of the Viceroy‟s two-way relationship 
with the Governors of both Bombay and Madras; Administration, Constitutionalisms 
and Work Cultures. These, channelled through the personality of the incumbent 
Viceroy and expressed to the Governors, then acquired their peculiar characteristics 
when perceived by divers individual Viceroys and Governors. In its turn, the 
Viceregal relationship (or the perception of it) with one of the given Presidencies set 
the tone for inter-presidency relationships between Bombay and Madras.  
It will thus be apparent that there were many rivalries contained within the 
apparently uni-dimensional Simla-Presidencies equations. This chapter will analyse 
the main threads of contention and differences, and examine how they manifested 
themselves under Curzon and the various Governors who served under him; 
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Sandhurst
7
, Northcote
8
 and Lamington
9
 in Bombay; Havelock and Ampthill in 
Madras. These relationships would have been rendered complex because of the 
traditional friction between these two presidencies and Calcutta and also because these 
were political appointments and the appointees, one would assume, possessed a 
degree of intriguing clout in the close knit governing circles of late Victorian England. 
Plus they turned out to be not very capable administrators, except, apparently,  
Ampthill, and Northcote. 
Against this, in the following chapter, will be set Curzon‟s apparently 
unproblematic relationship with the Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces, and 
his stormy relationship with the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. This chapter will 
also illustrate how Curzon‟s relationship with Ampthill,10 the Governor of Madras 
who was his locum as Acting Viceroy, got off to a bad start but matured into one of 
professional respect.    Curzon‟s relationship with the Second Baron Ampthill is a 
central case study, as Ampthill was Governor of Madras for all of Curzon‟s 
Viceroyalty and also acting Viceroy when Curzon went Home on leave in 1904.  It 
will then focus on the Viceroy‟s less intense engagement with the Governors of the 
Bombay Presidency (as opposed to his administrative work in the same presidency) as 
a means to highlight the flaws in the functioning of the administration of these two 
presidencies.   
 The major sources will be the private papers of the major figureheads, 
specifically the sections which contain their official correspondence with each other, 
my contention being that there is much to be revealed in the language of diplomacy. 
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Rather than picking out myself the anecdotes and evidences which are symptomatic of 
the prickly Simla –Bombay –Madras relationship, this thesis will use the incidences 
that seem to have inflamed the principal participants most and been construed by them 
as  being slights from their central or provincial counterparts.  
The core, overarching, unifying theme  in the power struggle between the Centre 
and the Presidencies was Centralisation, in principle and as it impinged upon 
administrative affairs (this would have affected Bombay more) and the expression of 
decentralisation and provincial autonomy in the presidencies‟ ceremonial trappings 
(which Madras, or its incumbent Governors, seemed to feel the greater). 
 
Centralisation vs. Decentralisation: the core of the conflict. 
Curzon once remarked on the Madras Governor‟s probable reaction if one of 
his districts came to him and demanded the same independence he saw Madras to be 
demanding vis-à-vis the Government of India.
11
 This comment, startlingly 
foreshadowing Midleton‟s that if Curzon had his way, India would be raised to the 
status of an independent and not always friendly power vis-à-vis the Government of 
Britain, reveals the deep rooted belief in adhering to established hierarchies of power 
within the Governmental corpus of the Indian Empire.  Centralisation (and its 
opposite) was always going to remain a relative term; this does not, however, mean 
that the people fighting for or against it saw it in such dispassionate lights.  
 Centralisation essentially amounted to a concentration, as opposed to a 
federalised diffusion, of power. For Bombay and Madras, however, the resistance to 
centralisation was as much due to the nature of the centralisation and the 
administrative spheres it affected as the principle of the thing, apart from the loss of 
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control over their administrations. Pre-Curzonian decentralisation meant that  
administrative matters in Bombay and Madras were more often dealt with internally, 
and thus did not come to the forefront in their dealings with Simla. The combination 
of Curzon‟s exactitude and his „centralising‟ zeal ensured that their affairs were now 
at the forefront of Viceregal scrutiny.  
There were, basically, two arms to the centralisation debate, Financial and 
Administrative, the latter affecting, or having the potential to affect, the provinces‟ 
control over their finances. Both Bombay and Madras were  only partially in control 
of their financial commitments, the regulations for which were decided every 5 years 
when the proportional distributions between the Centre and the Various provinces of 
India was worked out in a formula known as the Provincial Contract.
12
 It would 
appear that Bombay and Madras felt that if centralisation was to be imposed, then 
their financial expenses should be borne by Simla in greater proportion (cf. the 
Municipal boards row).  In the case of Madras, Havelock, especially virulent about the 
perceived ill-effects of centralisation, focussed largely on the financial, whereas his 
successor, whose administration was certainly better than Havelock‟s, was concerned 
with administrative autonomy. The prime concern of the Presidencies, especially 
Madras, as to over-centralisation centred around its financial drawbacks to themselves, 
which was why they argued for financial decentralisation. But Curzon‟s prime 
concerns as regards centralisation or otherwise were centred around issues of 
legislative and administrative autonomy. As he explained to Havelock,  
„When we have been writing about over-centralisation…we have had in our 
minds rather different things. Your eye has been fixed throughout on the Provincial 
Contract…[but] it is a matter of correspondence between our Governments….I do not 
know that I am particularly enamoured of the Provincial Contract system.‟13  
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What Curzon meant by centralisation was that the presidency governments and 
Simla could engage together on legislative issues; he did not want the Central 
Government to be seen a merely a issuer of laws or a government that was a rubber 
stamp to provincial decisions.  
 
 In the realm of internal administration, an issue that affected both Presidencies, 
it was the lack of financial autonomy that prompted an outcry.  Ampthill had enjoined 
the newly-appointed Lamington to read the Life of Sir Bartle Frere, the legendary 
1860s Governor of Bombay, as an example of the argument against centralisation.
14
 
Frere, who was steeped in the lore of the Bombay Presidency, having started his 
career at Poona, eventually rose to be one of the most efficient Governors of Bombay. 
To illustrate the ludicrousness of the tendency to centralisation, his biographer states 
that, as a result of it, „the Bombay Government was not even left to reform and 
organise its own Public Works Department (in Frere‟s day the PWD made some 
wholesale changes, such as finally destroying the battlements of the old Bombay Fort), 
but was forced to make it conform to the Calcutta Secretary‟s notions of what was 
best.‟15   Such an argument against centralisation was a conflation of the defence of 
„ancient privilege,‟ the virtues of the man on the spot, and the inability of the 
Government of India to control and manage a highly centralised structure. Indeed 
Frere‟s biographer claimed that even a Viceroy‟s powers were eroded as a result of 
centralisation (Curzon‟s motive for the same being quite the reverse) claiming that, 
„the departments at Calcutta become more and more independent, each secretary 
administering his own with less and less consultation with his colleagues or the 
Governor-General, who often knew little of what was being done till he was appealed 
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to put an end to friction or settle a farce.‟16 This sentiment, if quite in a different 
context, was echoed by Curzon.  
Decentralisation for the Bombay Government did not extend to financial self-
sufficiency. It is also notable that only 1.86 lac rupees of the famine relief expenditure 
made by the Bombay Government came from a combination of local government and 
charitable funds.
17
 This would suggest that famine relief was exclusively the 
prerogative of the centre; the presidencies were quite happy to have access to centrally 
managed funds. Like Bombay, Madras also chafed at its relative lack of autonomy in 
financial matters.
18
 Prudently, such dissent was directed to Hamilton, who might be 
safely relied upon to communicate it to Curzon, who would probably furnish a 
stinging, if accurate, reply, if the Governor suggested it to him.  There was some truth 
in Madras‟ argument. He seemed to feel that with increasing legislative autonomy, the 
provincial governments would increasingly „treat the supreme Government [i.e. the 
Government of India] as though they were merely a post office for the transmission of 
their correspondence to the Secretary of State.‟19  In this particular case the Madras 
Government had wanted the Viceroy to ask the Secretary of State to endorse a 
punitive police force for disturbed districts in South India (possibly Tinnelvely); they 
did not ask for the Viceroy or the Indian Police Commission‟s opinion, and did not go 
into the financial specifics either. There are interesting nuances to this episode. First 
of all it would appear that the provincial governments had a very good idea as to the 
exact delimitations of a Viceroy‟s power, especially in relation to London. It is also 
interesting that Havelock did not use his own right of correspondence with the 
Secretary of State to forward his plea, but went via the Viceroy, which would seem to 
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be an acknowledgement of a Viceroy‟s supremacy in India. It is also possibly a 
realisation of the fact that Hamilton would not have taken kindly to an administrative 
request which came to him over the head of the Viceroy. In effect, Madras was using 
the Viceroy‟s constitutional superiority as a means of getting what they wanted, and 
also remaining in the Viceroy‟s good books by a seeming subservience to that 
authority. 
20
 
But Curzon took pride in micro-managing local governments from Simla; such 
centralising was, of course, the best way of ensuring that the macro-reforms he was 
instituting contained any appliqué value at all and percolated down the Presidential 
Governments, thus coming into contact with the daily lives of „the Governed,‟ who 
were, of course, to be kept happy if the Empire was to remain stable. This would 
explain the reason why even the relatively non-important Madras Municipal 
Corporation (Bombay being responsible for a mercantile empire and Calcutta being 
the seat of Government) faced Curzon‟s reforming zeitgeist. This too was tied up with 
centralisation and provincial responsibility for their own finances; the Madras Board 
objected to having a grant of 1.5 lacs converted into a loan.
21
 They argued that since, 
at Home, Imperial aid was granted to local resources, the same principle should be 
applied in India. In this case, of course, they appeared very willing to acknowledge 
their subordination to the Government of India. Over finances, thus, the issue of who 
would wield overall authority was compromised over ideals of economy.  
Not unnaturally, the Governors of Madras and Bombay threw themselves into 
the campaign against centralisation. Havelock
22
 told Curzon that  
„holding as I do very strongly these views on the need for further 
decentralisation… I cannot agree…that the presidential Governments are already in 
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some ways independent. Possibly, if I were Viceroy, I might think as you do in this 
matter, but being Governor of Madras, I cannot.‟23  
 
However, even when his successor as Governor, the Second Baron Ampthill, 
became acting Viceroy in 1904, he certainly did not use the opportunity to „see the 
matter as Curzon did,‟ but contrarily,  straightway reassured his Bombay counterpart 
of his enduring commitment to decentralisation.
24
 The other grievance Ampthill did 
not hesitate to raise straightaway, in the same letter, was that of the Bombay and 
Madras Presidencies‟ antagonism to „centralization‟ [sic].  This would definitely have 
vindicated Curzon‟s view that the Governors of these presidencies were incapable of 
seeing beyond their own small spheres of influence.  
„Decentralization [sic] is all very well; but it appears to me, in the case of 
Bombay and Madras, to have been carried to a point in which the supreme government 
is nowhere, and of which the petty kings of those dominions are even unconscious that 
responsibility attaches to anyone but themselves…the system seems to me in very 
urgent need of reform.‟25   
 
He railed against the „mock independence‟ 26  claimed by Bombay, telling 
Godley that „decentralise as much as you like as regards administrative detail, but not 
as regards supreme executive authority.‟ 27 
From the point of view that decreed a Viceroy should be the undisputed 
executive of the Government of India, Curzon was justified in railing against 
decentralisation. Sometimes decentralisation, (especially coupled with un-co-
ordinated appointments) could become a very real impediment to a Viceroy‟s exercise 
of free authority.  James Fergusson, the Bombay Governor so famously sent out as a 
backup to the Conservative Lytton, who found himself serving under the Liberal 
Ripon after election reverses at home, became a real impediment to the reformist 
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Ripon, partly because of his ability to correspond directly with the Secretary of 
State.
28
 Certainly such a complex situation did not arise in the Presidencies during 
Curzon‟s Viceroyalty, which marked the apex of the long Conservative ascendancy in 
British politics. 
It would seem, however, that most people at the top of the governmental 
hierarchy, except Curzon, did not believe centralisation to be a good thing insofar as a 
heterogeneous country like India was concerned. The Home Government, for one, 
especially after 1903, when Curzon‟s old friends Balfour and Brodrick were Prime 
Minister and Secretary of State respectively, seemed to view de-centralisation as a 
means of keeping a check on the incumbent Viceroy through manipulation of his 
Presidency Governors and prominent people from presidency secretariats. The first 
„Indian‟ function St. John Brodrick chaired after becoming Secretary of State in 1904 
was a lecture about the Bombay Presidency given by Sir William Lee-Warner at the 
Society of the Arts in London. Lee-Warner‟s views, gleaned from long experience in 
Indian administration, happily coincided with the Home Government‟s and were also 
a useful counteraction to the Viceroy‟s. 29 According to Sir George Birdwood, who 
was present, the lecture was a direct call for the „maintenance of the status of 
[Bombay Presidency‟s] Administration in having direct dealings with the Secretary of 
State, as a check upon the centralising tendencies of the day.‟  Lee-Warner further said 
that the Governor of Bombay should be selected by the Crown, because it not only 
provided India with a statesman in the confidence of the Government, (who could also 
become Viceroy in Emergencies!) but imposed a check on the „dangerous tendency of 
over centralisation, by placing Home authorities in direct communication with the 
Governors.‟ This was basically encouraging the Governors to sneak on any 
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„centralisation-minded‟ Viceroy. This inspite of the fact of the three greatest of the 
Bombay Governors- Frere, Temple and Elphinstone- having been ICS men. The 
virtues of the „man on the spot‟ were also trotted out, but had this principle been 
stretched to its fullest extent, the „man on the spot‟ would logically have risen, like 
Lawrence, through the ICS.  But the Home Government seemed to understand it as 
„their man on the spot!‟  But Lee-Warner‟s reasoning was that the Government of 
India is not intended by Parliament to administer the whole Empire, but is charged 
with control and supervision over all its parts; it is well that it should be able to 
compare the effects of different systems.‟30 
Others inveighed against centralisation from rather more altruistic motives. A 
curious passage in George Hamilton‟s memoirs blames Curzon‟s methods of single-
handed reform for aggravating the evil of centralisation, which he then proceeds to 
claim as the cause of the recent upsurge in demands for provincial Home Rule. He 
then goes on to laud Curzon for sending in his resignation as Viceroy, „because he had 
sense enough to see that a similar centralisation [presumably to what he assumed 
Curzon was trying to achieve in civil administration] in military affairs could only 
result…in inefficiency and failure.‟31 This statement of course was made with the 
hindsight of Kitchener‟s failure in India, and had not occurred to Hamilton, or anyone 
else, in 1905. 
In 1900, however, Curzon still held the reins, and the formation of the NWFP
32
 
was another attack on decentralisation; a raid near Kohat was brought to the Viceroy‟s 
notice nine months after it had occurred. When Curzon  wrote to Mackworth Young 
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about this, the Lieutenant-Governor, in a fashion similar to that practised by Madras 
and Bombay, replied that the fault was not his but that of his Secretariat; „but did you 
ever hear of such a defence or of such a system?‟33 It might have been said of the 
defence of their „ancient privileges‟ by Bombay and Madras too. It is easy to see how 
Ampthill became a good administrator once removed from a provincial administration. 
Curzon also very astutely turned the tables on those who opposed centralisation 
while hammering out the creation of the NWFP, primarily because the Punjab 
provincial administration could not cope with the different conditions of governance 
the frontier required. As he noted,  
„it has frequently been argued that the intervention of a Local Government 
between the Government of India and the frontier, involves a wise and necessary 
decentralisation…on the contrary, it results in centralisation of the pettiest and most 
exasperating description…it has yet been the source of exaggerated centralisation [and] 
of interminable delay.‟34 
 
Nor did Curzon miss the point that centralisation meant that the Viceroy could 
assume greater responsibility; with his acknowledged genius for administration, he 
could only see this as a good thing: „Of course the Government of India has,‟ he wrote 
to Mackworth Young, 
 „from time to time, to overrule all the Local Governments. In a case like that of 
the Punjab Government the responsibility is largely personal to myself, because the 
matters concerned ordinarily fall within the scope of the Foreign Department, and 
relate…to Frontier Policy.‟   
 
By implication, severing the administrative link between the Punjab and the 
Frontier by the creation of a new Frontier province, would not only free the Punjab 
government of the irritation caused by the sharing of power, but also mean that 
frontier concerns would cease to have influence on Punjab legislation and 
administration. Curzon further stated that such overruling was „the price that any 
Lieutenant- Governor of the Punjab has to pay for a Viceroy who knows something of 
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the Frontier.‟ 35  The implication, of course, was that subjects crucial to imperial 
security could not possibly be left to a mere provincial administration. The only 
reason that Bombay, even with all its overseas and princely possessions, was not 
subjected to such stripping was that these charges were not, in Curzon‟s time, of 
Imperial concern; i.e. a security threat to Empire, which was possibly a factor that 
allowed the persistence of Bombay‟s defiant stance regarding the Government of 
India- Bombay was not a priori. And while Curzon and the Mackworth Youngs
36
 
totally severed relations with each other over the NWFP episode, it is notable that any 
bad blood between Curzon and the Presidency Governors was always confined to 
office. It is thus apparent that Curzon did not always resent his subordinates‟ attempts 
to redress his often tactless exercise of righteous power; what he resented was being 
corrected by an inferior. Bombay and Madras were accorded the status of equal 
sparring partners, at least in terms of status relative to the other provinces- Curzon 
himself was not immune to using  status as a determinant to interacting with his 
officials in India.  
 
Apart from the centralisation debate, which was properly germane to the issue of 
executive control of the Administration of India, contretemps flared up between 
Curzon and the Governors over symbolic issues, the main ones being the Governors‟ 
constitutionally enshrined right to write to the Secretary of State, and their self-
arrogated privilege of having the state bands play the National Anthem for them- both 
of which Curzon considered to properly belong solely to the Viceroy.  
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 Curzon‟s objections to the Governors writing directly to the Secretary of State, 
for one, may be seen as part of his drive to consolidate and extend the under-threat 
authoritarianism of the Viceroy, especially in the face of „modern‟ means of 
communication. The Governors' aversions to this were simply the result of not 
wanting to interfere with long established practice. Curzon, it would appear, did not 
only want to centralise, he wanted to  make the Viceregal office a focal point of this 
centralisation. In not underestimating Indian reverence for a strong office and the 
importance of the existence of some form of supreme authority on the spot in India, he 
was probably right. But this was not the direction the Home Government wanted, and 
nor was it the direction an increasingly regionally aware India wanted.  
In fact, the Governors appeared to think that Curzon‟s sole reason for keeping a 
watchful eye on the administrations of Bombay and Madras was the desire to rob them 
of their special rights at an opportune moment; „I can only,‟ wrote Lamington, 
„ascribe the resentment of the Simla Secretariat to the wish to curtail the Madras and 
B[om]bay Gov[ernmen]ts of… their few peculiar privileges.‟37 That he specifically 
referred to the Secretariat as opposed to the more personalised term „Viceroy‟ is 
perhaps an indication that it was the Bombay cadre as a whole who worried about 
being supplanted by those lucky enough to get permanent appointments at Simla.  
In this case Curzon was probably right in recommending that political 
appointments to the Governorships of Bombay and Madras be abolished, because they 
only helped the furtherance of the autonomy these presidencies arrogated to 
themselves.  Taking into account all this, plus the 9
th
 Lancers incident, and his views 
about the House of Lords, it emerges that Curzon was not at all the pro-aristocratic 
Tory he is purported to be. In any case, with the exception of MacDonnell, it was the 
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senior ICS officers who appear to have had more  active say in matters of 
administration than provincial governors, or at least (in Madras and Bombay) lobbied 
actively for such; and MacDonnell himself had risen through the ranks of the civil 
service to become governor of the United Provinces.  
 
Madras: the Governors’ haven. 
  
If centralisation was a binding issue of concern for both Bombay and Madras as 
far as their views on their relationship to Simla were concerned, there were other, 
unique concerns, as well as subtle differences in the battle against centralisation in 
each of these presidencies.  This section looks at Madras.  
Madras was far away from the centre of political and commercial action, and 
politically unawakened compared to the rest of India. While the shooting of Rand and 
Ayerst in Bombay in 1897 did not come as a surprise in principle, Havelock had 
occasion to write to Curzon when the Queen‟s statue was tarred on her 80th birthday 
that he was „particularly sorry that such a thing should have happened in Madras, a 
place hitherto conspicuous for immunity from disgraceful acts of this kind.
38
 In fact 
one of Havelock‟s excuses for not writing to Curzon as frequently as the Viceroy 
would have liked was that „as a rule there is not much to report from this ordinarily 
tranquil and well-ordered Presidency.‟39 
This Havelock was Sir Arthur Elibank, who probably resented a new Viceroy 
telling him how to run a province he had been Governor of since 1895. Havelock was 
perhaps the most intransigent of all the Governors, and his frictional relationship with 
Curzon seems to have become the historian‟s basis for claiming rockiness in Curzon‟s 
other relationships as well. The Havelock –Curzon correspondence is acrimonious, 
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and  singularly graceless in tone as compared to those exchanged between Curzon and 
Ampthill, Curzon and Lamington, Ampthill and Lamington. They plunge right into 
business matters rather than dilating on the normative pleasantries usually exchanged 
between such correspondents. Initially, however, in a stark contrast to the gloomy 
apprehension with which he viewed Ampthill‟s appointment, Curzon had been 
uncritical of the bridge- baptising Sir Arthur,
40
 who did indeed have his redeeming 
features. Curzon  strait-jacketed him as „ a type of official whom the Colonial Office 
turns out,‟41  and  later admitted, again to Hamilton, that he had been less than just and 
that he had found Havelock to be  „quite indifferent to the prejudices of the Indian 
official… hold [ing] just and liberal views about the way in which to administer his 
province.‟42  
Yet six months later he was fulminating that Havelock was a „capable 
controversialist;‟43 he had not approved of aspects of the Governors‟ correspondence 
with Hamilton, which apparently tended to assume a self-righteous tone. As a matter 
of fact Havelock seems to have turned the tables very neatly on the Centre, accusing 
them of proliferating the very thing the Viceroy was attempting to stamp out- 
paperwork. An obviously impressed Hamilton included an extract from one of the 
Governors‟ letters, infuriating the Viceroy. Havelock complained that 
 „as long as circumlocution and centralisation have their throne and court at 
Calcutta and Simla,  it is hopeless to expect that the minor administrations, which 
model themselves upon and love to reflect the glories of the Supreme Government, will 
change the traditions and practices in which they have been bred.‟44  
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In the same letter he also stated pompously that another reason for not writing to 
Curzon (Curzon expected, and returned, a monthly letter from each of his Governors) 
was that he wrote every week to the Secretary of State, adding in parenthesis that the 
Governors of Madras and Bombay were required to do this,
45
- (cf. Lawrence‟s 
comment on Old India Hands‟ resentment of the arrival of  the new superior Viceroy)  
presumably this excused them from writing to their immediate superior!   Basically as 
a governor Havelock was efficient, even as he appears to have adopted a laissez-faire 
style of administration, especially proving himself in relief operations. In fact, he 
seems to have been as incensed by administrative inefficiency as his Viceroy; he 
wrote to Curzon that when he had first arrived in Madras, he had been „appalled‟ at 
the inefficiency of its administration, but having been there for three years, he 
suggested that he might perhaps have succumbed to the „Oriental environment,‟46 and 
imbibed something of the Madras cadre‟s inefficiency. His letters contain many 
references to the princes of Arcot, Travancore and the Carnatic. He reserved his ire for 
these princes on the grounds that they were somewhat indifferent administrators, a 
point which Curzon also worked to eradicate.  Hamilton wrote to Curzon almost a 
year after Havelock‟s departure that his methods of plague control were being 
„universally adopted by the different local administrations…he seems [to have struck] 
the balance between harshness and lavish expenditure.‟47 This, along with the track 
record of Havelock‟s successor Ampthill, would prove that however self-important 
Madras might be, in matters of administration the Presidency seems to have had a 
humanitarian tradition of administration.  
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 Havelock in fact took an active interest in his successor and appointments to his 
staff, if only to groom the said successor into upholding Madras‟ autonomy. One of 
the papers he left behind for his successor to pursue was a missive composed by 
member of the Madras Civil Service, outlining the special privileges the Governors of 
Madras and Bombay were entitled to enjoy in comparison to the lesser Lieutenant-
Governors of the other provinces. Ampthill duly sent this off as a backing to his own 
arguments in Madras‟ favour to the Secretary of State.48 It is possible that Ampthill‟s 
early stormy relationship with Curzon was due to his following Havelock‟s tradition 
of administration; as he found his own feet, the relationship proportionately mellowed. 
The contretemps remained, but took on a more “Ampthillian character,” being flare 
ups over ritual as over administrative details, in which Ampthill seems to have been 
impressed by Curzon‟s line and applied it efficiently to Madras. 
In the cases of Madras, as with the princely states, power struggles were apparently 
more about the symbols of ritualism, precedence and constitutional status. Precedence 
was the most fiercely contested, it being the most visible symbol and affirmation of 
„superiority‟ or otherwise. This seems to have been especially aggravated in the case of 
the Second Baron Ampthill, Governor of Madras 1900-1906.  Curzon had welcomed the 
appointment of Ampthill, if with certain misgivings as to how his youth (he was 29, but 
had done a stint at the colonial office prior to Madras) would be received by the Madras 
cadre, and even forewarned Ampthill about the traditional friction between the Madras 
Govt and the Government of India,
49
 probably in an attempt to forestall a repetition with 
himself and Ampthill. But very soon the relationship seems to have degenerated into a 
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worse one (if only temporarily; Curzon later got on capitally with Ampthill, even though 
he never expressed the very vocal admiration for his administrative prowess that he did 
for MacDonnell‟s) than  Curzon had with his predecessor Sir Arthur Havelock. Curzon 
opened with a broadside on the unconstitutionality of Ampthill wishing that the title of 
„Her Excellency‟ be attached to his wife, whereas Curzon wished to reserve the use of 
this solely for the Vicereine as a mark of her constitutional status. 
50
  A few posts later, he 
complained about Ampthill breaking the Indian Warrant of Precedence and giving his 
sisters-in-law rank  over Indian dignitaries,
51
  following this up with the charge that the 
Governor ought not be allowed to have his band play the National Anthem at his 
approach, because local governors were not entitled to this, because „the Governors do 
not act on behalf of the Sovereign.‟ Only the Viceroy, representing the Monarch, was 
entitled to the National Anthem, but the governors of Bombay and Madras insisted, and 
Havelock had got around the rule by  
„carrying his own band about with him everywhere, and making them play the 
National Anthem whenever he turned up…Ampthill…must have it twice. A British 
regiment plays „the King‟ as he approaches the hall; his own band strikes up as he 
enters it. This…is an expansion of ceremonial to which even the Viceroy never 
aspires.
52
  
 
For Curzon thus, two issues rankled; the unconstitutional practice of playing an 
anthem whose honour he felt derived from what it represented, and the fact that, by 
laying greater stress on this form of ceremonial than the Viceroy, the Governors were 
trying to exalt themselves not only above their stations, but also above that of their 
constitutional superior, the Viceroy.   
 The Secretary of State, though „very desirous of not stirring up this class of 
question,‟ fully agreed with Curzon, and replied that he would point this out to 
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Ampthill.
53
  But apparently the system continued once Hamilton departed from office, 
and his successor, St. John Brodrick,  did not want to stir up the issue, knowing it to 
be a sore point with the Bombay and Madras Governments, and opined to Curzon that 
it was „better to let sleeping dogs lie.‟54 But it was a sore point with Curzon also, and 
he wrote back acrimoniously that he expected a course of action endorsed by 
Hamilton to be continually enforced by his successor, and that it should not be left to 
him to uphold these constitutionalisms of protocol in India; „it is not for the Viceroy to 
have friction with his subordinate Governors by rubbing in the orders of the India 
Office. It is rather for the Secretary of State…to remind the offender…not to repeat 
the transgression.‟55 It is apparent that the hierarchy of the Raj was not just based on 
gradations of power, but also upon specific types of power being exercised by persons 
in specific offices. To exercise power that was not the general provenance of one‟s 
office was itself an indication of possible lack of power or ability to enforce righteous 
power within that office.  
Further, the India Office‟s lackadaisical response to an issue that was clearly felt 
deeply by all the Indian administrators involved suggests that they did not grasp the 
depths the issue sounded in India. One may compare to this their hysterical response 
when Curzon appealed to the King, over their heads, and thus, according to them, 
unconstitutionally, to let him announce a tax remission at the Durbar. Then, it was 
Curzon who was bewildered by the vehemence of their objections to what he 
considered a perfectly ordinary and justifiable act. The India Office‟s mild put-down 
of the National Anthem spat as a non-issue not only failed to appreciate the threat 
Curzon saw to his constitutional superiority, but also (in assuming that the Governors 
would just need a light suggestion to stop playing the anthem) the Governors‟ 
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cherishing of an act they saw as establishing the distinction between their presidencies 
and the rest of India, and their comparative equality to the Viceroy, as opposed to 
other Lieutenant-Governors.  
But the easy-going Hamilton was not cognisant of this underplay of 
psychological warfare, and it was not until repeated breaches of protocol and 
administrative lacunae in Madras were brought before him by Curzon that he ventured 
to pronounce that „Madras is detached because there is little going on in that sleepy 
presidency of sufficient importance to necessitate references to the India Office.‟56 
The implication was there was not much lost due to Madras‟ un-communicativeness. 
Of course the same justification could be used to argue that the Governors of Madras 
should not be allowed the privilege of corresponding directly with the Secretary of 
State, as did the Viceroy, but Curzon did not employ it, preferring to base his 
arguments of theories of precedence and constitutional superiority. 
 It was not just Ampthill who was at fault, though, but the entire character of the 
Madras Cadre. Madras, according to Curzon, was „out-of-the-way, and consumed with 
a sense of its own importance exactly proportionate to the consciousness that most 
people regard it as a somewhat insignificant  and second class concern…pretensions 
[in Madras] have always been pushed more fiercely than in Bombay.‟57  Ampthill was 
eventually recognised and made acting Viceroy, perhaps at the instance of the  India 
Office, where Godley held him in high esteem, once venturing to rebuke the Viceroy 
that  he- Godley- would „venture to say positively that Ampthill is not incompetent.‟58 
Hamilton seems to have been less sanguine, attempting to console Curzon by stating 
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his belief that Curzon would find „that the social and ceremonial side of the 
Viceroyalty would be maintained at a very high level while you were away.‟59  
Contemporary scholars have also backed the contention that the administration 
of the Madras Presidency was not so very bad because „If association with the 
administration of Fort St. George immediately and of itself produced the force with 
which officials could smash the hegemonies of non-officials and establish their own 
rule‟- a reference to  the superimposition of an anglicised structure over local 
hierarchies of administration-  „then that administration must have been very powerful 
and must  have been able to command in society an overwhelming preponderance of 
force.‟60 Which it would not have been capable of doing if it was not efficient enough 
to hold the public trust.  
The basic problem, then, lay with the system of governance that Curzon had to 
ensure that the Madras government functioned as a part of, and the channels through 
which he had to direct its administration. The system of Madras governance may have 
worked all right –at half-speed- when applied to Madras Presidency in isolation, but it 
would not do when faced with the exigencies of being tied to the Government of India, 
which in turn was tied to Whitehall and the larger currents of Empire. Madras had to 
be efficient in order to serve the interests of the Empire.
61
  This was not the attitude of 
people in Madras; even though it was a „very inferior outpost‟ 62  of Empire, the 
absence of local political institutions meant that the Governor of Madras could rule 
like an absolute ruler, and there was as much intrigue around him as around the Indian 
Princes- though this was by no means restricted to Madras alone; Curzon famously 
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complained about Northcote being overshadowed by his two scheming council 
members.  
  
The imperfection of Madras administration across all levels was noted even by 
its own Governor; in a breaking of ranks, Ampthill grumbled- but significantly, like 
his predecessor, to George Hamilton and not the Viceroy- about the ease with which 
peasants could bribe revenue collectors to say that their crops were withered or 
destroyed, so that they could then claim exemption from paying land revenue. 
63
  Its 
other problem was the lack of a developmental vision and an unwillingness to break 
with bureaucratic tradition; in 1900 residents of Tirupati asked that the expenses for 
the local Girls‟ School, hitherto borne by the Municipality, be shouldered by the 
Madras Government, but Havelock refused this as it „had no precedent.‟64 
But it is certainly true that despite their contretemps, the Curzon-Ampthill reign 
was effective in bringing British ideas of rule into Madras Presidency, in the spheres 
of Curzon‟s most cherished reforms. One of these was negating the effects of casteism. 
Ampthill actively prevented the formation of caste cliques by appointing one C. 
Sankara Nair as High Court Judge over one V. Krishnaswami Iyer because „he 
(Sankara Nair) is not a Brahmin‟65 and the previous three had been Brahmins. Of 
course, as Copland has noted elsewhere, the destruction of Brahmin preponderance in 
upper administrative positions was taken with British interests in mind as well.
66
 This 
is illustrative of the streak of humanitarianism that runs through the administrations of 
both Curzon and Ampthill. Curzon  stood up for the rights of Indians in cases like 
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those of the 9
th
 Lancers and for Indian labourers on Assam tea-plantations; in Madras, 
in a similar instance on a Travancore plantation, Ampthill, backed by Curzon had the 
sentence condemning a planter who had killed an Indian, confirmed. He also 
grumbled about the Foreign Department of the Government of India recommending 
that Indians get honours a degree lower than those recommended.
67
  Ampthill proved 
himself in other areas as well. Inspite of complaints from Curzon and the India Office 
about the slow pace of administration, even the political situation in Madras could be 
termed satisfactory. By 1904, the Congress- and Madras Mahajan Sabha- in Madras 
were near collapse, because the local Govt. stopped attending to their petitions, and 
therefore it began to be seen as „not- respectable‟ i.e. affiliation to it probably did not 
advance one‟s prospects. Ampthill had the satisfaction of reporting to London the 
gratifying news that the „Congress as it is worked at present is nothing more than an 
annual „tamasha‟…a minor organisation.‟68 Like Havelock, Ampthill also went in for 
more practical ways of elevating the status of Madras, such as fostering economic 
development. A note by one of his cadre suggests the holding of exhibitions and local 
museums showcasing each town‟s produce, such as Calcutta‟s then Economic 
Museum, a precursor to the Government Handicraft Emporiums of today.
69
 It is thus 
apparent that the discovery of common ideals of administration improved Curzon‟s 
relations with Ampthill, and by extension, Simla-Madras relations as well.  
 
Ampthill as Viceroy 
 
Ampthill, however, only became Acting Viceroy by default. It had largely been 
the availability of Northcote taking over as Acting Viceroy that had induced Curzon to 
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suggest that he take leave in 1904 before embarking on his second term; he had 
himself suggested that the senior of the two Governors of Madras and Bombay fill this 
role; and at that time, Northcote (appointed just before Ampthill) had been the 
senior.
70
 He was hugely disappointed when Northcote accepted an Australian 
appointment in 1903.
71
   He was not too keen that Ampthill get the Viceregal spot, 
even though he respected Ampthill‟s administrative methods, partly because he 
thought the latter „has a portentous sense of his own importance,‟ but mostly because 
„you cannot take a man of 34 and make him head of the Government of India even for 
4 or 5 months- unless he is a very exceptional personality.‟72 Apparently the Viceroy 
did think of his own self at least as a somewhat exceptional personality, as he had 
thought himself fit to take on the same office at thirty-nine.  Curzon also had 
reservations about how Ampthill would be received by the senior bureaucrats in Simla: 
he predicted that Ampthill would be greeted with a  
„good deal of suspicion and consternation….the high officials…do not know 
the higher sides of his intellect, his character, or his work, but everyone in India is 
aware of the fact that he is pompous and pedantic to a degree.‟73 
 
 As a means of getting around this, he appointed J. O. Miller to be Ampthill‟s 
Private Secretary (Lawrence was retiring); apart from being an experienced, respected 
and capable bureaucrat, Miller was also the son-in-law of Sir Alfred Lyall. 
It would appear that Ampthill himself was aware of his position, writing to 
Lamington anxiously in May 1904 that he felt would „have been more appropriate and 
generally satisfactory if the duty of acting as Viceroy had fallen to your lot, since you 
are my senior not only in years but also…in political and administrative experience.‟74 
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But while he may have been suitably- and perhaps unnecessarily, as he did a 
good job- modest about his Viceregal capabilities, Ampthill certainly did not shrink 
from asserting the prerogatives of himself as Madras Governor. In his very first 
business letter to Lamington as Viceroy, he touched on what Curzon would have 
fumed at as the most provincial of subjects; the right of letting bands play the National 
Anthem for the Governors of Bombay and Madras. Since he had „heard‟ that the loss 
of this „ancient privilege‟ had caused Lamington as much vexation as it did him, he 
saw fit to mention, entirely between themselves, that if Lamington „made a fight for 
the lost privilege‟ he, Ampthill, would stand by him. But of course, he hastily went on, 
he could „hardly take advantage of my present position and raise the matter again.‟75   
In all fairness to Ampthill he did his best to carry on the administration „in 
faithful adherence of Lord Curzon‟s views and policy in matters both great and 
small‟76 the matter in this case being to dissuade the Raj Saheb of Dhrangadra (or 
more usually spelt Dhrangadhra) from sending the Crown Prince to school in England.  
This could be indicative not only of Ampthill‟s sensible cognisance of his position, 
but also of Curzon‟s ability to inspire loyalty (at this point, Ampthill was very 
strongly placed to become the next Viceroy, and striking an independent line could 
have brought him more notice) It might also indicate that Ampthill as Governor of 
Madras was not being wilfully provoking, but merely responding to either needs of, or 
being infected by, the atmosphere at Madras; Curzon would have inclined to the latter. 
There are many reasons as to why the Curzon-Ampthill relationship settled 
down to one of professional respect after the early days, the chief being a power 
vacuum in the  immediate layer below the Viceroy and his Council; i.e. the Governors. 
In 1901 MacDonnell retired, and was followed in 1903 by Northcote, who went off to 
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Australia. The previous year Sir John Woodburn of Bengal, whom Curzon greatly 
respected, had died suddenly. This left Ampthill as the seniormost and longest serving 
Governor, apart from Fryer of Burma (who also retired in 1903) in the country, and 
that too of a  major administrative unit. By 1903, he would, in addition, have had 
considerable experience of working, and working in tandem with the Viceroy. He had 
never served under any other Viceroy and would thus be less likely to bring up 
counterpoints of administrative strategy. All this made him the ideal man to be 
Curzon‟s liaison point outside of the Viceroy‟s Council.  In fact, by 1903, when both 
Northcote and Ampthill were in charge, there was a much vaunted amity between the 
Viceroy and the Governors generally, Northcote even insisting on seeing all the letters 
from all Departments of the Bombay administration before they were sent off to the 
Viceroy. 
77
 He detailed to the Viceroy (thus breaking ranks with his subordinates) his 
uneasiness at grappling with the Bombay administration and judiciary over the 
Fernandez-Wray case.
78
 This is indicative of the fact that he never tried to gloss over 
the troubles in his presidency and present a united front to the Government of India; 
but Ampthill‟s fighting spirit and willingness to stick up for his charges made him a 
better leader of men, and therefore more suited to the top spot than Northcote would 
have been. 
However much Ampthill may have been obsessed with ceremonial, it could not 
be denied that he was devoted to his presidency. After stepping down as Acting 
Viceroy, he was offered, and refused, an Undersecretary-ship in London, because he 
felt that it was Madras which deserved to benefit from the „unique experience and no 
amount of influence‟ he had accumulated as Viceroy. It would be unfair to deprive the 
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Madras Presidency of those two factors in efficient administration….‟79   Ampthill‟s 
staying on, unfortunately, did not much benefit either Madras or himself. He was 
pulled into the thick of intrigue over the Kitchener affair, which ensured that the 
Secretary of State did not devolve much time to the actual niceties of Indian 
administration,
80
 and his vocal support of Curzon‟s stance cost him the Viceroyalty 
once Curzon resigned, as well as high office immediately after. 
                      
Bombay: ‘Insubordination,’ twice over.  
 
Far from being a backwater, the other presidency, Bombay, was a bustling, 
mercantile presidency, largely devoted to commerce. It was not plagued by either 
ethnic or communal tensions, nor did it have any outstanding territorial realignment 
issues to be resolved. Nor was it ethnically divided, given that its two major groups, 
Gujaratis and Marathas, were largely split up between British India and princely India. 
As Curzon himself acknowledged in an address to the Bombay Municipality in 1900, 
„one calamity which we have been fortunate enough to escape…is warfare in our own 
territory or upon our frontiers.‟81 
But unlike other presidencies and provinces, the Governor in Bombay was not 
top-dog. Bombay was an „unwieldy Presidency,‟82 with no one dominant power block.  
As far as British administrators went, Bombay throughout the late nineteenth century 
was a presidency dominated by the likes of Sir William Lee-Warner, whose 
specialism was in the Indian states. Apart from that, the city was dominated by its 
                                                          
79
 Ampthill to his mother, the Dowager Lady Russell, 12 January 1905, Russell Family Private 
Collection,  in Le Maistre, “The Second Baron Ampthill‟s Governorship of Madras and Viceroyalty,”  
xii.  
80
 See Chapter 3, page 138.  
81
 George Curzon,  “Reply to an Address from the Bombay Municipality,” 8 November 1900, in Lord 
Curzon In India: Being a Selection from his Speeches as Viceroy and Governor-General of India, ed. 
Sir Thomas Releigh, 25.   
82
 A. H. L. Fraser (President, Indian Police Commission) to Curzon, 15 December 1902,  Curzon 
Papers, Mss Eur F111/206.  
126 
 
merchant chambers and industrial classes, whose concerns were commerce not 
politics, whatever Sir P.M. Mehta might say to the contrary. 
83
 To the hinterland of the 
Mahratta ghats the princelings of the old confederacy kept up a stir, and around 
Kathiawar, an entire block of the presidency was occupied by princely states, over 
which the Governors‟ writ did not directly run; and they were mostly much too small 
to be troublesome anyway. To some extent the situation was replicated in Madras, 
where the south Indian social structure took care of itself, inspite of Ampthill‟s de-
brahminising efforts. The opportunities for a Governor to make a splash were limited, 
and his duties covered varied specialisms; and given Bombay conditions during 
Curzon‟s time, the Viceroy was on the spot when the described the troubles of the 
Governor of Bombay as reminding him of „the afflictions of Job.‟84 Three successive 
governors- Sandhurst, Northcote and Lamington- tried and failed to make a 
constructive impact on a presidency ravaged by plague, famine, political insurrection, 
a nascent Congress movement and the depredations of its own Secretariat.  
Sandhurst, the first, faced a presidency ravaged by plague, and the greater part 
of his term was spent in battling plague, famine and the Natu brothers. Curzon  on 
arrival threw his support behind the Bombay governor, publicly praising him, 
especially commending his efforts at plague prevention and rehabilitation; „The 
unceasing and devoted efforts of your rulers…in this place of your Governor, whose 
application to the onerous work…has excited widespread gratitude and admiration.‟85 
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He went on to describe Sandhurst as „an untiring and chivalrous commander…‟86 in 
the fight against plague.  
However, this was no more than the public closing of ranks among the 
governing elite. Curzon, popularly perceived as strongly anti-sedition, took an 
extremely balanced view of its so-called perpetrators within Bombay Presidency. The 
Natu brothers, not convicted of shooting Rand and Ayerst in 1897, still languished in 
prison, and Curzon got to work to get the Bombay government to release them as fast 
as possible. This may have endeared him to the people, but not the Bombay officials 
who were responsible for persecuting the brothers in the first place, and might have 
left them feeling unsupported by the person who they had a right to believe should 
have backed them up. Sandhurst stalled; Curzon kept up the pressure.   As a matter of 
fact the Curzon-Sandhurst correspondence shows a degree of harried acquiescence on 
Sandhurst‟s part as to the clearing of the two brothers; even then the release took nine 
months- the Natus were unconditionally released in December 1900, after Curzon had 
started pressuring the Government from March that year.  
But as with the plague, Sandhurst, as well as his successor Northcote, displayed 
a spirit of exemplary co-operation and co-ordination with the centre when it came to 
famine relief. The centrally appointed Famine Relief Commission was headed by Sir 
A. P. MacDonnell, who had successfully tided Bengal and UP over famines in the past 
quarter-century. It is a testament to their overcoming their ingrained parochialism, and 
also to MacDonnell‟s administrative abilities, that there was no protest at his heading 
the Commission. It was, of course, a different matter when it was mooted that he 
might succeed as Governor of Bombay, as will be shown below.  As shown in the next 
chapter, MacDonnell‟s brusque style of functioning, and his quick decision making 
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abilities, as during the Cawmpore riots, might be Curzon‟s governing ideal, but it was 
far removed from that the Bombay governors happened to be. Curzon, apprehending 
protests from the Bombay cadre, ultimately gave way. MacDonnell left India in 1903. 
Sandhurst‟s successor was Lord Northcote, and not Alfred Lyall, who had also been 
mooted, but had declined citing a lack of enthusiasm.  
Northcote was a greatly more efficient administrator than Sandhurst; yet the 
essential problems in the Bombay –Simla relationship remained the same. The 
Bombay Government and its secretariat had a long history of open hostility to the 
Government of India, as they fought for control of the princely states and overseas 
territories conquered under its aegis and with its army.  Salisbury, Northbrook and 
Lytton all complained about the fact that, at Secretariat level, the Bombay 
Government was „imbued with a powerful and distinct sense of corporate identity, a 
compound of historical tradition and administrative pride.‟ Given this, the  
„readiness of the local government to seek a confrontation with Calcutta was 
inspired as much by narrow feelings of parochialism and sectional rivalry as by a 
genuine desire to find a solution to the problem of divided control.‟87  
 
As noted above, this tendency was apparent in Madras too, but the problems 
faced by Curzon in relation to the „insubordination‟ of Bombay and Madras were, 
while similar on the surface, of quite different character. While in both cases it was 
„entirely wrong that the deliberate orders of the Home Government should be 
openly…ignored,‟ in Madras this took the form of „knowing‟ ignorance, but in 
Bombay, perhaps because of the incompetence of the incumbent Governors during 
Curzon‟s time, government orders were „likely  quite unknowingly‟ ignored. 88  This 
was a dual irritant, all the more so because unlike Madras, a Viceroy, especially one 
who laid as much stress on foreign policy as Curzon, could not afford to forget about 
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Bombay. Given that the territories they managed included princely states and some 
offshore colonies, Bombay- and its prickly political department- was in fact required 
to work very closely with the Viceroy, as well as the centrally appointed Famine 
Relief Commission, given the extent of famines across the presidency, from the 
princely states of Kathiawar to the border regions of Belgaum. In Curzon‟s time these 
problems, caused by the Bombay cadre‟s having a spirit of its own, were exacerbated 
by the fact that a series of weak Governors occupied office in succession.  As Curzon 
and Hamilton realised, the system tended to overpower individual Governors brought 
in from the outside and unfamiliar with the administrative nuances of the „most 
specialised service in the world.‟  Hamilton observed that the „Civil Services, both of 
Madras and Bombay, are no doubt unduly sensitive as to interference, and in 
consequence much too secretive.‟89  He further attributed the intransigence of both 
Havelock and Northcote to the fact that  
 
„both no doubt have around them officials who wish to assert an independence 
that does not belong to the minor Presidencies, but that makes [their] position all the 
harder if [they] wish to cooperate with you, as the whole entourage become united in 
opposition to the legitimate authority and rights of the Indian Government.‟90  
 
The extremely parochial nature of the Bombay cadre meant that the Governor 
also became something of a go-between and /or (but mostly and) scapegoat between 
them and the Government of India, as Northcote very aptly described to Curzon. 
Petitions from the Bombay cadre for increases in salaries and related matters could be 
sent up to the Viceroy at the Governor‟s discretion. Deluged under petitions (for the 
Bombay cadre was notoriously underpaid and unabashedly vocal about this injustice), 
Northcote refused to send up any but the strongest cases, and the resultant effect, as he 
wrote to Curzon, was „a feeling that I, who have been fewer months in India than my 
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colleagues have been years, in the face of their deliberate advice, refuse – not an 
increase of salary, but… the right to ask India if [AB] has not earned an increase of 
pay.‟91 This might also highlight the fact that the Bombay cadre did not see any hope 
of equitable treatment arising out of their sent-on petitions; certainly they seemed to 
see themselves as downtrodden compared to the other provinces. Their logic was that 
„India could hardly have refused [AB‟s request] when BC and DE in the Punjab and 
Madras have more pay and less work to do and so on.‟92 It is interesting that there are 
no direct hints of the Governor colluding with the Government of India (given that he 
was an external superimposition) to „oppress‟ the Bombay cadre. This is also evidence 
that the various departments responsible for the running of India did not always pull 
together as a harmonious whole, and that „regional and departmental loyalties 
hampered the co-ordination of Imperial policy.‟93 
Northcote could not escape the system; as noted, any incoming Governor was 
very quickly set upon by the two Councillors appointed to assist him, and Curzon 
gloomily admitted that even the fairly competent Northcote, whom he wished to stand 
in as Viceroy while he went to England on leave in 1904, was „not strong enough to 
hold his own against his two Councillors, who are, of course, veteran partisans of the 
Bombay system.‟94 To illustrate to Hamilton how the system exerted its influence 
even over external Governors who should not have been imbued with provincial 
partisanship, Curzon cited the case of the Raja of Morvi, who, jealous of the fact that 
the Viceroy was going to visit the Rao of Cutch but not himself on his impending tour 
of Western India, asked for permission to sail to Europe three weeks before the 
Viceregal visit, pleading sickness. Northcote privately told the Viceroy he would not 
                                                          
91
 Northcote to Curzon, 26 February 1902,  Curzon Papers, Mss Eur F111/205. 
92
 Northcote to Curzon, 26 February 1902,  Curzon Papers, Mss Eur F111/205.  
93
 Copland, “The Bombay Political Service, 1863-1924,” 9.  
94
 Curzon to Hamilton, 20 June  1900, Curzon Papers,  Mss Eur F111/159.  
131 
 
recommend granting of the request, but a week later made a formal recommendation 
in his capacity as Governor of Bombay that leave should be granted, indicative of the 
„entire difference between the Governor when he meets the Viceroy or writes in 
independence of his Secretariat, and the Governor when he is once again under their 
influence.‟95 Curzon refused to grant leave in the event.  
But it was also impossible to abolish the system of Executive Councils in 
Bombay and Madras, and thus water down the influence of the secretariat on what 
was supposed to be an impartial Governor, as long as English peers or politicians 
came out as Governors, as the incumbent would then need local advice, not having 
experienced those specific conditions of administration before.
96
 This meant the 
members of the Governor‟s Council would continue to attempt to dominate the 
incumbent, whereas an ICS man with Indian experience would have been able to 
handle them effectively- though Curzon did not think so. As he observed to 
Lamington,  
 „So long as Governors are appointed from the outside they [Executive 
Councils] appear to me as great a necessity there, as a Council, for instance, is to the 
Viceroy here, and I would not dream of proposing their abolition. But in provinces 
headed by a Civilian, I would still less dream of introducing a mechanism so fraught, 
under those conditions, with possibilities of friction and delay.‟97 
 
And it was not  considered desirable  in  Curzon‟s time to appoint an ICS man as 
a Governor in Bombay or Madras, because „ a great deal of the Congress Movement is 
based upon dislike and jealousy of the ICS, and if we give to them the monopoly of 
appointments in India, this  feeling would be accentuated. It also has its reflections in 
Parliament…‟ 98   It would also have had a good deal to do with the belief of 
aristocratic competence, given that these Governors, already of noble birth, were 
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usually further loaded with titles before they sailed out to take office.
99
 So the 
situational deadlock stayed.  
This scenario was the main reason why Curzon had so vainly pressed (and been 
refused) for Northcote‟s successor at Bombay someone who would not be 
overwhelmed by advice from his subordinates, because „Government by one man is 
infinitely better than government by three men.‟100 He had  asked for MacDonnell, 101 
even though he had by then become disillusioned about what he had initially taken to 
be MacDonnell‟s lack of a desire for self-aggrandisement,  over the issue of Victoria 
Memorial Funds, as he was the „only efficient Indian Civilian‟ around. But nobody 
else wanted MacDonnell in Bombay because of his unpopularity with his officers and 
also the fact that he would be seen as an outsider by the Bombay cadre, making them 
even more obstructive.  Finally, MacDonnell went back to London and a seat on the 
India Council, and Lord Lamington succeeded Northcote. Curzon acquiesced  in the 
appointment of Lord Lamington only because  there was no other option and  since  
„dependent upon me as he [Lamington- he was best man at Curzon‟s wedding] has 
always been, in India I am sure he will not lift a little finger without consulting me in 
advance.‟102 This would, of course, effectively bring the Bombay Presidency under the 
Government of India‟s thumb.  Curzon‟s biographers have noted that he was the kind 
of leader who would prefer to work with a competent enemy rather than an unskilled 
well-wisher; but it is apparent that if the choice was between two unskilled persons, he 
would prefer to choose the one he considered himself to be capable of exercising more 
influence over, thus effectively steering the administration away from disaster. 
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Lamington was hardly unskilled. Curzon might console himself with the thought 
that the new Governor could be guided away from administrative disaster given the 
Viceroy‟s influence over him, but as a matter of fact Lamington was eminently suited 
to the Bombay Governorship. It was his first posting since his term as governor of 
drought ridden Queensland from 1895-1901.
103
 He seems to have hit the ground 
running, and  within a fortnight of landing, had addressed issues regarding 
administration, police, Indian states (two cases), public expenditure, the Aga Khan 
and pollution in Calcutta. And his old connections with the Viceroy did not prevent 
his making a stand for his presidency; when Curzon proposed that Aden be placed 
under Central command, Lamington admitted that it was „difficult to justify its 
retention [by Bombay].‟  But, he went on, if Aden were to be „removed from Bombay, 
then it should be considered whether Baroda should not be put again under Bombay. It 
is inextricably mixed up with the administration of Bombay.
104
  
  Thus, even while Curzon fulminated at the process which saw a „titled 
ornamental‟ take the top spot in Bombay because it hampered the administration, it 
may well have been the optimum method of reducing friction between the Viceroy 
and the presidencies. A governor drafted in might be influenced by pressures from 
senior officials from that presidency‟s cadre (such as with Northcote and Sandhurst, 
and then again he might ultimately not be–such as what happened with Ampthill). 
Appointing a senior ICS person from a presidency to the top spot would invariably 
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have resulted in a total break down in communications, especially given the extremely 
parochial nature of the Bombay cadre. And, as pointed out above, an ICS man from 
another province would not have been accepted by the local secretariat.  But, it might 
also be argued to the contrary, that the bringing in of external people definitely 
contributed to a lack of political continuity at Bombay; an ICS man would not have 
had the same incentive as Northcote, for instance, did, to accept other, possibly more 
prestigious appointments mid-way through his term.
105
     
It was not just a case of persons alone, though the Home Government seems to 
have construed it as such. Nor can it be said that all the Governors were wilful 
insubordinates, or that Curzon tarred them all with the same brush, because of which 
they and their presidencies became more un-co-operative than ever.   Letters from 
Hamilton and Godley solely cogitate as to the most suitable (or least unsuitable) 
person who could  be appointed as Sandhurst‟s successor to the Bombay 
Governorship, as though a change of persona at the top would solve all problems, 
especially if that individual and the incumbent Viceroy were in agreement over the 
issues at stake. But, as Curzon was to argue, and as happened with the successor 
eventually chosen, the system proved more overpowering than the individual.
106
 It 
was the system Curzon complained about, a system that needed a strong person to 
override it, and also to effect the changes the Viceroy wanted. The influence of a 
particular presidency‟s work culture upon a newly drafted Governor was telling across 
most presidencies, but it was in Bombay that it was at its height. At Madras, even 
though Havelock left detailed notes for his successor as to the Simla-Madras 
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relationship,
107
 seemingly designed to sabotage any hope of a smooth working 
relationship with Curzon and the said successor,  Ampthill eventually forged an 
efficient working style of his own, completing obliterating the bad blood that had 
existed between the Centre and Madras in Havelock‟s time. While Madras‟ isolation 
has often been cited as a reason for its keeping aloof from Government of India 
proceedings, and the potential for sulking over (imaginary?) slights passed at their rare 
meetings and interactions, Bombay‟s very close relationship to the centre demanded 
extensive contact, multiplying the possibilities for friction, especially on shared 
subjects. One must also take into account the situations or governing climates which 
divers governors were called upon to face, not only with regard to the exigencies of 
exceptional crises like famines, but day to day administration. As Curzon said, „A 
street crowd in Lahore does not present the smallest resemblance to one in Bombay. 
Bombay is utterly unlike Calcutta.‟108 For example, the Bombay Presidency was never 
very political, i.e. not rife with issues of ethnic and communal tensions. The concerns 
facing the Bombay Secretariat were, on the one hand, their semi-autonomous foreign 
policy – and this was greatly reduced following the removal of their off-shore 
dependencies and major princely states like Baroda to the command of the 
Government of India.  By Curzon‟s time, therefore, the concerns of the Bombay 
Government were primarily those of „repressing sedition.‟ Madras was not as 
politically turbulent, and once the chief cause of friction- administrative inefficiency 
and A.E. Havelock-were removed, it became something of a model presidency. 
Therefore, it was a combination of the temper of the presidency and the personality of 
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the Governor, as well as specific situational contexts, that determined Bombay and 
Madras‟ reactions to Curzon and his reforms.  
 
Inter-presidency Rivalry 
 
In part the cribbing of the Governors, and their jockeying for status and 
precedence, stemmed from inter-provincial rivalry.  Inter-presidency equations were 
dominated by rival claims to being the most privileged, and autonomous, presidency.  
Even the ordering of precedence found its way into inter-presidential rivalries. An 
Indian prince might refuse to attend the Durbar because he felt he was being slighted 
by not being granted precedence over any of his contemporaries; but this was very 
much the concern of the Governors of the Presidencies too. Precedence was set by 
dualistic, and sometimes duelling, factors. This could, and did, cause confusion at the 
Delhi Durbar. Between Bombay and Madras, the „precedence of Madras over Bombay 
[was] an immutable historical and official fact,‟ but in the Warrant of Precedence, 
„within a particular group precedence [was] decided by the date at which the 
individuals within the group entered it.‟109 The upshot of this sociological sounding 
epithet was that Northcote would take precedence over Ampthill at Delhi as he had 
come out to India as Governor of Bombay slightly before Ampthill came out to take 
charge of Madras.  At the Durbar Ampthill considered that the Governors had been 
slighted, and asked Northcote to collaborate in drawing up a list of slights apparently 
suffered by the two Governors, in an attempt at provincial solidarity. Northcote 
declined, and Curzon, writing to Hamilton, described him as the „most sensible and 
loyal little man in the world,‟110 a patronising label that nonetheless reflected the stolid 
qualities preferable in a Governor if a mercurial leader like MacDonnell was not on 
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hand.  On the other hand, we have seen how Ampthill worked to establish cordial 
relations with the Governor of Bombay when he was appointed Viceroy over 
Lamington. Thus, there was certainly inter-Presidential jealousy over precedence and 
status with Simla, but there was no real hatred/ rivalry, this being reserved for Simla 
and the provinces closer to it, which were seen as hogging more than their fair share 
of benefits from the Centre. 
In conclusion, it may be said that there was no genuine animosity between 
Curzon and the Governors of the major presidencies, nor did they fall out over the 
handling of many political issues.  While Curzon‟s relations with Bombay and Madras 
were marked with an unvarying degree of sameness, there was a unique aspect to his 
individual interactions not only with the two presidencies, but also with the different 
incumbent Governors. Since the Governor was the figurehead of these 
administrations, it was his relations with Curzon that could be said to symbolise the 
Viceroy‟s relationship with the presidency as a whole. Thus we have the Governor 
acting as front man for his administrations. At times, however, most notably in the 
case of Ampthill, the Governor‟s relationship differed from, and changed, for the brief 
period he was in office, the tempo of the Centre‟s equation with the given province. 
Curzon had time to develop a personal equation with Ampthill in Madras, but not so 
with Bombay because of the comparative frequency with which Governors kept 
changing, so it is possible he saw it and its administration in more generalised terms  
and did not engage with it to the same degree of closeness with which he worked 
alongside Ampthill to negotiate reforms; also, Bombay‟s administration was on a war 
and not day to day footing for much of the time during Curzon‟s Viceroyalty, due to 
successive waves of plague, famine and political unrest. 
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But it was not until the turbulent closing years of Curzon‟s Viceroyalty that the 
Presidency Governors, in the face of what they (along with Curzon) perceived as a 
conspiracy between the Indian Army and the Home Government, backed the Viceroy 
magnificently, in the process (at least in Ampthill‟s case), alienating themselves from 
London and political advancement. Until then, Havelock and Ampthill‟s using their 
privileges to write to the Secretary of State about being miffed at apparently cavalier 
treatment from Simla was cause enough to suspect that Curzon was right in wanting to 
remove this privilege. By 1905, it became apparent that it was the Home Government 
who were using this privilege to unsettle the Viceroy, and not the Presidency 
Governors. For instance, Ampthill once wrote a detailed letter to Brodrick about the 
day to day work of a Madras Governor, to which Brodrick replied that he did not have 
much to say on Madras questions before passing on to the latest Kitchener-Curzon 
gossip.
111
 Ampthill very categorically recorded his distaste of the attempt by Balfour 
to use him as a source of information;
112
  evidence that the apolitical thesis of 
administration in India had been imbibed by even an external, non-ICS Governor.  
Nor do the Governors themselves, especially Ampthill,  given his enhanced 
opportunities to get close to the centre of power, and the India Office‟s attempt to 
sedulously cultivate him a as a counterpoise to Curzon, seem to have taken advantage 
of the frosty relationship between Curzon and the Balfour-Brodrick duo; evidence of 
the fact that if decentralisation as envisaged by the British Cabinet was meant to 
function as a means of cross-checking Viceregal power, it was a failure. It may have 
been because the Governors were not politically influential or politically inclined men 
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back home; in any case, official relationships between the Governors and the India 
Office do not seem to have been deep-rooted or personal, but rather,  mainly confined 
to a bit of official cribbing so long as the protagonists were in office. By refusing to 
take part in that most unsavoury of political intrigues, the Kitchener affair, the 
Presidency Governors did show themselves to be administrators after the Curzon 
ethos in the most critical spheres- the ethics of running an Empire.  
Thus far, I have focussed on the relations of Curzon as a lone office holder with 
his Governors. As Ampthill- and indeed Curzon himself- noted, in India the individual 
was paramount: „In India…public opinion… attributes every act of Government to the 
individual will and personality of its head.‟113 But there was more to the Government 
of India. Outside of Madras and Bombay the presence of the ICS was more strongly 
felt, and the Governor was always an ICS man. It was the province of Punjab, and its 
incumbent Governor, that Curzon engaged with much more combatively than he was 
ever compelled to with Bombay and Madras put together.  This chapter has illustrated 
how individual relations shaped perceptions of Curzon‟s government in London; the 
next explores how he engaged with the less political, but more bureaucratic, heads of 
the provinces of British India.  
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Chapter Four 
 
The Provinces: The ICS and Its Head? 
 
  
 „You have thought fit to treat me with marked discourtesy on a charge the 
evidence for which you will not disclose…I am unable to accept with any satisfaction 
Your Excellency‟s appreciation…‟1 
- Sir Mackworth Young to Curzon, February 1902.  
 
 
 
Much of the portraiture of Curzon in India that comes down to us is from the 
pens of the ICS, some of whom were even better as historians than as administrators. 
It is the „competition-wallah’s pen that has written the accepted caricature of Curzon: 
well-meaning, expert, over-enthusiastic and very caustic; it is in fact the one 
consensual agreement reached by modern historians and the „Orientalists‟ they affect 
to critique.  Philip Mason, Penderel Moon, Walter Lawrence and Harcourt Butler all 
essentially offer up the same unvarying analysis. There are chapters on Curzon in 
most major works about British India, the most extensive, informative and didactic is 
Penderel Moon‟s The  British Conquest and Dominion of India.2  Moon‟s account is 
that of a civil servant of long-standing, its author taking for granted his right to 
interpret and judge a fellow administrator‟s actions.  Appearing to co-opt „efficiency 
of administration‟ Moon lists most of Curzon‟s domestic legislation as being 
constructive, his foreign policy rather less so, possibly because it was here that Curzon 
let his „unwarranted‟ Russophobia intrude. But at the time, the threat from Russia was 
real, and it must be remembered that Russia did invade Afghanistan in 1979, and the 
spillover has destabilised what is now Pakistan. By Moon‟s time i.e. post the Great 
War, the Russian threat had receded, and Moon‟s view of Curzon is probably 
influenced by the greater importance of keeping internal order in his own time. 
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Michael Edwardes‟ observation about the ultimate futility of Curzon‟s strenuous 
Viceregal undertakings
3
 is echoed by Philip Mason in The Men Who Ruled India,
4
 for 
the same reason; Indians had by then begun to assert their own views for their future 
in a world indisposed to endorse the idea of a people being subject to another. This is, 
of course, more a reflection on the evolving attitudes of the ICS than their attitudes 
towards and assessment of the Viceroy.  
If Curzon‟s relationship with the Governors of the presidencies offers an 
analysis of how he engaged with people he often did not think deserved to be in power, 
because of their lack of relevant expertise, then the provinces throw up clues as to how 
he could engage with a specialised bureaucracy whose top members could arguably 
said to be as knowledgeable,  and perhaps more experienced, than him. What emerged 
at times was a struggle for power, each counterparty believing that his particular brand 
of knowledge was more suitable for the contemporary situation. Yet  the ICS also 
offers a perfect model for examining the necessarily unequal power balance between 
Curzon and his subordinates, and how this was negotiated and worked around, given 
that Curzon, unlike Milner, has a reputation of not being subordinate –friendly, a 
reputation largely built upon the accounts of his subordinates. The relationship 
between the self-styled (albeit so that he could identify with its admired ethos) „head 
of the ICS‟ and the rank and file was necessarily that between a chief and his 
subordinates; the Viceroy in India was primus and above, again due to a consciously 
adhered to warrant of precedence. An outstanding work in this context is Khalid bin 
Sayeed‟s Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 5  a section of which explores the exact 
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position of the Viceroy of India; was he the  „titular head of the Indian civil service,‟6 
or the representative of the British cabinet in India? While Sayeed answers this 
question with relevance to the Pakistan Movement, an analysis as to whether Curzon 
was  of the governors or the administrators is pertinent because, by locating, or 
placing, him within a certain ideological camp, we have a basis upon which to 
interpret his relations with both „factions.‟  As discussed above, Curzon, with his 
„middle-class method‟ and a Viceroyalty funded via an American merchandising 
empire,  was avowedly not an aristocratic aristocrat, and yet this was invariably the 
position he occupied vis-à-vis the ICS. This chapter is thus also pertinent in analysing 
how  the social backgrounds of the administrators of the Raj informed their 
constructions of politics and polity –a subaltern studies project whose subject is 
anything but subaltern. 
During Curzon‟s term in India, many prominent civil servants were doing their 
spell of duty; Vincent Smith Commissioner of NWP & Oudh, 1898-1900, H.H. Risley, 
1902-1905, Home Secretary to Government of India, Robert Nathan, Private Secretary 
to Curzon  1904- 1905, John Ontario Miller, Pvt. Secretary to Ampthill, 1904,  Sir 
John Woodburn, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal 1898-1902,  Sir William Mackworth 
Young, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab 1897-1902, Sir T. W. Holderness, 
Secretary to Government of India for Revenue and Agriculture 1898-1901, Sir Antony 
Patrick MacDonnell, Lt-Gov of the United Provinces 1898-1901.
7
 How did Curzon 
interact with, and impose his authority upon, these senior administrators? What did 
ICS people think a Viceroy should be like? Did Curzon, according to them, go beyond 
his brief and intrude into their brief by being too enthusiastic re: efficiency of 
                                                          
6
 George Curzon, Speech at the Indian Civil Service Dinner Club, 08 July 1910, Curzon Papers,  Mss 
Eur F112/ 592, 56-57.  
7
 For a full database, see  Shigematsu Shinji (ed.), ICS: Database of ICS Members, 1790-1905 (Nagoya: 
University of Nagoya, 1984).  
143 
 
administration? Did they feel disenfranchised or gratified? Just how was he  perceived 
by ICS and how did he engage with the Viceroy‟s Council? As with the Presidency 
Governors, the forming of mutual impressions and the recording of these for posterity 
was a two-way process between Curzon and the ICS. But being rather more his 
subordinates, the ICS men were not open to seeing Curzon‟s vulnerabilities, nor to 
watching his work at close quarters or through direct interaction.   One must also take 
into account how the issues over which Curzon‟s relations with the senior ICS were 
structured influence the whole interpersonal relationships‟ paradigm. For instance, 
Mackworth Young is generally held to have been the one at fault in his spat with 
Curzon; but had the governor of any other province been in the identical position of 
having a huge chunk of his territory lopped off and refashioned into a whole new 
province without being consulted, he too might have reacted in the same way. What, 
then, were the varied motives behind the diverse reactions and feedback Curzon 
sparked among the ICS? 
Historians have not, however, made any in-depth analyses of Curzon‟s 
relationship with the ICS. Even Curzon‟s at time critical views about the ICS have not 
always been utilised by historians who seek to show that the ICS was not the machine 
of all encompassing efficiency that the memoirs of its old hands would have liked 
people to believe; they have just been used to illustrate Curzon‟s man-management 
skills- or lack of them. Those historians who take a high politics approach to the 
Curzon Viceroyalty tend to base their sources among the papers of eminent 
Conservative politicians, and confine the politics of power discussion to these circles. 
For those taking a more specifically Indian look at Curzon in India, such as Penderel 
Moon, the temptation is to dismiss him as having „come from above,‟ an alien if 
expert superimposition upon the most specialised service in the world. The traditional 
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incompatibility of the ICS and the „colonial governors‟ – differences due in part to 
class- has prevented synthesised studies of the two, except as opposing elements. Even 
more so, despite stressing the special administrative systems in place for Madras and 
Bombay, there are no  parallel generalisations about how coming from the ICS 
affected Governors‟ relations with their Governor-General. This chapter seeks to 
redress this gap in historiography using as case studies two Governors who had 
diametrically opposing relationships with Curzon. Curzon‟s highly approving 
assessment of Sir Antony MacDonnell, the UP Lieut.-Governor, has been used to 
illustrate the parameters under which Curzon could be said to have forged an ideal 
working relationship with a highly placed subordinate, and his often neglectful 
attitude towards Mackworth Young of the Punjab illustrates why so very many of his 
subordinates found  him unduly harsh.  As a binding theme, this chapter also examines 
Curzon‟s relations with the ICS, in terms of the power he exercised over them. It is 
built on two tiers, or levels of contact  the  ICS had  with the Viceroy- as members of 
the  Viceroy‟s Council and as senior administrators, along with the hypothesis that the 
latter had more active say in administrative affairs as they could be considered to be 
up-to-date on current affairs- the Viceroy‟s Council is examined more in terms of its 
position in the Simla-Whitehall tussle for power that erupted after 1902.  
Curzon‟s alleged dominance over the ICS is not a foregone conclusion; it must be 
remembered that while Curzon obviously had the upper hand- he was the Viceroy, and 
an acknowledged expert on eastern affairs-, the ICS was a highly specialised body of 
men who had spent their lives mastering a particular subject in the field, and 
traditionally, as Judith Brown observes, the Viceroy of India had been (mostly always) 
an aristocrat with little previous knowledge of India, and had depended heavily upon 
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his Home Department for advice.
8
 Given this historical context, Curzon could not 
have come straight out  and superimposed his views upon the ICS; indeed, it has been 
widely suggested he did not evoke strong reactions from the ICS; only a bemused 
scurrying around to carry out his plans, and peevish protestations when these were 
resented. He has done much to foster this impression himself, and in part because the 
administrators he approved of were people of long standing at the end of their careers, 
there has not been much study of his long –term legacy on the men who ruled India. 
The one junior civilian who went on to attain prominence was Harcourt Butler, and 
his formative influence, it is widely assumed, was the setting of Awadh. 
Offsetting the accounts with hindsight produced by Mason and Moon, there is a 
purposefully short section about Curzon in India in Walter Lawrence‟s The India We 
Served, a first hand account (and much quoted) of his private secretary of five years. 
Most of it stresses  Curzon‟s prodigious capacity for unceasing work; and Lawrence 
also makes the interesting, and I believe, much unappreciated point that there were no 
communal clashes during Curzon‟s time in India, proof, according to Lawrence, that 
Curzon‟s „patient endeavour to hold the balance was not in vain.‟9 It is a discussion of 
Curzon‟s style of working more than an introspective piece into the details of his 
administration. Seen in contiguity with his account of pre-Curzonian India, 
Lawrence‟s work makes it possible to comprehend the statements of later writers as to 
why the ICS saw Curzon as a superimposition trying to exceed his brief.  Lawrence‟s 
oft-quoted account recounts how many civil servants were extremely blasé about 
Curzon‟s appointment and cynical about his ability to effect changes; even among the 
senior bureaucrats, Curzon‟s appointment typically appears to have engendered 
bemusement, in part because he was an unknown quantity. Evan Maconochie recounts 
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how his father- in- law, a senior civil servant, reacted to the news:  
„Mr. Ibbetson had given his life to India, had taken little leave, and was not in 
close touch with English politics and personalities. I remember him wondering at the 
time of Lord Curzon‟s appointment, “what all the fuss was about.” He was soon to 
learn. From the time of association a bond of sympathy was established between the 
two which ripened into a warm mutual regard and admiration…‟10 
 
Of course, biographers are quick to point out that Ibbetson‟s – and A. P. 
MacDonnell‟s- were isolated cases; predominantly, Curzon and the ICS failed to 
establish an easy working relationship. This included a good many of the governors. 
And this is crucial to assessing Curzon‟s working relationships and the nature of the 
bonds he established with his officers in India, because, in a very real sense, the ICS 
was the administration of India. It permeated everything. The members of the 
Viceroy‟s Council were primarily drawn from the senior ranks of the ICS, the India 
Council was – according to Curzon in his more irascible moods- a place for the ICS to 
throw a wet blanket over any Viceroy tampering with an administrative system they 
regarded as theirs, and of course, the Lieutenant-Governorships of the provinces and 
Bengal. While the spotlight is often on the fact that the Viceroyalty (in practice) and 
the Governorships of Bombay and Madras were denied the heaven born- the fact is 
that the ICS controlled the most part of the administrative apparatus of the Indian 
Empire. In addition to the heads of all provinces except Bombay and Madras and the 
residents of the princely states, Curzon‟s private secretaries – Walter Lawrence, J. O. 
Miller and Robert Nathan-, and most of the members of his Viceroy‟s Council, were 
drawn from the ICS.  And they had the ear of the India Office as well.  Curzon‟s 
interaction with the ICS must not, therefore, be assessed within the narrow confines of 
the active service men he considered the Viceroy to be head of.  What Curzon thought 
of the state of the ICS would have determined his approach to them, and this in turn 
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set the pace for much of Central-Provincial relations throughout Curzon‟s Viceroyalty 
and heavily influenced Curzon‟s approach to governance.  
Kipling might write that an „erring‟ ICS  Assistant Commissioner would be told 
that he must remember that „ the service was made for the country and not the country 
for the service,‟ but this jesting satire carries the implication of a certainty that Kipling 
did not think that the ICS actually thought India was made for them.  Fifteen years 
later, the man who is equated with Kipling as the arch proponent of Empire could 
write as though he actually feared that this was indeed the case; in a gloomy jeremiad, 
Curzon wrote to his temperate Secretary of State that 
 „I cannot help feeling the truth of the contention that just now India is 
exploited for the benefit of the civil service, and that the statutory rights which 
they have obtained from long possession of a monopoly of government in India, 
and the increasing difficulty of in anyway ousting them from their position, or of 
stirring them up to the activity and the interest in the governed shown by their 
predecessors, is an increasing danger.‟11 
 
This is significant not just because it expresses concern about the purported 
declining standards of a service touted as the backbone of British administration in 
India, but because, as theorised above, such a view would have had a direct impact on 
Curzon‟s attitude to that service. His reluctance to delegate would have crystallised 
into certain refusal if he perceived the people below him as inefficient, and this is 
exactly how he seemed to view the ICS at one point.  
The main point to be examined, then, is not how he perceived the ICS, nor what 
course of action his perceptions led him to take, but what methods he used to combat 
„inefficiency‟ when he found it. This was also the dominant theme in his early 
interactions with Madras and Bombay. As Viceroy the people from the ICS he came 
into extensive contact with were senior administrators, the heads of provinces and 
departments. The following section examines how Curzon functioned in the Viceregal 
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office with respect to dealing with two of his Lieutenant-Governors- a study in 
contrast between the Punjab and the United Provinces.  
Power Unsheathed: Curzon vs. Mackworth Young 
 
Since the aim of this thesis is to examine to what extent Curzon was able to 
exercise unfettered power in his drive to streamline Indian administration, on aspect of 
this chapter examines what happened when he really did exercise roughshod power, 
when creating the North-West Frontier Province in 1901.  While the creation of this 
province was not initiated by Curzon, in pushing it through, he alienated forever Sir 
William Mackworth Young, an ICS officer of almost forty years‟ standing, who was 
Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, out of which the NWFP was lopped off.  It is 
interesting to note that in the other province whose boundaries he re-drew- Bengal- 
the incumbent governor was in full agreement with him, yet it was that which was 
reversed under popular pressure six years later.  
Mackworth Young (1840-1924) had joined the Punjab cadre in 1864, and 
exemplified the stereotypical attitudes of that cadre.
12
 Curzon thought that while he 
was conscientious, he could not divorce the personal from the political and took every 
act that went against the Punjab Government as a slur upon his abilities. He had 
opposed Curzon in 1900 over the Punjab Land Alienation Act, (though this may have 
been inspired by professional jealousy of Charles Rivaz, who was the main proponent 
of the act, rather than defiance of Curzon, who played a comparatively minor role in 
the passing of this legislation) and this possibly worsened the slight he felt when he 
was not consulted over the creation of the NWFP. It would appear too that he was not 
backed by any of his own frontier specialists, purely because they all thought they 
would have the chance of a chief commissionership when the new province was 
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created, and hence backed Curzon; a case of being disenfranchised by his superiors, 
and facing insubordination from administrators ranked below him- by this point he 
was, after all, the head of Punjab province. The final blow came when Curzon decided 
to shift Punjab‟s summer capital from Simla to Ambala.13  
 
In 1900, however, it was the Punjab Land Alienation Act which bitterly divided 
the Punjab Secretariat. The basic aim of this act was to remedy „the gradual transfer of 
ownership of the soil from its natural lords‟ the „Musalman tribes,‟ to „astute…Hindu 
traders & bankers,‟14 in short, to prevent land being alienated. While it had much 
impact upon future Indian political development in the region, and is still in force, it 
will here be analysed for the divergences and differences it threw up among the 
governing British. This is because, while Curzon was the force that pushed the Bill 
through to law, as demonstrated in Chapter 6, the Punjab Land Alienation Bill also 
demonstrates how Curzon‟s was not a Viceroyalty that relied on one-sided policy 
initiatives from the top down. It was the ICS that was primarily responsible for 
bruiting the idea of the Act and Curzon‟s senior ICS officials, principally in this case 
Charles Rivaz, exercised a palpable influence on him  and they , and Curzon were in 
turn affected by the political and economic climate of contemporary Britain and India.  
The Punjab Land Alienation Bill was an idea that had been doing the rounds of 
the secretariat for a quarter of a century before Curzon came to India. It was one 
instance where the ICS could truly be said to be an originator of policy. The idea had 
first been officially propounded by S. S. Thorburn. By Curzon‟s time, the main 
players, all of them past or future governors of the Punjab, were Denzil Ibbetson, 
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Home Member, Charles Rivaz, Dennis Fitzpatrick at the India Office, Mackworth 
Young the incumbent Governor of the Punjab, and Curzon himself. For much 
legislation passed by him, Curzon was a link in a chain, who „stimulated certain 
general trends in opinion than repressing them.‟15 In this case, Curzon mostly took his 
cue from Sir Charles Rivaz, then Home Member, and worked closely with him to pass 
the Bill. It helped that Denzil Ibbetson, for whom Rivaz was filling in as Home 
Member on the Viceroy‟s Council, shared his views about the sort of legislation 
desirable to contain land alienations. Both had long experience of the conditions in the 
Punjab, and with inputs (albeit hostile ones) from Fitzpatrick in London, Curzon could 
well afford to sideline Mackworth Young, as he had access to some of the most 
prominent experts of the age.  
 It was in part due to this collaboration that Curzon offered the Lieutenant-
Governorship of the Punjab to Rivaz at the close of Mackworth Young‟s term, 
because, as he observed to Rivaz, he would „have the congenial responsibility of 
carrying into effect legislative changes, in the evolution of which you have borne a 
conspicuous part.‟16 This was the same line of thought that would see the India Office 
pass over Ampthill as Curzon‟s successor because he did not care to mask his 
disapproval of Kitchener‟s military reforms. As demonstrated below, while the Punjab 
Land Alienation Act itself demonstrated a departure from traditional liberalism and 
laissez-faire,
17
 the manner of its passing was marked by inter-departmental 
negotiations and recriminations that were reflective of the long standing divergences 
opinion over policy that characterised the Indian Empire. It also reflected the ICS‟ 
ultimate dependence upon the Viceroy; had Curzon chosen to be convinced by the 
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opponents of the Bill, it might have languished within departmental files until the 
arrival of his successor.  This also opens up the possibility of sections of the ICS, or 
indeed of any administrative department, advocating their viewpoint before a superior 
who might be inclined to regard it favourably to fast track their most cherished 
projects. The Punjab school of government, within itself, nursed deep divisions- a 
situation that presented as many obstacles as freeways to passing legislation to any 
incumbent Viceroy.  But why did Curzon, so against special pleading when it came 
from the Indians, assent to the Punjab Land Alienation Bill? His stance cannot be 
solely attributed to the championing of the Bill in one form or the other by the 
(admittedly formidable) trio of Ibbetson, Rivaz and Fitzpatrick- he is known to have 
snubbed Lawrence‟s observation that the Indians would welcome a hint that their 
future might be self-determined.  
The Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1900 and the Co-operative Societies Act of 
1904, it has been suggested, illustrate a novel attitude in the British Government of 
India.
18
 D.A. Low suggests that in the late nineteenth century there was a marked 
reaction to the reforming tendencies which had been prevalent in its governing circles 
in the first half of the century. The shift was centred upon the proposition that society 
was more fragile than had earlier been allowed and that checks should therefore be 
imposed upon the workings of the social order so as to ensure that liberty should not 
become licence. The obvious fear was that the flower of the yeomanry might rise up in 
rebellion; a less immediate concern was that the yeomanry might totally cease to exist. 
These were concerns Curzon could sympathise with. The motives behind the Bill also 
dovetailed neatly with the aims of the reforms Curzon himself had initiated; the 
economic motive fit in with his efforts at improving the state of the agrarian 
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population, and the political one appealed to his efforts to improve the security of 
India, internally and externally. 
Thus duly convinced by the arguments put forth by the Punjab ICS arguing for 
the necessity of the measure, Curzon, as seen above, wrote to Hamilton urging support 
for the measure. Hamilton went to the extent of ensuring that Alfred Lyall was not 
present the day it was passed by the Council; Dennis Fitzpatrick did not oppose it, in 
this instance disproving the theory that the old India Hands on the Council were 
merely there to block legislation that ran contrary to the methods of governance they 
had preferred.  
* 
But, despite the Punjab Land Alienation Act being one of the few reforms of 
Curzon‟s Viceroyalty which were the result of collaboration with the ICS and almost 
universally approved,  Mackworth Young, governor of Punjab, was against it.  In this 
he was merely echoing the example of his predecessor Fitzpatrick, but whereas 
Fitzpatrick‟s rejection of the bill was based on that fact that he wanted to prohibit 
permanent alienations to non-agriculturalists alone, Young objected to the bill in 
totality, as he favoured free-trade. As will be seen in Chapter 6, he attempted to 
introduce a protégé of his into the committee set up to investigate the bill.  Curzon 
successfully foiled this by introducing a handpicked Indian to neutralise this, but by 
then he had already come to distrust Mackworth Young, further evidence of his astute 
man-management skills.  
It was probably this that made Curzon disinclined to consult Mackworth Young 
about the NWFP. Geographic determinism and historical geography were the major 
impetuses behind the creation of the NWFP. As far as the severance from the Punjab 
was concerned, the creation of NWFP would seem to have been a right move given 
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the differences in geography and ethnicity between the inhabitants of Bannu, Kohat, 
Dera Ismail Khan and the Punjab. The well-farmed plains of the Punjab, though a 
famous recruitment ground for the Indian Army, were a sharp contrast to rugged 
mountain habitat of the „magnificent Samsons‟ of the border. Lytton in 1877 had 
attempted to coalesce the entire region of what is now modern Pakistan into a single 
administrative block;
19
 Curzon, recognising the differences between the Punjab and 
the other provinces, decided to modify Lytton‟s plan and create a province composed 
of just the frontier districts -which then came under the aegis of the Punjab 
Government- whose government would report directly to the Government of India. 
But he declined to consult the governor from whose province these territories were to 
be abstracted.  
Curzon was not alone in wanting to exclude Mackworth Young from the 
deliberations; Secretary of State George Hamilton, who enthusiastically backed the 
frontier plan, also backed the plan to not involve the Punjab Government. Curzon 
asked Hamilton for his view about the „necessity or desirability‟ of consulting them, 
as he thought Mackworth Young was „naturally slow, very sensitive, very 
disputatious , rather long-winded‟20 and his objections would slow down the process 
of reform. Hamilton thereupon wrote to Curzon that,  
„any proposal that you make by which the Punjab Government will permanently 
be deprived of its present control over relations with frontier tribes, will be opposed in 
this Council. But the proposal is of such a character that it must be the Cabinet, and not 
the Council, who decide whether or not it shall be adopted. I think, therefore, it would 
be better not to consult Mackworth Young in the first instance. You would have to 
overrule him by putting on one side his objections. He, or the officials connected with 
the Punjab Government, are perfectly certain to write to certain Members of Council 
here. They will pick up their ears, and be on the qui vive as regards any despatch which 
comes home, and they will in anticipation have formed opinions hostile to your 
proposals. If under such conditions I refer your proposal to the Cabinet, it would look 
as if I did so because I wished, by this extraneous method, to override the opposition of 
my Council. On the other hand, if the proposal comes straight home, and I refer it at 
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once to the Cabinet, the Council would by constitution acquiesce in the decision of the 
Cabinet without demur.‟21 
 
The above not only illustrates how Hamilton felt about Mackworth Young- his 
opinion concurred with that of Curzon‟s- but also how Hamilton and Curzon colluded 
in matters of Indian polity, as discussed in Chapter 2.
22
 In this instance they very 
successfully managed to outmanoeuvre both the Indian Civil Service and the Council 
of India. This is one instance where India would really seem to have been governed by 
confidential correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy. Because 
Curzon and Hamilton got on so well, they could decide which bit of political 
machinery to use and manipulate when it suited them, proof of the instrumentality of 
inter-personal relations in high politics. This was not repeated with Brodrick, costing 
Curzon, ultimately, the Viceroyalty.  It also highlights exactly how rife political 
expediency was, because while Hamilton always insisted that due respect must be 
shown to the Council, he did not hesitate to cast aside his own principles when the 
exigencies so demanded it. This might also pin point to the fact that Curzon was in 
fact largely right about the „crabbed‟ character of the Council; but, co-terminously, the 
Council would also have been justified had they complained about being bypassed in 
a sneaky manner. Finally, this episode also highlights the fact that this was one 
instance where Curzon‟s expertise of Asian affairs (more precisely frontier affairs) 
helped him get his own way as it was what persuaded his fellow co-sharers of powers 
that he knew best when he proposed the creation of the NWFP. This was something 
the ICS was not heavily involved in; the legendary frontier administrators had mostly 
been soldiers. Curzon‟s knowledge gave him an edge over Mackworth Young.  
Of course, this also shows one instance where Curzon was in collusion with 
Hamilton; and also that Hamilton fully realised that the India Council could be 
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wilfully obstructive, especially when it came to protecting their „fellow‟ Indian 
Civilian‟s interests. Hence this comment of Hamilton‟s is extremely telling, indicative 
as it is on the many implications that can be read from it in terms of Curzon‟s style of 
governance. But Hamilton‟s fears about backstairs political negotiations between the 
India Council and ICS were not unfounded; lobbying for posts and airing grievances 
against superiors through the Council was a practice of long-standing, as demonstrated 
above, and Curzon later illustrated how Mackworth Young planned to use it:  
  „It appears that when the first rumours [about the carving out of the NWFP] 
got about, Mackworth Young assured all his men that they need not be in the least 
alarmed; that his party at the India Office was quite sufficiently strong to defeat 
any such project.... When the acceptance of the scheme by His Majesty‟s 
Government was finally announced… they all turned round, said they had been 
deceived by their Lieutenant-Governor, and that the least he could do would be to 
resign. When he showed no intention of doing this, their disgust was 
enhanced….‟23 
 
But on what grounds did Young oppose the creation of the NWFP? As discussed 
below, his objection as to the mode of creating it, without involving him, is certainly 
attributable to feeling dis-empowered, but what was his administrative justification for 
the stand he took? To what extent was this, in fact, bound up with his professional 
insecurities, if any? 
He laid out his most weighty objections in a memo to Curzon, opining firstly 
that:  
„The method of settling this long-debated frontier question by detaching 
from the Punjab administration and control the trans-frontier tracts politically 
connected with it…has been arrived at without any opinions from the Punjab 
Government having been asked.‟ This, as can be seen, was his main grievance. He 
continued that he had „given my reasons for objecting to this procedure, and the 
Government of India have dealt with my objections. I have not thought it proper‟- 
a conscious affirmation of his subordinate status and the constraints this imposed 
upon him- „or necessary to make any rejoinder…[but] I feel bound to indicate in 
some detail the dangers and drawbacks of the plan.‟24   
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That Curzon had gone all the way back to Lytton, and as far as London, to seek 
opinions on the proposed province, undoubtedly alienated Mackworth Young more 
than anything else. When it became inevitable that the creation of the NWFP would, 
anyway, be seriously considered, he wrote to Curzon to ask Hamilton to suspend 
making a decision about it until he, Young, had had a chance of putting his views 
before the Secretary of State,
25
 which he was not constitutionally privileged to do, but 
nonetheless he tried to seek assurances from Walter Lawrence to the effect.
26
 To this 
Curzon responded that there was no precedence of consulting local governors, that 
Lytton had never done so,
27
 and that he was therefore not transgressing a 
constitutionalism by doing so:  
„If there had been good grounds for such a charge, I cannot but think that they 
would have been pointed out to me, possibly by the Secretary of State, who was 
aware of what I proposed to do, anyhow by those of my colleagues who have a much 
longer acquaintance with Indian constitutional procedure than I can claim.‟28  
 
This is yet another instance where Curzon falls back upon the ICS and its 
deemed expertise in Indian administration to vindicate his stand regarding an 
administrative issue. This also throws up the sub-theme that the Punjab cadre were as 
sensitive to perceived slights to their authority within their boundaries, or with 
anything that concerned their administration, as the Bombay and Madras cadres; only 
this has not been highlighted by historians, or rather, has been passed off as bonding 
borne out of the experiences of the Mutiny. Re-tracing our steps to why Mackworth 
Young felt alienated, even insulted, however, it was, as Walter Lawrence 
reminiscenced, not just the wrenching away of a huge chunk of his province, nor the 
disregard for his authority, that engendered such feelings of disenfranchisement in 
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Mackworth Young; it was the ruthlessness with which Curzon went about pointing out 
the necessity of the operation. As Lawrence noted,  
„Curzon…never omitted a single detail in the elaboration of his plans…but as I 
had been in the Punjab I knew that the loss of this interesting charge would be bitterly 
resented by those who had so long watched and warded the passes into Afghanistan, 
and I was anxious that the wind should be tempered…I pointed out that he had proved 
his case and that some of the arguments were superfluous and might cause 
unnecessary pain to the Punjab Government. But he replied that a statesman should 
never omit an argument.‟29 
 
From Curzon‟s point of view, of course, it was unfortunate that Mackworth 
Young should be in Punjab at that critical juncture; highlighting his „incompetence‟ all 
the more starkly was the fact that his tenure was sandwiched between that of Sir 
Dennis Fitzpatrick and Sir Denzil Ibbetson, sterling administrators, both of whom 
went on to serve on the Viceroy‟s Council/ India Council.  
What added an extra dose of gall to Mackworth Young‟s post NWFP campaign 
of subdued defiance was the participation of his wife; Curzon‟s views on women in 
public life were that they were best dissociated from it, and his Council appears to 
have thought along similar lines. Lady Young‟s intrusion upset ritualised protocol; 
when she offered to apologise for any offence her comments might have afforded the 
Viceroy, the law member of Curzon‟s Council, Thomas Raleigh, wrote to Lawrence 
that he did not know how exactly to proceed: „My notion is, that when a married lady 
has to apologise, her husband ought to give the message. Sir M. has apologised on his 
own account…‟30  
From Curzon‟s point of view, thus, Mackworth Young was trying to hold on to 
a power he had (in Curzon‟s eyes)  no claim to, because he was unfitted to handle it. 
This divorcing of power from de jure authority is one of the hallmarks of Curzon‟s 
Viceroyalty; but it is significant that when he spoke, he always justified his power on 
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the grounds that he was an efficient Viceroy, and not just an efficient Asiatic affairs 
person who happened to be Viceroy.  
In terms of administrative theory, Young‟s major objections were based on grounds of 
equitable governance and popular appeal:  
„the severance of the five districts from the Province to which they have been 
attached since Sikh times will be unpopular with the chiefs and the people of the 
districts concerned….when these people come to realise that they have no right of 
appeal to Lahore, they will feel that their privileges under the British Government 
have been seriously curtailed.‟31  
 
Young even cited a similar reasoning made by Sir Henry Davies, Lt-Gov in 1876, 
even as Curzon drew upon Lytton to provide backing for his plan. As to the „people,‟ 
Captain Roos-Keppel had already stated in May that year that  
„the only Hakim the Afridi knows is his Political Officer…of the higher 
authorities from whom that officer receives his orders he has little or no knowledge. 
Unless some radical change of policy be inaugurated with the formation of the new 
Province, it will probably be some years before the Afridi realises that there has been 
a change of system.‟32  
 
That may well have been the case then, though Young was probably right about 
the long-term deleterious effects on the people.  The new province was a „non-
regulation‟ province, with all power concentrated in the person of the single 
representative of the Government of India, making the administration necessarily 
paternalistic and authoritarian, even while being effective.
33
  It adversely affected the 
political consciousness of the province, and its transition to modern democracy; 
though this, from Curzon‟s point of view, was probably an ideal outcome.  
As noted above, the NWFP ran the gauntlet of public opinion and survives today; 
it was Bengal where „the people-‟ or at any rate a section of them-, made their anti-re-
distribution feelings clearly known.  
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Young‟s other objection was that „the miniature administration…will be much 
less efficient than that which now exists as part of a large Provincial organisation.‟ He 
also seemed to feel that „there will be a constant tendency in the new administration to 
play to the political gallery…the chief commissioner will be selected for his political, 
and not for his administrative, attainments.‟34 This, to an extent, was true. But like the 
princely states, the frontier was an area where personal contact and the personal 
characteristics of the chief officer were instrumental in defining the character of the 
administration. All the warrant of precedence and the stress on hierarchy was nullified 
– that Curzon grasped this is testament to his skills of political perception, because it 
essentially went against the grain of his philosophy that it was the work that mattered, 
not who or how it was carried out. In fact, it was precisely to obviate administrative 
bureaucracy that the whole scheme had been instituted, a point which Young missed 
even as he refuted it.  
 Of course, while the chain of command was clearly one that caused Curzon great 
concern, it was because he felt it did not lead up to the proper apex.  He said that „the 
conduct of foreign affairs in India is vested in the Viceroy…Now in India foreign 
affairs….are [mostly] connected with the frontier tribes and problems.‟ 35  By this 
tendentious logic, the Viceroy as head of the central government, should have control 
of the frontier. By extension, according to Curzon, „it is from the nature of things 
impossible for a Local Government to carry out a foreign policy which it neither 
originates in the first place nor is responsible for in the last, with the same influence, 
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zeal or despatch as would the authors of the policy itself.‟36 As to distance from the 
frontier, he pointed out that for nearly half the year, both the central government and 
the Punjab government were based at Simla.  Young retaliated by pointing out that if 
the Viceroy were to be so closely connected with the day-to-day administration of the 
new province, whoever was appointed the chief commissioner of the new province 
would  
„feel so strongly the obligation of satisfying the Government of India in the 
Foreign Department in respect of his political duties, that with every desire to 
discharge his administrative duties efficiently, he will be unable to do so and will 
have to put them into commission by delegating them to his Lieutenants. An 
administration so carried on can never be a success.‟37  
 
This sentiment, possibly calculated to arouse Curzon‟s detestation of delegating work, 
failed to change the Viceroy‟s views, and the NWFP was born.  
A further blow came when Curzon, as a direct corollary of the creation of the 
NWFP, shifted the Punjab‟s summer capital out of Simla. Historically, the summer 
capital of the Punjab had been Murree, and it was only since the time of Lord Lytton 
that the Punjab Lieutenant-Governor had begun to base himself at Simla due to the 
necessity of discussing frontier affairs with the Viceroy. In Curzon‟s opinion, now that 
the NWFP had been removed from the Punjab command, there remained no reason  
„for the close propinquity, and indeed every reason against it. The Lieutenant-
Governor ought to be supreme in his own territories throughout the year. At Simla he 
is absolutely overshadowed by the Viceroy, and is almost a nonentity. The existence 
of two Secretariats side by side, at the opposite ends of the same station, so far from 
producing harmony and rapidity of work, has precisely the opposite result. There is a 
good deal of stand aloofness, and sometimes positive friction, between the officers of 
the two Governments. If any dispute is proceeding between them, it is not always 
agreeable to their respective heads to be thrown into constant social contact.‟38 
 
Young was to later bitterly subscribe to this view; but he did not initially view it 
that way.      Propinquity to power held a powerful lure for the Punjab Government. 
                                                          
36
 Minutes and Memoranda by the Viceroy and others on Frontier administration, 1899-1904, Mss Eur 
F111/322, 7.  
37
 Memorandum…by the Lieutenant Governor, 15 July 1901,  Curzon Papers, Mss Eur F111/321, 4.  
38
 Curzon to Hamilton, 08 May 1901, Curzon Papers,  Mss Eur F111/202. 
161 
 
They resented the fact that the Viceroy exercised maximum power in India only 
insofar as they were adversely affected by such exercise. But, in fact, members of the 
ICS had their methods and networks for bringing their colleagues to the notice of the 
Viceroy. For instance, Denzil Ibbetson and J. P. Hewett, in 1900, recommended 
Robert Nathan to Curzon for a CIE, because he had worked very hard during the 
plague. Nathan later became Curzon‟s private secretary. 
 In fact, the only thing Curzon consulted Mackworth Young about was the 
question of his successor. Curzon suggested Charles Rivaz, to which Young, possibly 
realising that the appointment was a foregone conclusion, gave his approval.
39
  
Mackworth Young came to epitomise all that Curzon found obnoxious about the ICS 
and that they felt the same about him.  The next section examines the reverse: how a 
governor viewed with circumspection by his own cadre commanded an envied 
confidential relationship with the Viceroy.  
 
Curzon and  Sir A.P. MacDonnell 
But Curzon‟s condemnation of the ICS could not have been wholly equivocal; 
after all, as we have seen, his private secretary was an ex-ICS man, he advocated the 
appointment of the Governors of Bombay and Madras from the ranks of the ICS, and 
he saw himself as a sort of „head of the ICS.‟  Nowhere was this more strongly evident 
than in his dealings with A.P. MacDonnell, the Lieutenant-Governor of the NWP and 
Oudh.  
A. P. MacDonnell
40
, an Irishman who was a passionate supporter of Irish Home 
Rule, was the one Lieutenant-Governor that Curzon wholly admired. An Irish 
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Catholic from rural Connacht, it has been suggested that MacDonnell‟s boundless 
energy stemmed in part from a desire to obviate any expression of the ambiguity 
towards Irish appropriation of Imperial postings that might have hindered his career.
41
 
In fact a great proportion of senior administrators during Curzon‟s time were Irish.  
The Curzon-MacDonnell relationship was uncomplicated and wholly revolved 
around matters of administration discussed in India itself and not constitutionalisms. 
Perhaps this was because of MacDonnell‟s own outsider status in the circles of British 
power, and also because he was a capable administrator. Curzon does not seem to 
have had a negative word for the Governor of the NWP and Oudh throughout. The 
secret of MacDonnell‟s success, he stated, was „that the invariably sends for the local 
leaders, gets them on his side, makes them put their names to a document embodying 
his policy, and thus at the same time carries through what he wants,  and remains free 
from attack.‟ 42  He backed MacDonnell‟s request for an extension in UP, which it 
seems was because he wanted to push through the Nagari resolution, telling Hamilton 
that „as a matter of fact, a movement is being widely organised in the Province- I 
admit by Natives- praying for a prolongation of his term: and I would rather comply 
before receiving the request than appear to yield to it at a later date.‟43   This is 
indicative of just how much Curzon wished to be seen as an administrator who would 
care nothing for Indian public opinion; the remark is also curious because it hints at a 
popularity enjoyed by the Governor; when in fact Curzon himself agreed that he 
would have to be passed over for the Governorship of Bombay because of his knack 
of alienating all those around him. It was chiefly for this reason, along with the 
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Bombay cadre‟s hostility to outsiders, that he was passed over.44  As Curzon noted, 
„MacDonnell runs his own show with great ability (and great unpopularity).45 The 
Nagari resolution, for example, was his own initiative, enabling the use of Hindi in 
government notifications because „it has often occurred that an order in Urdu has been 
posted up in a village not a single soul in which could read it… [it was not made] 
because of any political considerations, but because of the over-whelming 
administrative necessity…‟46 Curzon merely gave it his unqualified approval, stating 
that he had „not a doubt that …the declaration is one of equal liberality and justice.‟47 
In fact the Viceroy thought so highly of MacDonnell that he used his 
relationship with him to illustrate to the Secretary of State how he was being unfairly 
maligned for being allegedly harsh with his subordinate governors and other 
colleagues; „that my standards are not impossible may, I think, be judged from the fact 
that, during the 1 ¾ years that I have been in India, I have not had one word of private 
or public disagreement with the strongest Governor [sic] now in the country, Sir A. 
MacDonnell.‟48 As Curzon was for once perceptive enough to realise,  having the 
backing of this idiosyncratic administrator of long standing did much to dispel the 
myth of  his inability to forge relationships with those in power with well-formed 
opinions not necessarily congruent to his own. 
He warmly recommended MacDonnell for a seat in the India Council, perhaps 
as much with his own interests in view, as an affiliate there would reduce his frequent 
clashes with that antediluvian body;  
„He would prove an invaluable recruit. His knowledge and ability are great: his 
subtlety is not inferior to his courage; and barring certain pronounced political 
inclinations [MacDonnell was a committed Home Ruler] which have a home [sic] 
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rather than an Indian application, he is sufficiently Conservative for a Member of the 
Council of the Secretary of State.‟49 
 
Of course, the fundamental reason that Curzon got on with MacDonnell was that 
he found him to be an efficient governor- their views on administrative affairs tended 
to tally.  The strongest instance of this was the method of famine relief. Over the years, 
through independent studies of the Western Indian famine, their views on relief tended 
to converge, resulting finally in the report of the famine commission. The 
recommendations, which very emphatically de-emphasised the free distribution of 
largesse that had hitherto been the norm, bear the stamp of being formed by people 
who believed in controlled, tight administrative systems.
50
 MacDonnell shared 
Curzon‟s views about making the peasant self-supporting. In consequence one of the 
chief concerns investigated by the Famine Commission was whether people on relief 
showed an inclination to be satisfied upon completion of enough work to garner them 
the minimum wage. To this the collector of Nasik answered in the affirmative; „Yes, 
they loafed…we introduced a penal wage afterwards.‟ 51  The minimum wage was 
subsequently reduced by 25 percent. But MacDonnell also shared Curzon‟s belief that 
the welfare of the lay peasantry was the British justification for being in India and in 
consequence they pair lobbied hard to ensure the passage of the Report in a form that 
would ensure security for the peasant. In August 1901 MacDonnell wrote to Curzon 
about a letter Sir Charles Crosthwaite on the India Council had written him; they 
differed over the method of land tenure.  Crosthwaite was for „abolishing the power of 
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acquiring the tenant right, and for reducing all tenants to the level of holders for a 
term,‟ which MacDonnell feared would leave them exposed to arbitrary ejection. He 
threatened to resign, fulminating that 
 „If the Secretary of State does not now accept the Bill, as approved by the 
Government of India, the conclusion is that he prefers to be guided by Crosthwaite‟s 
anti-tenant views, rather than by the views of the men on the spot, [a turn of phrase 
sure to strike a sympathetic chord with the Viceroy; italics mine] which reconcile the 
interests of both parties…If Crosthwaite‟s views prevail, I must leave to other hands 
the work of altering the Bill…Perhaps, to facilitate a decision, Your Excellency may 
think it worthwhile to inform Lord George Hamilton that Sir C. Crosthwaite‟s new 
idea in regard to ejectment [sic] has been fully considered here and rejected.‟52 
 
Curzon promptly intimated this to Hamilton,
53
 and was able to reassure 
MacDonnell that Hamilton had accepted the Bill as it stood.
54
 As a matter of fact 
Hamilton had never pushed for alterations, telling Curzon that MacDonnell was 
„unduly alarmed‟ about the fate of the Bill, even as he expressed the private view that 
legislation in the Empire was heavily skewed in favour of the tenant.
55
 This 
demonstrates that not only was Curzon willing to back up his subordinates, but that he 
was also willing to indulge their protestations and gratify their personal wishes- 
MacDonnell was anxious that there should be no delay in passing the Bill as he was 
due to leave India shortly. As Viceroy he utilised the power of his office to function as 
an intermediary between the ICS and the Government in London, viz., between the 
bureaucracy and the policy-makers, though these distinctions were fungible between 
the ICS and the India Office.  
In the above instance one can discern parallels with Hamilton‟s backing, 
discussed above, of Curzon over the creation of the NWFP. Apart from the obvious 
patronage extended by the constitutional superiors in either case, what is noticeable is 
the transparency of the exchange between the parties concerned.  That MacDonnell 
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used Curzon as an intermediary to transmit his messages to London was exactly what 
Curzon wanted – and did not always get- in the case of Havelock, Ampthill and 
Sandhurst.  
 
But to say that Curzon and MacDonnell developed a healthy rapport because 
MacDonnell was intrinsically a governor whose style of functioning matched 
Curzon‟s expectations of how a model governor should function, and also happened to 
mirror Curzon‟s own style of communication, is being rather too harsh on the 
Presidency Governors.  There were factors other than the inter-personal that were 
responsible for their efficient working relationship, the chief being the nature of the 
provincial administration. The United Provinces administrative cadre did not possess 
that healthy spirit of autonomy from Simla that the Bombay and – to a lesser degree- 
Madras governments did, owing to its historical circumstances. Had MacDonnell been 
governor at either of these places, it is probable that his Curzonian drive for efficiency 
would have rubbed up the local secretariats the wrong way; certainly he was passed 
over as Governor of Bombay for this precise reason.
56
 Curzon may have viewed 
Ampthill‟s pedantry as an annoying trait, but his stolid, yet steady approach ultimately 
worked wonders for the Madras administration, because he did not antagonise the 
Madras cadre by always pushing them on, something an enthusiastic, eager-beaver 
Governor would almost certainly have done. And neither the Madras nor  the Bombay 
cadres liked being pushed about. It is true that MacDonnell was a valuable asset in that 
he managed to reassure Indian opinions, but local opinion in Bombay and Madras, 
was, again, of a very different character than in the U. P. Curzon‟s wishing for a dozen 
                                                          
56
 For a detailed analysis, see Chapter 3.  
167 
 
MacDonnells was one instance where his vision may have been flawed because he did 
not make it context-specific.  
But by 1901 Curzon had fallen out with MacDonnell, complaining to Hamilton 
about the manner in which MacDonnell had prohibited the Talukdars of Oudh from 
contributing to the Viceroy‟s Victoria Memorial Scheme, and had instructed them 
instead to subscribe towards the North-Western Provinces‟ Local Fund.57  To this 
Hamilton replied that Curzon might hint to MacDonnell that „running counter to the 
Viceroy in an unreasonable spirit is not likely to increase his chances of getting an 
appointment to the Secretary of State‟s Council, as the latter official is naturally 
influenced in his selections by the opinions of the Viceroy as to the capacity for work 
and cooperation of the retired officials who come home.‟58 But Curzon was not the 
person to entertain a grudge and told Hamilton he should certainly place MacDonnell 
on the India Council, as befitted a man of „such great ability.‟59 This was obviously a 
blatant attempt on the part of the home establishment to keep out someone with 
undesirable political views, using his former patron as a cat‟s paw; a hint of how 
scruples would be cast aside in the Kitchener affair. MacDonnell, in any event, left 
India in 1903. And Sandhurst‟s successor in Bombay was Lord Northcote, and not 
Alfred Lyall, who had also been mooted. This was an instance where Curzon‟s 
consideration of people‟s opinions before taking an action erred on the wrong side of 
caution.  The people, if not the government, of the Bombay Presidency would have 
welcomed MacDonnell. In 1903 the Bombay press even suggested he might be a good 
successor to Curzon:  
„Sir Anthony [sic] MacDonnell is well known in India for his sympathy towards 
the people, as well as his sound common sense and administrative capacity; and if he 
                                                          
57
 Curzon to Hamilton, 21 March 1901,  Curzon Papers, Mss Eur F111/160.  
58
 Hamilton to Curzon, 10 April 1901, Curzon Papers,  Mss Eur F111/160.  
59
 Curzon to Hamilton, 16 December 1901,  Curzon Papers, Mss Eur F111/160.  
168 
 
returns to India as Viceroy he will have a hearty welcome from the Indian people and it 
will also be an honour to the ICS.‟60 
 
Of course, no ICS man after John Lawrence ever became Viceroy.  However, the 
study of the Curzon-MacDonnell relationship is crucial to dispelling some of the 
myths surrounding Curzon‟s ability to forge mutually constructive working 
relationships. His biographer Dilks attributes his ultimately warm relationship with 
Ampthill and Lamington to the fact that both were junior to him in age and 
experience- presumably, any dialogue over matters of administration with these two 
was wholly dominated by Curzon.
61
 While Chapter 3 has demonstrated how Ampthill 
was certainly not intimidated by Curzon, the fact that Curzon was able to establish an 
equable relationship with MacDonnell demonstrates that Curzon was able to convince 
the senior ICS of his bona fides.  
A comparative study of MacDonnell, Mackworth Young and their very different 
rapports with Curzon throws up many interesting reflections.   These respective 
personalities had come up through the same system within a few years of each other, 
albeit in different provinces. Yet they aroused very different reactions from Curzon. 
The very qualities Curzon might respect- enterprising spirit, a certain lack of disregard 
for bureaucratic rules, - could be taken too far, in his estimation, especially if they 
were used to shoehorn what he perceived as unjustified advantages for one province 
over another.  Curzon‟s dislike of governors standing up overenthusiastically for their 
provinces is not understandable in the light of his failure to see why the India Office 
might have sought to curb what they saw as his reckless championing of Indian 
interests over Imperial ones.  
                                                          
60
 Bombay Native Newspaper Reports 1903,  Native Opinion, 26 February 1903, IOR L/R/5/158.  
61
 Dilks, Achievement, 80.  
169 
 
 A.P. MacDonnell was at the fag end of his career in the ICS when Curzon 
arrived in India; the rising star then was Harcourt Butler, who had joined the ICS in 
1890.
62
 Butler, who wrote extensively to Richmond Ritchie, forms an interesting 
counterpoint to MacDonnell‟s analysis; he also appears to have subscribed to all the 
stereotypical ideologies attributed to the British in India; as a representative official, 
his views are important. Butler thought Curzon was insufficiently accommodating 
towards the Indians, and shared the view that by denouncing the Congress Curzon was 
giving it a fillip.  
Maconochie gives an insight into how Curzon actually worked, as opposed to  
merely stating how he single-handedly attempted to get work done. Here he is, talking 
about how R.C. Dutt‟s charge that famines were caused by excessive taxation was 
rebutted:  
„the first step taken was an examination by the department concerned…Mr. Holderness 
took up the Zamindari Provinces and handed the Raiyatwari over to me…whatever the 
use to Government of my investigations, their pursuit was an education to me, and 
when I left Simla I knew more than most…Mr. Dutt‟s criticisms were forwarded to the 
Local Governments and their replies invited. The final result was the resolution of the 
Governor-General in Council, No. 1, dated January 16, 1902, which, with its 
appendices, contains a complete exposition of the policy of Government.‟63 
 
The provincial governorships were only one means by which the ICS and 
Curzon actively collaborated in the formation of polity. The other was the Viceroy‟s 
Council- in Curzon‟s time, a third avenue was instituted by which the ICS could have 
a say in influencing the Viceroy- the office of Private Secretary to the Viceroy. When 
Curzon appointed Walter Lawrence as his private secretary, the job consisting of 
being essentially a buffer between the Viceroy and the masses, including „filtering, 
screening and mediating,‟64 it was a departure from precedent. Lawrence himself, for 
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reasons above personal modesty, demurred. As he noted, „up to this time, the private 
secretaries had been selected from England.‟ Lawrence himself was an ex-ICS man 
who gave up a pension with the Duke of Bedford to return to India, because, „it 
seemed to me that it would help a Viceroy to have with him someone who knew at 
any rate the puzzling terms and technicalities with which the Indian administration 
bristles.‟65 And of these, as Gilmour has noted, there were very many.  
 
Lawrence might have been right, but not everyone thought along these lines of 
logic. Lansdowne‟s ex-private secretary wrote to Curzon expressing a totally 
contrarian view to the one held by Lawrence: „Don‟t take an Indian Civilian. They are 
all too closely bound up in the country. An outsider will be far more useful, 
particularly one who knows English official and parliamentary routine, and the 
exigencies of party government.‟66 This might have been true, especially in the light 
of Curzon‟s contretemps with the Home Government, but since Lawrence left in 1903, 
and Curzon‟s next secretary too was an „Indian Civilian,‟ the theory remained 
untested throughout the Kitchener Affair. But the private secretary did increasingly 
become a focal point of reference for those civilians wanting to get a message or a 
plea across to the Viceroy, all the more so because Lawrence was seen as being rather 
more approachable than Curzon. It set a precedent; after Lawrence went back to 
England, the other two private secretaries, Robert Nathan and John Ontario Miller, 
were both drawn from the ICS.  
* 
Interestingly, while the ICS, or its ex-members, should have stuck up for 
Curzon‟s suggestion that recruiting the Governors of Bombay and Madras from their 
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ranks might be a good thing, it was an ex-ICS member who proposed extending the 
system of bringing in external persona to other provinces. In 1901, Alfred Lyall, 
otherwise so conservative when it came to sanctioning new plans, suggested that it 
might be worthwhile to make someone Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab who had 
not spent his career in that province, given that „the true-bred Punjabee…is strongly 
prepossessed in favour of certain views and a certain system.‟67 Of course, breadth of 
vision was also a reason why no Viceroy or Governor of Bombay and Madras was 
ever chosen from the ICS if other options were available. And it is possible that inter-
provincial rivalry was confined to Bombay and Madras, or even largely existed only 
among the Bombay cadre. But, as seen in Chapter 3, Curzon himself had reservations 
about the extreme overhauling the administrative system in the presidencies would 
require were the post of Governor to be made over to an ICS man. From this one may 
conclude that Curzon‟s views about the ICS, and therefore his relationship with them, 
were influenced, in short, by a mixture of social class, official equations forged in the 
traditions of British India, and also regional attitudes within India. What is surprising, 
in light of the fact that many biographers have pointed to his extraordinary 
administrative skills, why he did not himself join the ICS. The explanation that 
springs most readily to mind is that of social class; people of Curzon‟s relatively 
aristocratic and titled background would not enrol themselves among the ranks of the 
bureaucracy. His love of ordering polity is another reason; the ICS was not an 
originator of polity.  A final factor is his romanticization of the office of Viceroy, 
which fused as it did the concepts of stewardship of India, links with the Crown, and 
an acknowledged place in the line up of British ministerial designations.  
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Curzon and the Viceroy’s Council68 
Because Walter Lawrence was an ex-ICS man, he was also involved in the 
deliberations of the Viceroy‟s Council. This body, a handpicked team that functioned 
somewhat like a modern Cabinet, was the other major way in which Curzon interacted 
with the ICS, and this was, in a way, more fraught than his relationships with either 
Mackworth Young or MacDonnell, because the Viceroy‟s Council‟s every move was 
watched by observers at the India Office for signs of excessive subordination or 
otherwise to the Viceroy.   
A great part of the authority of the Viceroy stemmed from the fact that he was, ex-
officio, the head of the governing Council of India. As an old India hand noted at the 
height of the Kitchener dispute, 
 „The statute is perfectly clear that …  the superintendence, direction and 
control of the whole civil and military government shall be vested in a Governor-
General and Counsellors [sic] …no one of these counsellors has the right to separately 
administer any department. If the order which he alone proposes is issued by the 
Secretary to Government, it issues as an order of the Governor-General in Council, 
and derives its authority from their corporate acceptance of it. At the same time…a 
process of centralisation has been going on in the last few years[and] the personal 
term “Viceroy” has figured in despatches as it has never done before…[but] it ought 
to be understood that the law provides for one control only, that of the Governor-
General in Council; and less friction would be caused if those words were more 
frequently used in official literature….The Governor-General in Council alone directs 
and controls.
69
  
 
And Lee-Warner was not even pro-Curzon, quite the opposite! 
  For members of the ICS, of course, being on the Council was one way by 
which they could express direct power. Hence this section also seeks to explore the 
relationship between the Viceroy‟s Council and the ICS. How did the ICS see the 
Council; did they view   them as a link to the Viceroy or as former comrades-in-arms 
who had gone over to the other side? Evan Maconochie‟s father-in-law, Denzil 
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Ibbetson, was on the Council, and Maconochie notes how he knew a lot of people 
around.  How did the Council see its role? The interaction between the India Council 
and the ICS (their possible feeding off each other) has been documented, but the 
Viceroy‟s Council has been largely overlooked. Obviously a place on the Council 
could be given to someone who had risen through the ranks of the covenanted civil 
service, and this was always the case, except in the case of the Law Members. Yet, 
while competition for Governorships was rife, the ICS does not seem to have attached 
the same importance to a seat on the Viceroy‟s Council, and this section examines the 
reasons for it. The Council itself was not necessarily composed of people from the 
ICS; in fact there was a tendency to strike a balance between Civilians and men 
brought out from Home.  
 During Curzon‟s term in office, the members of his Council (and the army 
Commanders-in-Chief, who did not have a seat on the Council) were as follows:
70
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NAME PORTFOLIO TERM OF OFFICE 
Clinton Dawkins Finance 1899 
Sir Edward Law Finance 1900-1905 
Sir E. H. H. Collen Military 1898-1901 
Sir Edmond Elles Military 1902-1905 
Sir Thomas Raleigh Law 1899-April 1904 
Sir H. Erle Richards Law April 1904- 1905.  
Sir A. T. Arundel  Public Works  1898-1905  
Sir Charles Rivaz Home  1899-1902 
Sir Denzil Ibbetson Home 1902-1905 
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Of these, only Richards, Rivaz and Ibbetson were ICS men. For the most part, 
Curzon appears to have regarded his council as a collection of curiosities.  Denzil 
Ibbetson was one of the few officers he admired, and this admiration was reciprocated; 
Ibbetson (and J.P. Hewett) offered to resign along with Curzon and renounce their 
pensions in 1905. Ibbetson was sensitive to the changes of mood among his colleagues 
and the Council, and Curzon once wrote to him that he had „such confidence in your 
advice (though this sounds rather a paradox) that I prefer your first thoughts to your 
second.‟ 71  But even Ibbetson (like A.P. MacDonnell, the other Governor whom 
Curzon expressed approval of) did not escape a few reproaches; in March 1904 we 
find him writing to Curzon asking to be excused for not having gotten through two 
outstanding cases due to ill-health and his wife‟s absence- perhaps the wrong excuses 
to plead before Curzon. 
72
 As to the rest, he noted in 1901: „[Charles] Rivaz does his 
work…with sobriety, but without a spark either of enthusiasm or initiative. Collen and 
I now languish in each other‟s arms. Trevor is marking time-till the day of release 
dawns…73 
However, the Council had several diligent members upon it, even if they never 
quite matched Curzon‟s mental agility. One of these was the first law member, Sir 
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Thomas Raleigh,  a man of „cloistered appearance and sequestered habits,‟74  who 
went on to produce a compendium of Curzon‟s Viceregal speeches. Despite this, 
Curzon described him as  
„although a man of fine intellect and much ability, [he] is essentially an Oxford 
Don, and in no sense a leader of men…he cannot…drive anything along…What we 
want in our Legal Member is a lawyer of good abilities and experience, who can 
speak and debate well, who can conduct difficult Bills through Committee, and who 
knows sufficient jurisprudence to save us in our ordinary business from legal 
mistakes…in consequence of the great names that have been connected with it in the 
past, it is both desirable and necessary to select someone of standing and 
reputation…‟75 
 
 Though Curzon did concede that he was useful to have around, and very handy 
for odd jobs,
76
  Raleigh was eventually succeeded by Sir H. Erle Richards, who, like 
everyone else in the later stages of the Curzon Viceroyalty, devoted much of his time 
to cogitating over the constitutionalisms or otherwise of Kitchener‟s various demands 
for reform.  
The other outstanding Councillor was Clinton Dawkins, the Finance Member for a 
year in 1899.  During his term he did much to make the path of free enterprise easier 
in India; until Curzon and Dawkins,  
„the attitude of the Government of India towards men anxious to invest their 
brains and their capital in India was that of the bulldog towards the burglar…Mr. 
Dawkins, who possessed a wide knowledge not only of Government finance, but also of 
the great business world, pleaded strongly for a more liberal policy, and this attitude 
was warmly welcomed by the Viceroy…‟ 77  
 
He then went back to become a merchant banker in the City, but continued to 
write politically insightful letters to the Viceroy throughout his tenure. By contrast, his 
successor, Edward Law, was not a man whom Curzon warmed to; partly because he 
had no Indian experience and no knowledge of unique Indian situations.  
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The Home Member was perhaps the most important person on the Council, and 
it is notable that both the incumbents during Curzon‟s time were from the Punjab- 
revealing of the preponderance of the North in the mental landscape of the Raj.  In the 
context of this thesis, it is worth while considering how having two influential Punjab 
civilians on his Council helped Curzon gain the support he needed from that body to 
counter the incumbent Punjab governor‟s protests over the Land Alienation Act, and 
how being on the Council helped these two –Ibbetson and Rivaz- gain the Viceroy‟s 
ear.  
Curzon was acutely sensitive to the fact that the people on his Council were, 
essentially, from the ICS and not the governing elite. He shot down Brodrick‟s 
speculations as to whether their annual pay of £5300 could be improved upon, saying 
that it was „ample for a promoted Civilian and quite sufficient for the class of man 
whom we get from home.‟78 
The Commander-in-Chief was not, of course, a member of the Council; in fact it 
was the fact that the Military Member acted there in his stead that was the trigger that 
ended Curzon‟s time in office- this illustrates the importance attached to a seat on the 
Council, which was a sure shot way of guaranteeing the attention of the Viceroy. It 
would be all too easy for a Councillor to acquiesce in a Viceroy‟s proposal with the 
hope of gaining either a Governorship or a seat on the India Council after completion 
of his term. This was why the Viceroy‟s Council, while not figuring prominently in 
Indian public life, attracted a great deal of attention from the India Office during the 
politically turbulent years of the Curzon Viceroyalty. This was probably why St. John 
Brodrick as Secretary of State protested violently when Denzil Ibbetson resigned from 
the Council in 1904 to become temporary governor of the Punjab- he could not hold 
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both posts simultaneously. Brodrick wrote of the disapproval of the India Council at 
this; „here on the [India] Council they attach the greatest possible importance to any 
change in personnel, though I am afraid you would not consider that this would make 
much difference to the course of business...‟79 Ibbetson was one of the most prominent 
ICS men of his time, and Brodrick evidently thought Curzon was trying to remove 
what might have been a dissident voice on his Council. He would not, of course, have 
known of the warm working relationship shared by Curzon and Ibbetson. It is possible 
that Brodrick was trying to express his own views through the media of the India 
Council. He had touched upon the matter the month before, when it becomes clear that 
he actually professed to be concerned about the perception of a weakened Council in 
the eyes of the world:   
„the present composition of the Council, with 4 men all brought in during the 
past year, is one that gives no authority outside to their decisions other than that which 
attaches to the prestige of the Viceroy, and to yourself in particular…. The unanimity 
of your Council is represented to be that of a body of men, so many of whom are 
personally dependent…on the Viceroy. It would have helped me very much in 
fighting for the decisions of your Council if there had been more outside influence.‟80 
 
Curzon refuted this. „I do not myself think that Members of Council are any 
more dependent upon the Viceroy than Cabinet ministers at Home are upon the Prime 
Minister, or the Members of your Council upon you.‟ He further sought to remind 
Brodrick of the slights he felt the Government of India had anyway been dealt: „I do 
not remember that while [Ibbetson] has been with us, any greater weight has been 
attached to our advice than will probably be the case in the future. He also strove to 
dismiss claims that by putting his „own men‟ in he was benefiting them in any undue 
ways:  
„the utmost that the Viceroy can ever do is make a member of his Council a 
Lieutenant-Governor…in 9 cases out of 10….a man is marked out for succession to 
the chief post of a province in a manner so conspicuous that the Viceroy has not much 
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influence upon the course of events…‟ and finally he rebutted the claim that his 
Council was dependent on him; „Councillors here seem to me to be quite as 
independent as any similar Committee I have seen elsewhere…‟81 
 
But it soon became clear that it was not the turnover, or the relative inexperience 
at that level of then new members of Council, that Brodrick was concerned about. 
Basically, he did not want the Viceroy‟s Council to be composed of Indian  Civilians:  
„I have been most reluctant to complete your Council from officials serving in India, 
however distinguished. Honestly I think you want new blood, and an independence 
which no man who has been brought up under the Indian system can altogether feel.‟82  
What Curzon cared about, however, was competence, not where the person came from. 
It is probable that Brodrick thought planting the Council with people fresh from 
England would give him direct access to the Viceroy‟s methods of administration, but 
too many such incidences might have provoked an outcry from the ICS at what they 
would have rightly seen as another denial of their rights to partake in decision making 
for India. It is also not clear why Brodrick should have felt that Indian civilians would 
be complaisant with Curzon‟s ideas, because Curzon never ceased complaining about 
their intransigence. Nor did the ICS go overboard in proclaiming their enthusiasm for 
him, even if they did acknowledge his organisational efficiency. As a matter of fact, if 
Curzon was right, they used the influence of their ex-colleagues, now on the India 
Council, to attempt a negation of the Viceroy‟s reforms. 
Thus, trying to bring in more men from England to serve upon the Council 
would definitely have caused mutterings from the ICS- for them, it would have meant 
the removal of access to high government. Within the Indian Empire, proximity to the 
Viceregal machine was considered a sure-fire method of being noticed, promotions, 
and a permanent post in Simla. This was one of the reasons the Punjab provincial 
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government did not want to give up sharing its seat with the Central government at 
Simla and move to Ambala. As Curzon wrote to Brodrick about it, „Rivaz (ex-Punjab 
civilian and member of the Viceroy‟s Council before he went back to the Punjab as 
Lieut.- Governor) is …influenced…by his civilians, who think they will not get so 
many chances of promotions, when they are not in immediate contact with the 
Government of India.‟ But this argument only served to strengthen Curzon‟s 
justification for the removal of the Punjab Government; „if there is anything in the 
belief, [it] is of course a strong reason for the change, since the Punjab enjoys an 
advantage denied to other Local Governments.‟ 83  It is apparent from this that 
members of the Council were certainly not disinterested yes men looking to further 
their chances of lieutenant- governorships by being the Viceroy‟s sycophants- indeed, 
quite the reverse.  
Nor did they hesitate in taking an independent line when they thought fit to do 
so; most notably when Ampthill was presiding as Viceroy and they did not agree with 
him (or Curzon) about the necessity for opposing Kitchener‟s proposal for army 
reforms. But other than that, it was really not possible for the Council to diverge 
sharply from the Viceroy because Indian polity was generally consensually formulated 
after feedback from the provincial administrators concerned- and major legislative 
changes were often in the pipeline for years before a decision was reached, which 
would have given everyone a chance to air their views and perceive the direction the 
debate was taking. The Viceroy was not a top-down formulator of policy, though he 
may have been a strong initiator; as seen in the matter of the governorships, the 
machine had a way of functioning upon its own momentum, even if Lawrence and 
Curzon thought that momentum was one of half-speed.  
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But it is clear that Curzon attached a lot of importance to having a qualitatively 
sound Viceroy‟s Council, much more certainly than he did to that other advisory body, 
the India Council. But this made sense- the Viceroy‟s Council had its specialisms very 
clearly defined and as such had the potential to back up a Viceroy magnificently. 
Further, the people on the Council were currently serving officers in various capacities 
and hence could be relied on to be in touch with the contemporary scenario. Finally, 
as observed above, a Council that could be proven to be independent would help his 
cause in London.  
While the Viceroy‟s Council is often seen as being complaisant with Curzon‟s 
wishes and uniform in its action, the lack of dissension being held up as the result of a 
disallowance of free expression, it may have been because they were all of the same 
mind, broadly speaking.  
In conclusion, while there was no deliberate nexus between the ICS and the 
Viceroy‟s Council, or even the Council of India in London, it is entirely 
understandable that once civil servants secured a place on any of these, they might be 
expected to utilise it to promote their long held administrative schemes to the 
incumbent Viceroy. As observed, these councils offered a means of access to the 
highest echelons of power, which were otherwise not open to an individual not from 
an appropriate socio-political background. Curzon needed the ICS to implement his 
plans, and they needed him to voice their plans to the governmental structure.  
Thus far, the thesis has explored Curzon‟s relations with the civil administration 
of India. The next chapter takes on the Indian Army. 
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Chapter Five 
An Officer and A Gentleman? English hiatus, Ampthill, and the Kitchener 
Affair. 
 
This is a principle which I shall always observe in public life.  If any subordinate, who 
disagrees with me, and with whose conduct I have had reason to be seriously dissatisfied, 
offers me his resignation, either out of pique or bad humour, or a desire to put me in the 
wrong, I shall not hesitate to accept it. 
1
 
                                                                                         -Curzon to Sir Arthur Godley, 14 March 1901.  
 
 
Introduction 
The Kitchener Affair has been exhaustively speculated upon and worked on; 
however, as a study in backroom intrigue and the importance of the „political‟ as also 
„intangibles,‟ it has few parallels in the administrative history of the British in India. 
But studies of Curzon‟s Viceroyalty invariably relegate it to the trigger cause that 
ended the Curzon Viceroyalty, rather than an issue in which the political 
predominated over the administrative or the ethical, not the norm in British India. The 
only episode of comparable unsavourability was the war time Government‟s dumping 
of Wavell as Viceroy.  As Cohen states, it is also important in that it illustrates, by 
means of the workings of the Government of India, how an administrative issue 
pertaining to the internal administration of India became an affair of high significance 
in determining positions of power in Home and Anglo-Indian politics.
2
 Chapter 5, An 
Officer and a Gentleman… therefore explores this; albeit looking closely at the 
negotiations Kitchener employed to swing opinion against the Viceroy. It also 
explores the extent to which the Kitchener affair was used as a smokescreen by people 
who would have been only too happy had Curzon resigned on some other pretext. The 
chapter also examines intensively the „Ampthill angle‟- the degree to which Curzon‟s 
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England hiatus and Ampthill‟s acting Viceroyalty enabled Kitchener and the Home 
Government to cement a web of intrigue around the Viceroy. Delegation here proved 
costly to Curzon, and for Ampthill, sticking up for Curzon while being his locum cost 
him the succession to the Viceroyalty. To what extent was the India Office used by 
Kitchener as a pawn to induce Curzon to resign? What is the reason behind the India 
Council‟s comparative silence on the issue? While some of them publicly came out in 
support of Curzon‟s argument, these protestations do not seem to have been officially 
tabled. Nor has their support been logged by historians, even as it was an astonishing 
turnaround for a body whose relationship with the Viceroy had been mutually 
considered unworkable. It is especially puzzling because in the case of the Kitchener 
affair, it would appear that Curzon was for once in tune with the majoritan opinion; 
that Kitchener should not be allowed to get his way. As the future governor of the 
U.P. wrote,  
„K…wants some-one [sic] to check him, and if there is friction, as the papers 
say, between him and the Mil
 y 
 Member [sic], I think it is probably an argument in 
favour of a military member. Is friction a bad thing? It seems to me to have many 
advantages. The more experience I get the more distrustful I feel (?) of the one-man 
system. Possibly not being the “one man” affects ones [sic] point of view.‟ 3 
 
Yet most documentation of the Kitchener Affair, including that of the seminal 
King thesis, draws upon the Kitchener-Marker/Salisbury/Maxwell correspondence, 
and tends to state what Curzon did, or did not do, in reaction, and subordinates these 
points to the argument that Curzon‟s piqued offer of resignation was an outcome the 
India Office had been angling for. Curzon is presented as a naïve victim; the efforts 
within Curzon‟s team to present their case against Kitchener have not been utilised; in 
fact, there is no mention of the fact that he had a support team. Peter King‟s The 
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Viceroy’s Fall: How Kitchener Destroyed Curzon,4 is one such; it highlights how 
Kitchener and the India Office both used each other to oust a Viceroy they both 
wanted out of India for different reasons. What it leaves out- or at least underplays and 
does not seek to analyse- is the role of Curzon‟s subordinates and supporters, 
especially Lord Ampthill and Curzon‟s Council, in backing up Curzon‟s case. 
This is in part due to historical evaluation of the Kitchener Affair as being 
illustrative of Curzon‟s unworkable relationship with Balfour and Brodrick; their 
responses to the Curzon-Kitchener struggle are very well documented. The Viceregal 
team, perhaps to heighten the contrast, has been presented as a one-man entity, an 
exercise that furthers the image of Curzon as someone lacking in delegation and 
teamwork skills. But it was not just Curzon who was responsible for handling the 
Kitchener Affair. The point of first contact for Kitchener was the then Military 
Member, Sir E. Elles, and it was through him that the matter made its way to 
Viceregal attention, in terms of its being formally taken up. And, of course, between 
Kitchener‟s appointment and Curzon‟s resignation, the Viceregal chair for eight 
months was occupied by Curzon‟s locum, Lord Ampthill, and it was during this time 
that Kitchener really began a campaign of backstairs intrigue with London. These 
were three people in very different positions, circumscribed by differing sets of 
circumstances, and possessing very different temperaments. All this presents a very 
strong argument for elevating the Kitchener Affair above the level of either a duel 
between Curzon and the Commander-in-Chief, or presenting it as an example of 
contemporary Whitehall‟s cliquey, conspiracy-rife political framework.  
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At this stage, it becomes necessary to ask why, over the Kitchener affair, Curzon 
has been highlighted as acting in isolation while Kitchener surrounded himself with a 
band of his „boys?‟ This portrayal is the one constant to be found in the works of the 
sparring biographers of both. Not only does this present an inaccurate picture of both 
men‟s networking skills, especially given that in this matter at least, it was Curzon 
who enjoyed vocal and broad-based support from the ICS and Kitchener who operated 
by means of a loyalist clique- but the contrast seems to be deliberately highlighted just 
to show exactly how bad it was for Curzon that he did not engage in teamwork. 
Perhaps Curzon has been portrayed as acting alone because his towering personality 
easily lends itself to biographic studies, often verging on the hagiographic in the case 
of his many admirers and contemporaries, of the „Great Man‟ school of historiography. 
Yet neither Curzon nor any other Viceroy in the colonies ever functioned as 
autonomous kings in their realms. (In any case, the „lofty colossus‟ persona has been 
applied to Kitchener as well; and the single-handed relief of Khartoum sits uneasily 
with the conniving band of „boys‟ who skulked around the C-in-C‟s Indian lodges.) 
The Viceroy was not a figurehead; rather, in India he was „located in an 
interconnected network of people whose careers were also spent in carving Britain‟s 
imperial interests,‟ 5  incorporating varying levels of authority and power. This 
portrayal of Curzon acting in isolation may be to show his increasing dislocation from 
his superiors in London. But when academicians turn to his legislative policy, and his 
foreign policy, he is portrayed as interacting with his colleagues, even if only to 
disagree with them as he did with Mackworth Young, so the total omission of any 
other Indian administrator from analyses of the Kitchener affair is startling. This 
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chapter will therefore devote space to analysing who made up Curzon‟s team, and 
how they operated.  
Traditionally, analyses of the Kitchener Affair also leave out how Brodrick, 
Godley and the India Council did their best to push matters through, partly because 
historians tend to concentrate on Kitchener and his „unconstitutional‟ methods of 
operation when it came to getting his way and thus ignore the role played by the 
official persona. Brodrick is not always portrayed as being an active agent; the 
consensus is that his jealousy of Curzon led him to go along with Kitchener‟s views, 
i.e. enabled Kitchener to make him his pawn,  but the full extent of his, and Godley‟s, 
duplicity is not always revealed. Thus, the relationship between Kitchener and the 
India Office over the Military controversy is overlooked, as is the India Office‟s own 
stance on the matter. Curzon always complained that Brodrick deliberately obstructed 
him in London, especially over this issue: but exactly what was it that Brodrick did or 
did not do? How did he manoeuvre through the sticky affair and come out unscathed 
even in the eyes of posterity?
6
 The point to note here is that Kitchener used the centre 
of power (the India Office) which properly could have been expected to support 
Curzon as they were the people responsible for appointing him; Kitchener‟s 
constitutional superiors, at the highest level, being the War Office or the Imperial 
Defence Committee, which Balfour had instituted. The blurring of boundaries 
between various centres of power was the major contributory factor for the messy 
intrigue that was the hallmark of the Kitchener Affair. 
Cohen‟s paper presents the Kitchener-Curzon dispute on many levels, as 
opposed to reducing it to a simplistic analysis of any one façade of the debate. Cohen 
teases through the strands of authority, perception, and the interpretations of 
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scheme- and consequently his efforts to put it into operation-  was discredited in 1916,  a few weeks 
after he drowned at sea.  
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constitutionalisms through means of an open „European-style‟ psychoanalytic 
structure.  This chapter moves between a detailed factual narrative and the fluid 
dynamics of personality assessment to present an integrated account of two 
overlooked themes in the Kitchener Affair; resignation-as an antidote to the most 
commonly explored theme of clinging on to supreme power- and the role of Lord 
Ampthill, Acting Viceroy in 1904, again as an antidote to the theme of emphasising 
the dominance of the dominant and principal actors. The examination of Ampthill‟s 
role takes on particular significance as it enables the historian to demonstrate that 
Curzon too had a team, a support structure and sounding board that functioned as a 
counterpoint to Kitchener‟s network of backstairs contacts.  
In terms of linkages to the thesis, since the base theme of the thesis is executive 
power and the checks upon it, this section seeks to examine to what happens when 
power, or the free exercise of it, is perceived by the individual to have been frustrated. 
What are the options then open to that individual? One obvious option is resignation. 
Resignation is important because, apart from obviously emphasising a position of 
defeat / unsuccessfulness, it can also be used as a position of strength or to show one‟s 
immutability on a standpoint. Which of these applied to Curzon in the light of the 
Kitchener Affair?   Resignation is relevant in this context as it is not only an over-
riding theme of the Curzon Viceroyalty, but it is about making a standpoint through 
the voluntary letting go, and non exercising, of power.  
The other major contention of the thesis is to examine shared power, or 
delegated power, and how good was Curzon at it. This section will utilise the 
Kitchener affair as a medium through which to explore these themes. This section will 
examine how shared/delegated power operates and is perceived by those around the 
individual in office, especially in contrast to 'original' power, in this case the power 
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exercised by Curzon as Viceroy or Kitchener as C-in-C, as opposed to Ampthill taking 
up the Viceregal chair by default, his status not being that of a „genuine,‟ but acting 
Viceroy.  
It is all the more important to examine this as Curzon was not comfortable either 
delegating tasks or power to anyone, nor was he comfortable with shared control, 
precisely because he liked to do everything by himself. This section should also be 
read in conjunction with Chapter 3, to gain an understanding of how problems in the 
allocation of power have more to do with the office in question, as opposed to the 
office holder; as Governor Ampthill did not have Curzon's approbation to the extent 
he did as acting Viceroy, in part because Curzon was disposed to regard the Madras 
cadre, and by extension its incumbent head, as disinclined to co-ordinate with the 
Centre. In the case of the Viceroyalty though, it being an office he held almost sacred, 
he was a model of the co-operative senior administrator, perhaps because this was the 
only way he could ensure a continuation of his legacy in that office.  
This section will also look at how power puts individuals in unexpected positions, for 
example Ampthill during his early days as Governor of Madras, when the stereotypes 
attached to the Madras cadre were automatically tacked on to him: - but the seniority 
of that province elevated him to a position where he came closer to being the 
Viceroy‟s right-hand man than anyone else in British India.  
 
Theme 1: Resignation 
The determining points of Curzon‟s Viceroyalty all centred on resignation as a 
theme.  George Hamilton resigned in September 1903, which led to St. John Brodrick, 
with his past love-hate relationship with Curzon occupying the Secretary of State‟s 
chair; Kitchener attempted to resign in September 1904, but his overtly political feint 
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was shot down by Ampthill; nor was Curzon‟s unenthusiastic offer to resign in 
October 1904 accepted by Brodrick because it would have seemed inappropriate to 
accept it. Furthermore, Balfour‟s concern to keep the Conservatives falling out of 
power and Brodrick‟s anxiety to clear his name and prove himself in army affairs after 
not obligatorily resigning at the War Office
7
 all contributed to Curzon‟s resignation in 
1905. 
 
As an instrument in the exercise of political power, resignation, or the threat of 
it, was a prominent tactic of the day under Balfour‟s government; no less than six 
ministers had resigned in the summer of 1903, and Curzon‟s made it seven. 
Resignation tactics gained an especial poignancy because the Conservative 
government was itself shaky after Salisbury‟s death till it fell in December 1905, and 
each resignation had the potential to cause a domino effect; or failing that, to injure 
the Cabinet in the eyes of Parliament. In fact, much of the Conservative Government‟s 
eagerness to resolve the military dispute hinged on the fact that they might be kicked 
out of office any day, thus making speed crucial and also underscoring the importance 
of making the scheme impregnable. This determined, very consciously, the specifics 
of their actions. It was understandable that the Government would choose to stall a 
resignation such as that of a high-profile soldier like Kitchener‟s all the more eagerly. 
Ampthill, who had turned down Kitchener‟s resignation in 1904, noted to 
Curzon in 1905 that he should have let Kitchener resign, as there would then have 
been no occasion for Curzon to do so.
8
 Hence, this section is comprehensively given 
over to an examination as to why Ampthill did not accept the Commander-in-Chief‟s 
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 King, The Viceroy’s Fall, 133.  
8
 Ampthill to Curzon, 17 August 1905, Ampthill Papers, Mss Eur E233/8. 
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resignation; and why, indeed, did the C-in-C see fit to tender his resignation at all. It 
will also examine the motives behind resignations in contemporary Indian politics; 
whether it  was an expression of helplessness in political affairs and a consequent 
desire to dissociate oneself from measures one did not approve of but felt to be wrong; 
or an act of protest that sought to deprive a misguided government of an upstanding 
civil servant owing to their wrong policies; or finally, because one felt that the 
measure was indeed insupportable and resigned in a purely altruistic fashion to prove 
one‟s point.  It will examine the efficacy of resignation as a tool for getting one‟s 
point across to the powers that be; as Harcourt Butler noted at the height of the 
Kitchener controversy, the option of resigning itself signified power over the 
powerful; „it must be pleasant to be able to threaten resignation and frighten the 
powers.‟9 
As Cross and Alderman note, most resignations, or threats thereof, are 
„deliberately used to gain political objectives…actuated more by pique than policy.‟10 
Curzon resigned over a matter of policy; had Kitchener‟s resignation over the Swan 
issue been accepted, he could definitively have been said to have resigned over an 
issue of pique- he had not wanted civilian interference over disciplinary issues in the 
army. Curzon was much too emotionally involved with India and very sure of the 
benefit to be accrued to India by having him as Viceroy; and perhaps because of this 
felt keenly that it would be better to go than sustain non-expert obstructions to his 
plans. But it is possible that his many threats to resign went over as attempted 
blackmail, and „an over-frequent use  of the tactic, particularly over relatively trivial 
issues [or those that might seem trivial to the other party, as happened with much of 
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 Harcourt Butler to H. Erle Richards, 28 April 1905, Butler Papers, Mss Eur F116/18.  
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 R. K.  Alderman and J. A. Cross, The Tactics of Resignation: A Study in British Cabinet Government 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), 18-19.  
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Curzon‟s „wrongs‟], clearly reduces its force, and the minister involved runs the risk 
of having his bluff called.‟11  As Brodrick commented to Ampthill,  
„although nobody believes he [Curzon] intends to resign…if only 
people…could know that the threat of resignation loses force by continual repetition, 
they would be wary of using that sacred but last „pièce de résistance‟… [however] we 
are most anxious to save his face in any way we can.‟12  
 In Curzon‟s case, then, his resignation became a „striking example of the relative 
dispensability of the apparently indispensable.‟13 
Interestingly, while Curzon‟s various threats of resignation, both over the 
Kitchener affair and other issues, are well known, Kitchener himself used the tactic to 
unsettle the Home Government, and in September 1904 actually resigned, but in the 
event Ampthill as Acting Viceroy did not accept his resignation. This chapter will 
examine the reasons as to why Ampthill did not accept Kitchener‟s resignation in the 
summer of 1904; according to Ampthill himself, as Kitchener had resigned over the 
issue of penalising a minor captain, he had declined to accept a resignation made on so 
comparatively petty a matter, probably rightly in terms of political strategy, because 
„when a minister does seriously threaten resignation on what is obviously a minor 
issue it can be seen as evidence that the Government is  in a weak position.‟ 14 
Ampthill of course perceived that Kitchener was using the Swan case merely as an 
excuse to either publicise or force the Supply issue, itself a smokescreen for his 
campaign of abolishing the post of Military Member.  
By mid-1905 Curzon was very much aware of the political angle of the 
resignation debate- though not that Kitchener was actively using it to his personal 
advantage. As he noted to Ampthill, „they [the Cabinet and the Secretary of State] are 
anxiously considering whether they would lose more by Kitchener‟s resignation or 
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 Brodrick to Ampthill, 30 June 1905, Ampthill Papers, Mss Eur E233/11.  
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 Alderman & Cross,  Tactics of Resignation,  17.  
14
 Alderman & Cross,  Tactics of Resignation, 41.  
191 
 
mine…Military prestige is so much greater than Civilian, that the result may be 
anticipated…I am quite ready to go…‟15 
But in 1904, Curzon still believed, unlike Ampthill, that he and Kitchener were 
engaged in an objective struggle to make the Government of India as efficient as 
possible. It is quite possible that he would have condemned out of hand Ampthill‟s 
„self-importance‟ had he endorsed Kitchener‟s resignation. 
To the last, the Government sought to convince itself that Curzon had not 
resigned over the affair of the military membership, or that he was using it as an 
excuse to avoid it being bruited about that the was resigning due to his unpopularity 
with the Indians because of the Bengal Partition and his inflammatory speech at the 
Calcutta Convocation of 1904. 
16
 In fact, the official line supplied to the palace from 
both Balfour and Brodrick was that Curzon had resigned because he could not cope 
with the furore the Partition of Bengal had raised.
17
  
But Curzon probably resigned from a sense of disillusionment, as did his 
Military Supply Member, Sir E. Elles, who had handed in his papers in June 1905 as 
he felt it was time to bring in fresh blood to work the new system and that given the 
depredations to which he had been subjected, he did not find it any great sacrifice to 
resign
18
- the latter sentiment one which Curzon had been echoing since 1904.  
The point to note is that none of Curzon‟s supporters resigned in solidarity; 
something he had confidently predicted they would do. As he said at the time the 
Dane Treaty was signed in Kabul in 1904, he had not resigned then  because  
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„my colleagues desired me for a not less momentous affray, namely that raised 
by the Commander-in-Chief. Here also we are entirely unanimous, and a stronger 
dispatch never issued from the Government of India. It seems to me inconceivable that 
the present Government should decide to trample on the Government of India in a 
matter affecting their own Constitution. Should they do so, I think it not unlikely that 
the entire Government of India might resign en bloc – a situation which would be 
without parallel in history… If such were the case, I can hardly think that any Viceroy 
who knew anything of India or its Constitution would agree to take my place. For in 
the hands of a military autocracy one main sphere of the Government‟s responsibility 
would have been cut off and destroyed.‟19 
 
Even Ampthill, who had become one of Curzon‟s most vocal supporters, did 
not resign. Nor did Barnes on the India Council. Personal career concerns 
ultimately took precedence over misgivings about the administration of India under 
what was feared to be on the way to becoming a military autocracy. Elles, it is true, 
resigned, but then, like Curzon, he was directly affected by the changes.  It is not 
surprising that Curzon never again resigned a political post in his life, because not 
only did it remove from one the position to influence affairs, it also isolated one 
politically as nobody politically supported a fallen man. It may be noted here that 
while Curzon had many supporters who commiserated with him when he resigned, 
they did not take official steps to overturn any justice they thought might be done 
him- with the exception of the press-man Lovat Fraser, and later the adventurer 
Francis Younghusband, and they were not  politicians.  
Many people resigned when dealing with Kitchener because they could not 
match his influence at home; hence it was futile to attempt to reason through his 
obduracy. As Elles, who tendered his resignation shortly after Curzon‟s, said,  
„Lord Kitchener came out here with a cut-and-dry proposal for abolishing the 
Military Member and taking the whole administration into his own hands…Personally 
it would make very little difference to me whether I gave up office in a few months 
time or completed my five years but….it would be a gigantic mistake to place the 
whole administrative or executive power in the hands of either a powerful 
Commander-in-Chief or a weak one…there is no question of any personal difference 
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between myself and the Commander-in-Chief. We have also always recognised his 
great prestige and that he had a work to perform out here on behalf of His Majesty‟s 
Government…I am very glad to find that Your Excellency thinks my concessions to 
the Commander-in-Chief reasonable and proper. If he accepts them, I think it should 
be as a permanent solution of the question, not as an ad interim one.‟20  
 
Yet inspite of that it was them and not Kitchener who suffered in terms of future 
political advancement. Even those who did were not compelled to resign, for example 
Ampthill, found their careers stalled as they were seen to have opposed him, in this 
case not because of Kitchener‟s direct manoeuvrings, but because the establishment 
had come to distrust all those who had sided with his „opponents.‟ There also seems to 
have been an impression that Curzon had turned this into a personalised duel between 
himself and Kitchener and therefore for other officials to take sides (by resigning) in 
the dispute would be tantamount to partisanship of one statesman/administrator over 
another. As Arundel wrote to the Law Member,  
„[I] have written at some length to the Viceroy entirely and unreservedly 
confirming the opinion I gave…that members of Council should not resign because 
they differ from the Secy. of S. [sic] on an important question of policy…Have 
begged the Viceroy to set aside his own personal view to resign, out of regard to the 
public interests at stake and in deference to the united request of his Council and 
Colleagues.‟21 
 
It would thus appear that the Council, in common with other interpreters of the 
Kitchener Affair, failed to grasp that Curzon (and Ampthill) did not seek to oppose 
Kitchener‟s plans merely because they held them to be affronts to their personal 
authority, but because they felt the planned reforms would undermine the 
constitutional paramountcy of civilian over military government in British India.  As 
noted below, Ampthill had experienced some difficulty in persuading his Council to 
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back his stance; it is possible, though unlikely, that they had never been entirely 
convinced.  
The next section examines Ampthill‟s role in the Kitchener affair and contends 
that the „ad interim‟ status of Ampthill‟s administration weighed a good deal in 
deciding what weightage to give to developments in the Kitchener saga while he was 
in charge of the Viceroyalty. As noted, Elles was concerned that the government 
might regard any developments as only stop-gap arrangements and re-open the matter 
while Curzon was back in India, while Ampthill, initially diffident about his own 
prowess, did not think the matter should be raised at all till Curzon resumed office. 
The section also examines the possibility  that Ampthill was emboldened to speak out 
about his own views  on the Kitchener affair, instead of following a line indicated by 
Curzon or Whitehall, his two masters,  precisely because he was an Acting Viceroy. 
The degree of unusualness  (deviation from the standard norm of bureaucratic 
administration) of the Curzon administration in fact probably freed up a lot of people 
to express themselves more freely than they might otherwise have done! 
 
Theme 2: Ampthill and the Exigencies of Exercising Delegated   Power: the 
locum’s dilemma. 
We will look at Kitchener‟s campaign in the light of how Ampthill handled it, 
and also examine issues of timing and how they are pertinent to the high politics of 
power. This section also examines how the de jure status of a governor‟s tenure in 
office affected his colleagues‟ and subordinates‟ interactions with him. Ampthill.  It 
starts off by demonstrating how Ampthill‟s views developed as he familiarised 
himself with the Viceregal office, and how these developments –and consequently 
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Ampthill- were regarded in London, with Brodrick (and Kitchener in India) 
attempting to win over the new Viceroy to Kitchener‟s point of view. This section also 
explains how Ampthill reacted to these attempts by London to impose their power 
over the Government of India by capitalising upon the temporary nature of his office, 
and how he reacted (and resisted) to this by bringing his own powers of perception to 
bear on his assessment and dealings with those individuals involved in the 
Government of India.  
Arthur Oliver Villiers Russell, Second Baron Ampthill, Governor of Madras 
before he was translated to the Acting Viceroyalty at thirty-four, being the youngest 
man ever to occupy this position,
22
 was responsible for handling the most significant 
incidents that occurred during the Curzon Viceroyalty- the Dane Mission to Kabul and 
the Younghusband Expedition to Lhasa. The point here is that his was far from an 
idyllic interlude; in the face of growing uncertainty as to whether Curzon would 
resume duties for a second term, Ampthill managed to keep the increasingly restive 
Kitchener at bay for seven months. In fact, Ampthill‟s handling of the Kitchener 
affair, with his unwavering emphasis on keeping interference from London out, served 
better to contain Kitchener than his chief‟s methods. As has been demonstrated below, 
Kitchener‟s camp thought Ampthill‟s Viceroyalty a fertile preparatory ground for their 
campaign; but in fact the campaign was successfully stalled by the acting Viceroy to a 
greater degree than has been avowed – in fact, no analyst of the Kitchener Affair has 
factored in Ampthill‟s term and contribution, evidence of a gap in historiography and 
an under-estimation of the „acting‟ Viceroyalty. „Acting‟ does not imply that 
Ampthill‟s duties were any lighter merely because he was not a long –term Viceroy; 
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yet the „ad interim‟ status of his charge looms large in all correspondence about the 
governance of India.  
The interesting thing is that, as Ampthill‟s biographer notes, in the run up to 
Ampthill‟s taking over the Viceroyalty, neither Curzon nor Brodrick mentioned the 
three affairs of paramount importance that Ampthill was to steer the Empire through- 
Tibet, Afghanistan and Kitchener. The private correspondence, ostensibly of such 
value that it was instrumental in the governing of India, limits itself to details of 
household arrangements; Curzon reserved the Kitchener topic for when Ampthill 
came to stay with him a week prior to taking over. So Ampthill was, after all, well-
acquainted with the nuances of the question.  
From the outset, Ampthill was apprehensive not about the specifics of the 
question itself, (which, like Curzon, he considered unworthy even of debate) but the 
quarrels discussion of the question could lead to. For this reason he was anxious to 
settle the question once and for all with as much speed as possible. As he wrote to 
Brodrick, 
        „There is another matter in which Lord Kitchener is pressing me very 
hard and concerning which Lord Curzon can tell you a great deal. He desires that the 
administrative
23
 control of the Supply and Transport Department should be 
transferred to the Commander-in-Chief. My colleagues appear to regard it as a 
comparatively simple and unimportant matter…but after a careful study…I take it 
[as] an axiomatic principle that the Executive and Administrative should be sharply 
divided in Army affairs. Lord Kitchener‟s proposal is in effect to revert to the system 
of combining executive and administrative functions under one head, a system which 
no longer exists in any other army in the world…I can see no reason for making 
even one step in this retrograde direction and I consider that a large question of this 
kind should not be raised during an “ad interim” administration…it remains to be 
seen whether my colleagues will…rally to my support…I have urged Lord Kitchener 
to accept a compromise suggested by Sir Edmond [sic] Elles…strengthening the 
executive powers….he already possesses. If he accepts the suggestion we shall avoid 
a very difficult and thorny question…if not we shall have to fight out the battle in 
Council and I fear that this latter contingency is the most probable as Lord Kitchener 
is desperately keen on the subject. He refers to it on every possible and impossible 
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occasion and he even dragged it in the other day on some papers relating to the 
diseases of camels. I only hope that it will not lead to any serious disagreement 
between Lord Kitchener and myself. 
24
 
 
But Curzon‟s team-primarily Ampthill at the time concerned,- were more 
concerned with reiterating their case over and over again, to emphasise their 
constitutional righteousness, as opposed to taking steps to make the British 
Government see that their case was right, in terms of publicity as well as military 
angles. As Winston Churchill famously noted about Curzon, he „thought too much 
about stating his case and too little about getting things done.‟25 By concentrating 
upon the advantages of the contemporary system, Curzon‟s team failed to address, 
using practical scenarios, the potential flaws in the workability of Kitchener‟s scheme- 
flaws that led to Kut. In fact, they explicitly ruled out involving themselves in the 
military side of the debate; as Ampthill noted when Kitchener tried to explain that he 
considered the question very important from a military point of view, he did not  
„pretend to be a judge of the technical military aspect of the case; I can only go 
on the broad grounds of well-known principle, administrative necessity and public 
expediency and there I had not hesitation in forming the opinions which I expressed. I 
greatly regret that a question should have arisen in my time on which there will be a 
sharp divergence of opinion in Council and particularly one in which I cannot co-
operate heartily with you. You say that you have written “rather strongly;” I hope not 
in such a way as to import a personal element into the question. We must argue it out 
on its merits alone.‟26 
 
 This was idealistic thinking, very much against the grain of contemporary 
political life, wherein „the process of determining….policies is…a power struggle 
between individual and departmental views, and much depends on the force a minister 
can develop in the inter-ministerial contest.‟27 This chapter therefore looks at how 
Curzon‟s side engineered, or tried to engineer, 1904. 
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Curzon grumbled continually about the unworkability and unconstitutionality of 
Kitchener‟s suggestions, but failed to highlight their potential for causing discord.  
Another significant comment of note is Ampthill‟s free admission that he has not 
carried his Council with him; Curzon often stated this in lesser crises to demonstrate 
that the Government of India was not a one-man show; but in Ampthill‟s case, it could 
only have led the Cabinet to assume he was on the wrong track, possibly influenced 
by Curzon. Thus a development which, if announced by the Viceroy, would have 
irrefutably demonstrated his resolve to encourage the idiosyncrasies of individual 
administrators, only served to further the impression that his locum, possibly 
indoctrinated by him, was unable to impress his views upon a (rightly) recalcitrant 
Council.  
But it can be seen from the above that Ampthill viewed this as a purely internal 
matter for the Government of India, and never expected it to spread to London. This 
might explain why he protested so strongly when he found that it had indeed done so. 
Indeed, Ampthill, even more than Curzon, very categorically disliked irregular 
interference from London. In a letter to Curzon he deplored Balfour‟s „love of 
theorizing [sic] on military matters,‟28 and his disinclination to take advice from any 
but the Imperial Defence Committee he had instituted. Ampthill and Curzon theorized 
that this was because Balfour and Brodrick were fascinated with the subject of 
Imperial defence.
29
 But the real reason was that Balfour and Brodrick received their 
input from Kitchener, who, of course, was at the centre of things, and from English 
sources, and had planted his moles in the Imperial Defence Committee.  As Curzon 
noted about the Imperial Defence Committee, „I do not know that they know anything 
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…about India, and I do the talking, while they ask questions…‟30 It was the man -on –
the- spot- principle at work again.  
Ampthill had to contend with two masters when negotiating with Kitchener; 
Brodrick as Secretary of State, and Curzon, to whom he was answerable; after all he 
had been parachuted into the Viceroyalty just to facilitate Curzon‟s assumption of a 
second terms of office. He also had to contend with the initial intractability of his 
Council, and well as the problem, in itself, of how to handle Kitchener and his conduct 
towards the Military Supply Department.  By July he had managed to swing his 
Council round to his point of view; „I am very glad,‟ he wrote to the Law Member, 
Sir. H. Erle Richards, „to hear that you are against Lord Kitchener‟s proposal and that 
then is a majority of that opinion.‟31 
Kitchener also made efforts to win over Ampthill initially, going down for a 
weekend at Madras shortly before Ampthill was due to take over as Viceroy. Ampthill 
reports him to Curzon as being „most genial and pleasant;‟ he was in fact encouraged 
to hope that Kitchener and himself would get along well at Simla.
32
  It is also possible 
that Kitchener was not just trying to disarm Ampthill, but genuinely win him over to 
his side, especially as it was well known that he had a frictional relationship with 
Curzon in the early years of his Governorship. A Viceroy who genuinely liked him 
would prove more conducive to pushing his schemes through.  
Ampthill in fact admired the way Curzon handled the Kitchener affair, and thus, 
if Kitchener, or indeed Balfour and Brodrick, thought it would be easier to push their 
views through during Curzon‟s leave, they were mistaken. Ampthill, genuinely 
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flattered at having been asked to step in as Viceroy, was disposed to follow Curzon‟s 
line as closely as he could.  
„What I admire most is the way in which, while disagreeing with Lord 
Kitchener, you have shown the greatest possible deference for his views and brought 
out into strong relief the extraordinary liberty of action which he has thus far 
enjoyed…[but] his is a mind which is not open to argument whether the discussion is 
based on abstract principles or practical matters of fact.‟33 
 
 Kitchener began by going on the attack, endeavouring to show Ampthill that he 
had the support of the military establishment as a whole.  
„My views, as also those of my generals, senior officials of the Supply and 
Transport Services, are so divergent from his [Elles‟] that I think the only way is to 
take the matter up in Council‟- the very thing both Ampthill and Curzon wanted to 
avoid. He further continued that „with the present system I would not willingly 
accept the responsibility of command in a serious war. In these circumstances if the 
changes I advocate are not entertained I think you will agree that my position here 
becomes a false one…in the face of the position he [Elles] has taken up I have had 
to write rather strongly…to bring home to the Civilian Members of Council‟ – thus 
making it very clear he despised the Council and the fact that as non military 
personnel they should possess the right to sit in judgement on his plans- „the great 
importance of the decision to be taken on a highly technical military question.‟34 
At this stage, in fact, Ampthill probably harboured a greater degree of 
apprehension over the expected showdown with his Council (who, as he had written to 
Godley, did not share his and Curzon‟s views about Kitchener‟s proposed reforms) 
than of what Kitchener might do by way of political intrigue. He writes to Elles that a 
note written by him should help dispel many apprehensions the Councillors had 
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held;
35
 evidently the Council needed reassurance from an experienced India hand, as 
they looked upon Ampthill as too young and inexperienced. It is doubtful, however, 
whether Kitchener or his staff spotted Ampthill‟s prowess of perception; they did not 
like Ampthill and tried to make him out to be a poor weak creature, further 
emasculated by the constraints of being a very young locum to a very autocratic 
Viceroy. Certainly they were sure of their infallibility in power as long as Ampthill 
held the reins, for the reasons cited above, but they not perceive that Ampthill himself 
was aware of the inherent „political‟ tinge of the whole affair, preferring instead to 
believe that Kitchener was indispensable for the maintenance of law and order in India; 
as one of the „boys‟ remarked, „Ampthill is quite dependent on K.‟36 He was, albeit 
not in the sense construed by Marker. The Curzon years were some of the most 
peaceable in India, and in any case there was no dearth of capable soldiers. But as was 
proved with Curzon in the summer of 1905, Ampthill could not have politically 
survived an outright clash with Kitchener, because the entire Conservative 
Government considered itself dependent on Kitchener‟s image with the public, and 
counted on that to keep them in office. Kitchener knew this as well, and given 
Ampthill‟s sub-ordinate position in the administrative hierarchy, was spot on when he 
commented that “Curzon knows that I am practically the only one who understands 
that he alone is the real obstacle.”37 This may have been true in terms of persons 
opposing the Viceroy‟s scheme, but it is clear that Ampthill did everything he, too, 
could do to oppose the reforms; had he been Viceroy instead of Curzon, he would 
have opposed them in the same manner as Curzon, but it might have been easier for 
the Home Government to recall him- certainly easier than recalling a Viceroy 
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regarded as one of the foremost Asiatic experts of the time- unless that Viceroy 
himself chose to resign.  
It has often been observed how Curzon was done in because he failed to take 
cognisance of Kitchener‟s under-handedness. This is true, but what is surprising is that 
Ampthill more than Curzon spotted Kitchener‟s extreme willingness to resort to 
tactics that were not quite cricket to get his way in things, and also his fundamental 
lack of precision. Ampthill also displayed skills that enabled him to contain Kitchener. 
He repeatedly reiterated his observations about Kitchener to both Brodrick and 
Godley, telling them variously that Lord Kitchener „is not above making hay while the 
sun shines,‟38 „has imported a personal note into the discussion which I had been at 
pains to keep out,‟39 and finally that he „does not seem to understand argument and 
resorts to mere declamation himself.‟40 Ampthill was thus quick to perceive that it was 
the personal and not the constitutional that was paramount in the tussle over the 
Military Member. He was also quick to sense that Kitchener‟s staff were intriguing on 
his behalf, and that they constituted a dangerous opponent precisely because they were 
so firmly convinced of his greatness that they further fuelled his ego. As he noted, 
„Lord Kitchener is badly served by his staff who are very inexperienced and quite new 
to administrative principles. They back up the great man in all his autocratic actions 
without having any real knowledge or opinions of their own and only confirm him in 
his self-confidence.‟41  
But Ampthill, again unlike Curzon (who took  much longer to come to a similar 
conclusion), did not naively assume that the India Office was a disinterested party; he 
also showed himself very acutely aware of the close relationship Kitchener had 
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managed to establish with the India Office at the cost of that office‟s estimation of the 
Government of India; „Brodrick has got a strange idea into his head that I am not 
working with Lord Kitchener and keeps on asking me whether Lord Kitchener agrees 
to this or approves of that…‟42 
Ampthill was also aware of the degree to which London‟s increasing 
involvement in the Kitchener Affair could damage its chances of being brought to an 
amicable conclusion,  exasperatedly asking both Brodrick and Godley to stop 
discussing it at Home, as it would further inflame matters in India.
43
 
 Matters were inflamed a month later, however, when Kitchener sent in his 
resignation to Ampthill, as seen above. Unlike Curzon‟s spontaneous resignation  
eleven months later, Kitchener‟s had been long in the planning. In the July of 1904 he 
commented that „I see a possible chance of resigning before long…‟44 The chance 
came when Kitchener‟s order for initiating disciplinary action against a Captain Swan 
was overturned by the Indian Government because it was unconstitutional.  Kitchener 
argued that this damaged his authority within the army, and resigned. He had already 
previously stated that if he was compelled to resign as C-in-C of the Indian army, he 
would retire from military life altogether.  
Calculating that the real centre of power was London, and perhaps anticipating 
that Ampthill would not inform London of his move, Kitchener, in a characteristically 
roundabout way, had Hubert Mullaly inform Balfour that he (Mullaly) had „received a 
telegram from Lord Kitchener in which he instructs me to tell you that he has sent in 
his resignation and telegraphed details to the Secretary of State for War…if his 
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resignation is accepted he intends to retire from the army.‟45 And even then he made 
no bones about the fact that the Captain Swan affair was no more than a smokescreen, 
telling Balfour that  
„the immediate cause is a case in which his disciplinary powers have been 
interfered with; but the whole position assumed by the Military Department…render it 
impossible for him to continue under existing conditions. He tells me that he thinks Sir 
E. Elles or himself will have to go.‟46  
 
Mullaly‟s wording as to informing Balfour that Kitchener had sent in his resignation 
to the Secretary of State for War, altogether bypassing the India Office, further 
underscores the fact that Kitchener wished to make it emphatic that he did not see any 
part of the Indian Government as his master; he was first a soldier and then a cog in 
the wheel of Indian administration. 
This epithet set out, starkly and chillingly, the consequences to the Government 
if Kitchener did not have his way over the Military Member tussle. He would not stay 
on in India if it was not sorted out, and if he resigned, which in itself would be an 
electoral blow to any Government given his popularity with the public, he would not 
stay on in the British army- the ballot box aside, Kitchener had proven himself in 
Africa, and as noted, there were not many generals who could replace him in the army 
per se, whatever they did in India.  
Ampthill was outraged that Kitchener had even handed in his resignation over 
such a trifle. As he noted in his private diary of 1904, 
23.9: Letter from Kitchener placing his resignation in my hands for a reason 
which was paltry and contemptible.  
25.9: Wrote another long letter to Kitchener pointing out the folly and mischief of 
his conduct.  
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26.9: Kitchener came at 3 and stayed till 5. It was a trying interview but at the end 
he withdrew his resignation and I was able to send off a telegram reassuring the 
Home Government.
47
 
 
It is likely that in this case both men over-estimated the gravity the other 
attached to his own stance; Kitchener probably made a protracted stance for the 
theatrics of it; there is no evidence that Kitchener expected Ampthill to take his threat 
seriously; to the contrary, he did not think Ampthill would dare endorse his 
resignation. As he had written to Marker in July 1904 about his possible resignation, 
he had added that „I fear it will be blocked as Ampthill would not like my going in his 
time.‟48 This was true, inasmuch as it would have been a political catastrophe for 
Ampthill in the event he had accepted Kitchener‟s resignation. Letting Kitchener 
resign in the summer of 1904 would have been political suicide for Ampthill. He 
would of course have been disowned by the London establishment, and it is also not 
too clear how Curzon would have viewed such a development. In any case, he would 
definitely have fulminated about Ampthill‟s rocking the boat while being left in 
charge. As he poignantly referred to himself, he was the „junior man‟ and would have 
been heavily criticised for being so inflexible as to let so senior a soldier as Kitchener 
(one moreover highly esteemed by his grey-haired superiors) go. Kitchener could not 
have been unaware of this; he also knew that the likelihood of being reinstated at 
some future date would be greater than if he had resigned while under, say, Curzon, 
and that a resignation made under Ampthill would be more damaging to Ampthill‟s 
career than his own. Thus one must conclude that Kitchener only „resigned‟ for the 
political effect he knew it would create in London.   
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As a matter of fact, for Kitchener, resignation under Ampthill would have been a 
masterstroke; in his case, it would not have meant „failure to carry one‟s point in the 
current conflict and in all subsequent conflicts.‟49 The popular assumption, both public 
and political, would have been that if Kitchener had resigned, it was only because 
Ampthill had been too pig-headed to see his viewpoint, and Curzon had refused to see 
it because he did not want to acknowledge his superiority. „Rank clearly adds to the 
tactical value of a resignation threat,‟50 and all the more so when there are disparities 
in ranking and public esteem among contemporaries. In Kitchener‟s case it was 
exacerbated by his „external indispensability; [one‟s] standing in the world outside the 
Cabinet room,‟51 which here constituted the press, the British public (and to some 
extent the Indian public) and above all, the Indian Army. Thus, the „circumstances in 
which a resignation threat is made clearly affect its impact.‟52  
Why did Ampthill not accept the resignation? Probably not due to the 
implications to himself this would have resulted in, as described above, as he was a 
very „high-minded, conscientious, and extremely hard working public servant.‟53 The 
main reason seems to have been that he realised that Kitchener was not really 
attempting to resign over the Swann case. Ampthill of course realised that this was 
merely a cover for the real reason, (that the proposals for abolition of the Military 
Member were not being too well received at Simla) and he guessed very astutely what 
that was, but he also felt that what had precipitated Kitchener into finally tendering his 
resignation was the discovery that the Viceroy‟s Council backed the Viceroy and not 
Kitchener.
54
 As shown above, they were initially disposed to support Kitchener‟s 
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plans, and thought Ampthill was being too pedantic,
55
 but changed their minds after 
Ampthill produced detailed information from Elles to the effect that Kitchener‟s 
system would not work.  But the knowledge of Kitchener‟s resignation did not 
become public.  
„No one…knows of it outside our family circle here… I don‟t know if the 
Viceroy even told Elles. But of course it will leak out in time. Of course K was 
immensely relieved when he had done it, and I think and hope the effect will be good. 
It gave the Govt. a shock and may awaken them to the folly of treating K like any 
ordinary creature…I think on the whole K has found this a dull season with 
Ampthill.‟56  
 
This was probably true; there is no mention of Kitchener‟s attempted resignation 
in Ampthill‟s letters to England-  and to some extent the episode did encourage the 
home government to prioritise Kitchener over any incumbent Viceroy. But the fact 
that Kitchener found it a „dull‟ season with Ampthill does highlight how effectively 
the Acting Viceroy managed to keep the general at bay during his months of charge. It 
may have been that Brodrick and Godley were reluctant to push through reforms 
under a temporary Viceroy who did not hesitate to make his unfavourable views 
known, because it would have been seen to be a hollow victory, and also because of 
the trouble Curzon, in England then and later when he went back to India, could 
cause. They had, of course, much to their regret, already committed to an extension 
for Curzon as Viceroy. Had they pushed the reforms through, had Ampthill resigned 
or laid himself open to dismissal through a refusal to co-operate, and Curzon publicly 
denounced the process from England in Parliament, - and a third new Viceroy been 
appointed, - the transparent political overtones of the affair would have emerged, and 
it is doubtful if the government could have survived this. Therefore the Home 
Government could not take advantage of Curzon‟s absence to put Kitchener‟s plan 
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into action. Therefore, what could have been a position of weakness for Ampthill was 
turned, in reality, into a strength.  
What is of even more interest is why Kitchener waited till Ampthill was in 
power to take the first steps, as he knew they would be, towards forcing the issue. 
Timing would appear to have been very important to Kitchener, possibly because it 
would not only have determined how his plans would have been received, but also 
how he would be perceived by the governmental corpus, dependent on who he had 
negotiated with.  Kitchener‟s action, in fact, appears  to have been out synch with  „the 
boys‟‟ opinions; Repington noted that they had time on their side to strengthen their 
case while Lady Curzon was ill, because, „K. would in no case act while  a mere 
locum temens was in power in India.‟57 Obviously the boys were mistaken on this 
one; or they did not guess that a feint made while a locum was in charge would 
sufficiently alert the Government as to the damage that would be caused by the real 
thing, and make them work towards preventing it at all costs.  Kitchener probably 
conjectured that Ampthill would be a pushover, or that he would be amenable to the 
plan itself (possibly due to the traditional friction between Madras and Simla and the 
consequent possibility that Ampthill might like to assert himself as Viceroy). It is also 
possible that he was confident about the long term success of his plan and did not 
really think that the attitude of any incumbent Viceroy would be a serious barrier.  
The boys did not share Kitchener‟s precise reasons for deeming timing 
important; they cogitated endlessly as to the best time to swing Kitchener‟s plans into 
action. They might have thought it unseemly for “K” to be seen tussling with a „mere 
locum temens‟ but they did not relish the idea of him taking on Curzon either in what 
might have very possibly been an unsuccessful battle.  Repington felt that  
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„as to the question of expediency, whether  it is best to bring matters to a crisis 
while Curzon is Viceroy, or to await his departure, that is a matter for K. to 
decide…my opinion…[is] that is better to avoid a collision with Curzon. This 
moribund Government…will always depend on Curzon whether he is at home or in 
India. He rules them.‟58  
 
And again, „If I were K I would await this appointment [that of Curzon‟s 
successor] before acting, as Curzon has rather a strong following and there is no 
object in arousing unnecessary opposition.‟59 The boys, apparently, were rather less 
confident of ultimate success than Kitchener- his apparent risk taking might in fact 
have spurred them on to idolise him even more than they already did.  
It is also possible that Kitchener was genuinely surprised at Curzon‟s 
disapproval of his plans. Kitchener knew of course why Curzon had sanctioned, 
indeed pressed for, his appointment: to reform the Indian Army. This would 
immediately have suggested to him that the other top generals, the Military Member in 
particular, were inadequately equipped for the task- otherwise, why would the Viceroy 
have asked for him? The logical extension of this line of thought would be that the 
Viceroy would give him a free hand, as indeed he had with other administrators he 
thought highly of, such as A.P. MacDonnell and Francis Younghusband. Thus 
Kitchener‟s obduracy when he found that this was not so, springing from what he 
judged his task to be, as per his temperament, is understandable if not justifiable. And 
of course, the Government of India‟s consent was necessary for all his actions (this 
was before he embarked on his full-fledged campaign of political intrigue) - but he did 
not see himself as being bound to work in co-ordination with it; rather, as Balfour 
wrote to him about his views on the matter, „the existing division of attributes between 
the Commander-in-Chief and the Military Member of the Council is quite 
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indefensible…the remedy is with the Indian Government and I am sure you will see 
that it is applied…‟60 The use of the phrase „Indian Government‟ to be oblique about 
one‟s exact targets was not limited to Balfour; as noted below, Kitchener also took 
recourse to it. In any case, Kitchener‟s thinking was that if the Indian Government 
under its full time chief was not amenable, it had better be rushed when it was 
possibly rather more vulnerable and susceptible to strong external influences.  This 
may be one explanation for his attempt to force the issue during Ampthill‟s time in 
office; perhaps he hoped that the combination of a temporary Viceroy and a 
supportive India Office might get him his way.  Curzon might or might not come back 
for a second term, but the possibility was that, if presented with a fait accompli on his 
return, he might wish to focus on the remaining items on his agenda of reform rather 
than squabble about what would be difficult to have overturned.  
It is possible that following this conjecture, Kitchener‟s campaign was pitched 
rather more strongly than it would otherwise have been; the Kitchener camp all seem 
to have over-estimated the degree of control Curzon by then had over the Home 
Government.  Perhaps they did not know of his wrangles with the India Council or 
Brodrick, or assumed, as others did, that Curzon got on famously with Brodrick 
because of their longstanding intimacy. It was the conflagration of Curzon‟s private 
contretemps over administrative issues with the India Office and Kitchener‟s 
campaign (to achieve his own ends) that did him in. These strands never met on their 
own until Brodrick took it upon himself to make them meet. This is also a pointer to 
the fact that just as Kitchener used Balfour‟s love of military strategising and 
Brodrick‟s hostility to Curzon to get his own way, so also they used him to stamp their 
predominance over the Viceroy. 
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And given the remote possibility that Ampthill might have accepted his feinted 
resignation in 1904, it would still have been a lot less damaging to Kitchener than 
being outmanoeuvred by Curzon. Losing a tussle with a senior Conservative politician 
– for that was what Curzon was- could have scuppered his political ambitions, of 
which he had a great many.  Here is Repington again, writing to Marker if he knew 
that K had been  
„in touch with the heads of the Liberal Party & that they know, or think they 
know, that he would chuck soldiery to become S of S [sic]?…Would the gain of such 
a capable administrator compensate for the loss of K as CinC [sic] in a great war? If 
the Govt. were over thrown would K have gained or lost?
61
  
 
This actually destroys Stephen Cohen‟s claim that Kitchener did not have any 
ambitions for even greater military power, but merely wanted to make the army 
efficient; as a matter of fact, given that around fifty percent of pro-consuls in the mid-
nineteenth century were from military backgrounds, Kitchener was acting perfectly in 
accordance with the textbook model of assuming, first military, and then 
administrative, charge of a colony
62
 But it also reveals the calculations which induced 
Kitchener to set the ball rolling while a locum was in office.  
 
Brodrick, Ampthill and Kitchener. 
Ampthill might have possessed one sort of power during his incumbency of the 
Viceroyalty, but the sort of power he customarily exercised- that of the Governor of 
Madras- and its attendant ideological affiliations, influenced the India Office‟s 
reactions to his reactions to Kitchener.  It appears to have been assumed by Brodrick 
and Godley that the best of the traditions of the Madras and Bombay Presidencies- a 
                                                          
61
 Repington to Marker, 08 November 1904, Kitchener-Marker Papers, Add. Mss 52277B.  
62
 See John W. Cell, British Colonial Administration in the mid-nineteenth century: The policy-making 
process (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1970), 48-49.  
212 
 
grudge against the Viceroy at Simla- would manifest itself in Ampthill‟s handling of 
the Viceregal office. They appear to have assumed that Ampthill would be unable to 
leave off identifying with, and acting as per the traditions of, his old post at Madras. 
Chapter 3 explored the extent to which the Governors utilised their privilege of 
writing direct to the Secretary of State to  turn that official against the Viceroy, and 
concluded that except Havelock, the Governors did not greatly utilise this „ancient 
privilege‟ to personalise their battles against the Government of India. But they were 
caught up in the cross-fire between Curzon and Whitehall, and their letters were used 
as ammunition. It was to be expected that, under such circumstances, the provincial 
governors would be somewhat sandwiched and be hard put to maintain a successful 
balancing act between Viceroy and India Office without jeopardising their political 
careers. It was Ampthill who, as the longest serving Governor under Curzon, and also 
Acting Viceroy, bore the brunt of the cross-fire, given that he was acting Viceroy and 
also the longest serving governor under Curzon-
63
 and consequently generated more 
political interest from the India Office.  
This interest at first seems to have been limited to gauging the extent of his 
readiness to be the India Office‟s pawn- the fact of that readiness seems to have been 
assumed to be beyond question. What Brodrick and Godley did not calculate was that, 
ultimately, as colonial governors, the heads of the Bombay and Madras Presidencies 
were compelled to identify with India, where the interests of their presidencies were 
concentrated, as opposed to the political nerve-centre in London. They came to share 
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Curzon‟s frustrations as to the man-of-action-on-the-spot thwarted by scheming 
mandarins; after the Akalkot case, where the unanimous decision of the Government 
of India and the Bombay Government was overturned by Hamilton,
64
 Sandhurst wrote 
that he was „dismayed as well as amazed…the feeling, prevalent enough, will 
immensely gain strength that no matter what the decision of the Government of India, 
intrigue and India Office backstairs influence will upset their decisions.‟65 Ampthill in 
fact is the perfect illustration of the subordinate as a supportive side-kick to his 
superior, and also the hapless victim by association, drawn into the orbit of his 
superior, and having, by transference, people react to him only insofar as he was 
related to his superior and tarring him with the same ideological brush they used for 
Curzon.  
But the l`ese majeste´ of Balfour and Godley prevented them from perceiving 
this shift, charted in Chapter 3, of the Governors‟ attitudes to the Viceroy. The India 
Office, and Godley in particular, had been approving of the choice of Ampthill as 
Curzon‟s replacement, initially because they found him to be the most suitable 
candidate for the post, and also because, according to the warrant of precedence, no 
one else could constitutionally occupy the post. But instead of making a concerted 
attempt to work the administration with the Acting Viceroy (who confessed to feeling 
apprehensive as to his new responsibilities), the India Office swung into action to try 
and use Ampthill for making political points against Curzon. The India Office, first 
and foremost, used their „convivial relationship‟ with Ampthill to demonstrate that it 
was Curzon, and not themselves, at fault for the recent fall-out between Simla and 
London. Neither Godley nor Brodrick exercised restraint or caution in the attempts to 
being Ampthill over to „their side;‟ primarily by providing him avenues to inveigh 
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against Curzon. Scarcely had Ampthill assumed office when letter after letter filled 
with innuendoes – criticisms that disclaim any critical intent- against Curzon flowed 
to him from Godley.
66
 Godley and Brodrick adopted a twin line of attack; vocally 
praising Ampthill‟s administration over Curzon‟s, and telling him that Curzon, in 
England and therefore in close proximity to the India Office,  was being the reverse of 
appreciative of Ampthill‟s running of the Government of India. 67   And knowing 
Ampthill‟s devotion to Madras, Brodrick attempted to play upon the much bruited 
(but by then no longer extant) Madras-Simla friction by telling him that he did not feel 
that the Government of India had always backed up Ampthill‟s plans as Madras 
Governor, and that he (Brodrick) was now in a position to do so, given that he could 
liaise openly with Ampthill on central as well as Madras issues.
68
 But Ampthill, as 
seen in Chapter 3, was anxious to compartmentalise the Viceroyalty and the 
Governorship, and did not fall for the bait; nor did he take Brodrick‟s offer as 
anything other than an attempt to drag him into the web of political intrigue that 
enmeshed the British Government of India throughout 1905:-  much too transparently, 
Brodrick tried the very reverse once Ampthill went back to Madras.  Ampthill 
complained that Brodrick „has really forced me to go on writing about Government of 
India affairs in spite of my original determination to mind my own business.‟69 His 
irritation stemmed not only from dislike of political gossip, but also from the fact that 
Brodrick, obsessed with the Kitchener affair, paid scant attention to Ampthill‟s 
detailing of the needs of Madras Presidency, especially in light of his earlier professed 
concern! 
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 Godley also most openly hinted to Ampthill the avenues possible if he switched 
allegiances. Writing to Ampthill after his term as Acting Viceroy had to be extended 
owing to Mary Curzon‟s illness, Godley penned, „ You say “it is flattering to know 
that the extension of your term of office does not cause us anxiety.” No indeed; the 
anxiety that we feel is caused quite otherwise.‟70 Perhaps Godley and Brodrick did 
sincerely believe that „the current state of affairs [the strained relations between India 
and the Home Government] was really the result of your predecessor‟s system of 
never taking no for an answer.‟71 Brodrick wrote to Hamilton that did not get any 
information from Curzon about anything, „except grumbles….[his letters] contrast 
very unfavourably with those of his locum temens.‟72 It is also significant that he 
stated this to an admirer of Curzon‟s, who had often backed up Ampthill when his 
abilities had been called into question by Curzon. 
Even after Ampthill stopped being Viceroy and went back to the Governorship of 
Madras, the India Office continued to write to him about matters that were properly 
the provenance of the Simla-London correspondence. As Ampthill wrote to his mother, 
he ended up becoming a close confidant of both Curzon and Brodrick, though his 
sympathies lay with Curzon; as he noted, „Both Lord Curzon and Mr. Brodrick 
continue to make me their confidant, and I daresay there is nobody who knows more 
of the inner history of the business than I do.‟73  
Ampthill lost the Viceroyalty following Curzon‟s resignation because of this 
determined resistance of the India Office‟s blandishments; as seen above, from asking 
his advice on administrative matters long after he had left off being Viceroy, to 
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running a smear campaign against Curzon, and to open injunctions as to political 
benefits of taking „their‟ side, Brodrick left no stone unturned in his quest to get 
Ampthill back their- and Kitchener‟s- campaign. By the time Curzon resigned, 
however, the India Office apparently seems to have resigned itself to Ampthill‟s 
supporting Curzon and not themselves;  the more I see what you write, the less I feel I 
can convince you…But when one [having] given a decision in fairly stiff terms, finds 
that it is ungraciously challenged by the party who considers himself defeated…‟74  Of 
course, he was not offered the succession to the Viceroyalty, as the India Office was 
now patently aware that he was not the anti-Curzonian entity they had tried so hard to 
discern in him; after India, as Le Maistre notes, he never again held high office. 
Curzon rightly speculated that Ampthill was disadvantaged by having spoken out in 
his favour; „you may also have had to suffer from the misfortune of holding the same 
views [as myself]. For had you been in the opposite camp, I daresay that you instead 
of Minto would have been my successor.‟75 
But Brodrick could not yet brush off Ampthill; there was the possibility of 
Curzon returning immediately to England, in which case it would be Ampthill who 
would take over as Viceroy again till his successor came out, and thus be responsible 
for making „all the preliminary arrangements for working the new scheme‟ and he 
could very well sabotage it if he was so inclined to. Brodrick was left with no recourse 
beyond stating that he would be glad if he (Ampthill) would „clear your mind of any 
pro-Kitchener or anti-Kitchener bias with regard to our feelings with regard to your 
own.‟76 Given that the Kitchener affair was one of the most unsavoury triumphs of un-
constitutional behaviour, it was ironic that the government could not send out a more 
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amenable Governor as Acting Viceroy because they were all junior to Ampthill as per 
the Warrant of Precedence. But there was no need for Ampthill to go up to Simla 
again; because Minto was sent out; he had been ready for the post since the January of 
1903.  
Brodrick also took advantage of the privacy of the correspondence between the 
Secretary of State and the Viceroy to tell Balfour, who did not of course read 
Ampthill‟s letters to Brodrick, that Ampthill had said that the Government of India 
lived in dread of Curzon‟s return and that Curzon was personally hostile to Ampthill.77 
In India Ampthill was fed the same information, but, receiving as he did a regular 
correspondence from Curzon, probably did not attach much weight to the fabrication; 
in fact, it probably made it all the more clear to him that he was embroiled in a 
political row.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
But there had been another, more sinister reason for Brodrick wishing to convert 
Ampthill over to his views about the Military Administration. The Conservative 
government was shaky, and if it fell, the Secretary of State would have to go too, and 
be replaced by a Liberal- and Morley, the eventual successor, was at that time known 
to be anti-Kitchener.
78
 A pro-Kitchener Viceroy safely installed in Calcutta would go 
a long way towards counteracting London‟s inclinations.  
It was not as though Brodrick and Balfour had Kitchener‟s regard; he was aware 
that they were open to manipulation from the opposing camp. To the last, Kitchener 
was anxious as to whether he had successfully pulled off the coup, writing to Marker, 
„I should like to know…whether Brodrick has stuck out about Barrow…what a liar 
                                                          
77
 Brodrick to Balfour, 03 September 1904, cited in Dilks, Curzon in India, Vol. 2: Frustration, 145.  
78
 After taking office, however, he changed his mind and became the new system‟s most dedicated 
supporter, engaging in enthusiastic witch-hunts with Godley to root out all „ Curzonians‟ from the 
administration of India.  But this did not prevent him from ultimately vetoing, in 1909, Kitchener to 
succeed Minto as Viceroy; Curzon‟s old friend Hardinge went instead.  
218 
 
the man is…‟79 He probably also knew that, were it not for their hostility to the 
Viceroy, and the „cliquey‟ nature of the Conservative Cabinet, it would have been 
much more difficult to push his proposal through. It opens up another angle as to why 
he did not pursue the matter more aggressively while Curzon was on leave; a weak 
government might very well have decided to dispense with him if they happened to be 
well-disposed to, and inclined to listen to Ampthill- and this was a likely possibility, 
as the governors‟ and Curzon‟s contretemps  with each other via the Secretary of State 
were well known.  
The biggest mistake both Ampthill and Curzon made was to assume that 
Kitchener‟s animosity was largely directed at Elles by virtue of his occupying the 
Military Member‟s post, and that they themselves were only side targets. This 
translated into letters to London complaining freely about Kitchener‟s lack of 
professional conduct with regard to the military department, and themselves as being 
caught in the crossfire. But the impression that it was Elles he was against was one 
fostered by Kitchener himself; as he wrote to the Viceroy, „the Government of India 
has undoubtedly accepted and supported my proposals for Army improvement, but I 
cannot say that, owing to the dual control in the Army, the Military Department has 
not, in my opinion, been responsible in some respect for delay in their progress.‟80 
This not only had the effect of reinforcing the impression of his apparent loyalty to 
Curzon, but also intimated to the Viceroy that he was not satisfied with the reforms 
thus far. They fell into the trap of keeping Kitchener informed of their correspondence 
with Brodrick, thus not only alerting Kitchener to what was going on, but also letting 
him know how Brodrick assessed him in his letters to them;  
„I do not know why the Secretary of State telegraphs privately on this matter 
which is as official as anything well can be. I shall ask him to make the 
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correspondence official later on so that it may be on record after I have removed 
myself and my papers from these scenes.‟81 
 
The plaintive tone of Kitchener‟s letters to the Viceroy and Mary did deceive 
Curzon into thinking that Kitchener was being straightforward; the only time Curzon 
tasked him about having taken opinions about military reorganisations from senior 
generals in the Indian Army and forwarding them on to Lord Roberts, without 
informing the Viceroy (the move in itself was unconstitutional and could potentially 
create divisions within the Indian Army) he acknowledged the charge while trying to 
justify it, in detail. By discussing this, the most trivial bit of his campaign in England, 
Kitchener managed to throw the Viceroy off guard about his greater plans for gaining 
support from the Cabinet. And inspite of these admittedly Herculean efforts, he was 
prepared to bide his time till Curzon left India to put his plans into action; as Curzon 
repeatedly told Hamilton.
82
  This feeling was widespread, and may possibly explain 
why he did not take Ampthill‟s warnings seriously, and Brodrick consequently did not 
exercise the caution he would have in his dealings with Ampthill had he thought the 
latter to be a confidante of Curzon‟s.  
Ampthill handed over power in December 1904. As seen above, he continued to 
be involved in discussion of the controversy till he left India. Ampthill‟s colonial 
career was yet another victim of the Kitchener-Curzon saga, but he did not complain.  
This chapter has demonstrated how „political structures can undergo incremental 
change as the result of individual interventions.‟83 In conclusion, it may be observed 
that while Kitchener managed to have his way over army administration in the short 
run, the scrapping of the system after Kut meant that the Curzonian side of the debate 
prevailed. This was, however, long after both men had quit India. It does mean that 
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Curzon failed to get his views across to the people ultimately responsible for Indian 
legislation. He failed because he was not perceived (by Balfour and Brodrick) to have 
adequate knowledge of the best way of running an army. In addition to having to 
contend with this perception (and on the face of it, Kitchener was certainly better 
qualified than Curzon, let alone Ampthill, to expound on military matters), Curzon 
failed because he lacked the contacts and savoir-faire to build a contrary perception of 
himself as the person best equipped as to knowledge of what was most suitable in 
Indian conditions. For Brodrick, the Kitchener saga (he and Balfour had in fact 
warned Curzon against having him out) became an excuse to get rid of a Viceroy with 
whom he had fallen out. As Curzon observed bitterly to Ampthill when informing him 
that he had sent in his resignation, „Brodrick has got me out.‟84  It was also a means of 
containing a political competitor- a Curzon returning in triumph, would, as Mary 
forecasted, have been a foregone conclusion as the next Conservative prime 
ministerial candidate. This way, he was out of active politics until 1915. It also meant 
that he never again resigned a political post. 
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Chapter Six 
 
Communalism, Imperialism and the Dialogue of Inequality: Curzon and the 
Indian Intelligentsia. 
 
 
„Your Excellency is the true sympathiser and well-wisher of India, and 25 crores of its 
peoples of different creeds and castes who were always treated alike without any exception or 
speciality for a particular religion…‟ 1 
-Wafadar, 01 September 1905.  
 
* 
 
„If there has ever been a Viceroy, who is non-suspect… has shown a complete 
impartiality, between all religions, including his own, is it not, by common admission, myself? 
That anybody should accuse me of favouring one religion at the expense of another, would 
seem almost incredible.‟2 
-Curzon to Sir Denzil Ibbetson, 16 September 1903.  
 
 
 
That Curzon left India after greatly inflaming Indian nationalism is well-
documented; what is rather less documented is that he landed in India to the cheers of 
the Indians, if not of the ICS. As the Times so emphatically put it, „the advent of no 
Viceroy has awakened loftier hopes than those held regarding Lord Curzon. The 
cordial welcome extended to him is an expression of dual desires.‟ 3  This cordial 
welcome lasted well into the later stages of his term as Viceroy; in 1901, an Indian 
newspaper, reacting to Curzon‟s proclamation that the Indian princes were crucial to 
the governance of India, commented that 
„Lord Curzon, though a Christian, seems to have fully realised the soundness of 
the view of Manu that the customs and hereditary form of  government obtaining 
among a conquered people should be upheld, even though opposed to those of the 
conquerors…‟4 
 
Approval was not just confined to the press, which might, after all, be driven by 
political interests; two highly laudatory Indian works made their appearance while 
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Curzon was still in office; one Hindu, one Muslim, within two years of each other. 
Empirical proof of Curzon‟s early popularity with Indians, is a work from Calcutta- 
later the bastion of the anti-Curzon groundswell. K. C. Roy evaluates in précis all of 
Curzon‟s 12 point reform programme, and makes the point that Curzon was liked by 
Indians not only because of his obvious devotion to India, but because he was given 
the Viceroyalty on merit- not merely because he happened to be a titled peer of the 
realm. 
5
 
The other account was produced by a Hyderabadi Muslim, Syed Sirdar Ali 
Khan, in 1905,
6
 to refute the popular perception that Curzon was not in sympathy with 
the Indians, and to prove that Indians (and Mahomedans specially) were grateful to 
him.  This work also sounds a note of hero-worship, but provides a strong Indian 
justification of Curzon‟s oft-criticised (by the ruling British) acts, such as the Delhi 
Durbar, which Indians were presumed to have been indifferent to. Some people, at 
least, fell for his spin, and did not consider the Durbar an excess. Its provenance is 
even more significant as the Hyderabadis were then supposed to be smarting over the 
loss of the Berars.  
  This chapter explores the Viceroyalty as it touched on the following points: the 
Congress in Western India, Indian Muslims, the Partition of Bengal, and the Punjab 
Land Alienation Act. These will be explored to find out what view Curzon took of 
India‟s religio-political landscape, and assess the reactions of Indians to Curzonian 
polity, insofar as it touched upon their ethnic identities. 
 Insofar as the exercise of power was concerned, even more than in the case of 
the ICS, in a very basic sense, there can be no ambiguity as to whether Curzon 
exercised any power over the Indians; he was, after all, the head of the ruling 
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administration. He also very pointedly and consciously refused to be influenced by 
Indian protestations. Does the historian then conclude that Curzon‟s relations with the 
Indians were, in fact, characterised by a classical pattern of dominance? Post-colonial 
theorists would have us believe that in colonial India, „power simply stood for a series 
of inequalities between the ruler and the ruled…derived from a general relation-that of 
Dominance and Subordination.‟7 The question to be asked then is, not whether or to 
what degree Curzon imposed his will upon the Indians, but whether they thought that 
he was imposing it upon them.  It may be said that Curzon did not have any two –way 
consultations before going through with the Partition of Bengal; but did the majority 
of Bengalis resent the move? Hypothetically, they might have made a similar decision 
if invited to a public mandate.  
 This chapter seeks to explore three facets that illustrated, or more pertinently, 
have come to illustrate in a post-Independence, post-Partition and postcolonial 
scenario,  Curzon‟s Viceroyalty in terms of his relations with Indians; communalism 
as it is always his alleged “partition” of Bengal that is used as the showpiece event to 
back up the „Divide and Rule‟ theory, imperialism and its contested interpretations, in 
this case Curzon‟s paternalistic/despotic benevolence, and the emergent Indian 
contention that this „compassionate conservatism‟ was merely a set of ideas linked 
together to keep the Indians from self-governance, which obviously resulted in an 
unequal dialogue when it came to negotiations between the Indians and the British, 
especially when, as in the case of the Congress, the Indians were not arguing from a 
traditionalist viewpoint. Thus, Curzon‟s appreciation of customised societal modes 
will be assessed in as a determining factor in his relations with different groups in 
India.  
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To explore how these concepts were present on the political scene of India in the 
early twentieth century, this chapter will thus have three sections, the final one of 
which will examine what actually were Curzon‟s views, in the light of his actions 
towards the two facets of Indian society named, which will be discussed below. The 
other two sections will examine the facets of power which emerge from his dialogue 
with the Indian National Congress and the Muslims of British India, the central theme 
being the partition of Bengal for the latter, and Curzon‟s reception in the Bombay 
Presidency in the former. Given the constraints of Imperial administration, equal 
attention will be paid to Curzon‟s expression of his legislation as well as the acts 
themselves. It will also be explored as to why he evoked such differing reactions 
across different provinces, while the power balance between him and the Indians was 
essentially similar across the provinces.  
The first section of the chapter makes use of the Congress literature in particular, 
and material from Western India in general to highlight how the „political masters of 
twentieth century India‟ regarded their Viceroy, and this, too, has a superabundance of 
English sources. Linguistic constraints confine the sources for this chapter to  
translations or compendiums in English of primary sources dealing with the Indians.   
Some of the relevant works that throw light on Anglo-Muslim relations have already 
been discussed, and they illustrate how some Indian Muslims did think of themselves 
as having a separate identity over issues which touched their concerns. These above 
mentioned turn of the century accounts of Curzon as Viceroy also throw pointers as to 
how India‟s Muslims felt about his interest or otherwise in them.  The second section, 
evaluates Curzon‟s relations with the Indian Muslims in Bengal and the Punjab, and 
explores the extent to which he co-opted favourable Indian opinion to help him win 
negotiations with his governors. 
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It is important to justify one‟s choices for study. For obvious reasons, the 
Congress is important as it rose to become a barometer of Indian opinion, and at that 
time, and consisting as it did of a large number of Bombay luminaries, can be 
assumed to have been influenced by the political climate there prevalent.  The setting 
of Bombay Presidency, as noted, was also politically volatile; it was wracked by 
famine and political unrest at the time of Curzon‟s Viceroyalty. Yet Curzon himself 
seems to have been very warmly welcomed there, inspite of it being the place from 
which many prominent Congress leaders hailed; „The more cordial relations between 
Europeans and Indians in Western India is very remarkable to one who has been long 
accustomed to the attitude….in other parts of India.‟8 Curzon remarked to Sandhurst 
that Bombay was the only city which could properly raise a cheer. Indeed, as seen in 
the preceding chapters, it was the Bombay Government which caused more stir in 
Calcutta as opposed to the Indians. 
Indian Muslims, again, are self-evident objects of study because of the 
„partition‟ of Bengal and the resultant charges of communalism thrown at Curzon. 
Thus, the Muslim reaction to Curzon and „his‟ partition of Bengal will be viewed 
against the backdrop of the larger theme of Curzon‟s relations with Muslims across 
India. There are obviously sub-sets within the major fields of focus; for example, it 
was the Partition of Bengal that is supposed to have re-galvanized a flagging INC. 
How the exercise of Viceregal power indirectly affected another section of the 
populace- in a way it shows the ultimate lack of control the Raj had- or at least lack of 
simultaneous control over various peoples in India.  Since the INC took up the 
campaign largely after Curzon left India, it is not within the scope of the thesis, but 
one can examine how Hindu, or secular Bengalis‟ views about Curzon changed in the 
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light of the territorial re-distribution. What was the reaction of the highly political 
Bengali intelligentsia? This intersection also provides a platform for examining 
nascent Hindu-Muslim political interactions in the context of British rule. 
In a post-imperial world, this final core chapter is fittingly set in India and is 
important as it acknowledges and de-homogenises the Indian counterpoint to British 
power in India.  As noted in Chapter 1, by their reactions to the exercise of power, the 
Indians did in fact set limitations and boundaries within which that power could safely 
be exercised.  
 
Dialogue of inequality: Curzon, the Indian National Congress and western India. 
 
Curzon appears to have been well-liked in the Bombay Presidency. When he 
landed in Bombay on 30 December 1898, it was to great applause.  Educated Indians 
seem to have welcomed in particular his reputation for getting things done. India 
observed that  
„Lord Curzon…is in many ways the reverse of his predecessor. He has played a 
far greater part in the politics of his native land; and he has a strength and self-
confidence which should save him from sinking into the mere tool of an official clique. 
Wilfulness rather than weakness will be the origin of the faults of his rule…‟9  
This  approval was forthcoming inspite of the fact that Curzon  poured scorn 
upon the Congress, a great proportion of whose members came from Bombay and 
Pune and the surrounding hinterlands,  strictly enforced the plague segregation rules 
(which caused such riots in Cawnpore), grumbled about the Bombay secretariat, and 
above all, saw his Viceroyalty coincide with the worst ever famine in Western India. 
On top of that his relations with the premier western Indian prince, the Gaekwar of 
Baroda, can at best be described as „stiff.‟ Why, then, have the adulatory accolades 
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poured in from this presidency as far as contemporary Indians are concerned? One of 
the most original commentaries on Curzon has come from a Bombay based 
caricaturist; H.A. Talcherkar‟s Lord Curzon in Indian Caricature,10 is a unique work, 
which brings together a series of cartoons produced in mainly western Indian papers 
and discusses their contextual meaning, being all the while greatly appreciative of 
Curzon. The answer may be found in Gordon Johnson‟s assertion that Indian 
politicians of the Victorian period, and the Congress in particular, wanted more rule, 
not less, from the Government of India.
11
 Curzon‟s prompt tackling of administrative 
lacunae and the problems that the average Indian faced in his/her daily life – access to 
justice, racial discrimination, famine, - would therefore have appealed to them.  It is 
also possible that Curzon was popular in western India on account of his defence and 
encouragement of Indians there, primarily in securing the release of the Natu brothers. 
A striking illustration of his popularity at the zenith of his Viceroyalty in 1903 is 
evinced by the assertion that the masses were greatly distressed by bazaar rumours 
that the Viceroy intended to return to an English parliamentary career immediately 
following the triumphal Delhi Durbar and were relieved when Curzon announced he 
had no intention of doing so.  According to the author of that report, this substantiated 
the „happy relationship subsisting between the great proconsul and the people… the 
mutual regard between ruler and ruled.‟ 12  This mid-way-through the Viceroyalty 
production offers an opportunity to vindicate the claim that Curzon did indeed get 
much admiration from Indians. The book deflects controversial situations with 
humour, and even goes so far as to quote appreciatively from Kipling‟s White Man’s 
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Burden. The papers Talcherkar drew upon were mostly Gujarati and Marathi papers, 
and the Hindi Punch, with an overwhelmingly Hindu readership.  
Further evidence from the Indian press substantiates the assertion that Curzon was 
admired for his work in India, and not just because he represented a welcome change 
from the apparently apathetic Elgin. The Rast Goftar felt that, in view of the 
contemporary Asian political situation, „a strong and experienced Viceroy like Lord 
Curzon would go far to instil confidence in the people in case certain eventualities 
occur.‟13  In 1903 the Voice of India noted that  
„an extension of his term of office would be infinitely preferable to the 
importation of a fresh student of India affairs. But when the government majority is 
dwindling in England, there may be unforeseen contingencies which call more loudly 
for Lord Curzon‟s services at home.‟14  
Mary Curzon was not the only one who thought that Curzon was indispensable to the 
Conservatives at both home and abroad.    
When the two year extension to his term was finally announced, even the Tilak 
controlled Kesari approved of it, though it did speculate that Curzon‟s real reason for 
extending his term was „not the completion of the twelve point reform programme but 
to ensure the stability of British sway in India and to expand its sphere in Asia.‟15  Yet 
it did not seem to have any objection to this proposed consolidation of Empire, 
observing a week later that 
 „the Indians, under the aegis of British rule, are receiving valuable political 
training and  are to-day [sic] considerably ahead of other Asiatic peoples. The wealth of 
the country is no doubt  being drained away on an enormous scale, but we must not 
regret this drain in any way but regard it as the price of our national awakening for 
which we must ever feel grateful to the British Government.‟16 
Of course, it is possible that public opinion tended to be unquestioningly 
loyalist, because the government was the source of all power and authority, and there 
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was as yet no real alternative for persons wishing to attain eminence in public life, 
except through such participation as the Government of India afforded.  In January 
1899 a reader of the Times of India wrote in to castigate the Congress, because,  
„in the last sitting of the Congress, the Congress leaders not only welcomed a 
person who was convicted by the highest judicial court in the Presidency [Bombay  
Presidency] of so grave an offence as sedition against Government, but actually took 
his counsel in their deliberations…surely sedition and loyalty cannot be together…‟17  
 
Even the Congress‟ mouthpiece in London, India, which Hamilton saw fit to 
describe as a „pernicious little rag,‟ noted with approbation the happiness of the 
Madras Session of the Congress when Curzon telegraphed an acknowledgement of 
their professions of loyalty.
18
 
Prima facie, it is easy to dismiss Congress approval of Curzon as being the 
natural apathy of a then largely loyalist party, - or rather a party controlled by the 
loyalist members- but this would be a fallacy. Bombay was not just a presidency 
absorbed solely in the furthering of mercantile interests; at the twentieth session of the 
Indian National Congress, Sir P.M. Mehta articulated at length the delegates‟ 
disenchantment at being told by Curzon to devote themselves to science and industry 
and keep out of politics, as that was a pastime „not befitting to any subject races.‟  
Mehta‟s argument against benevolent Curzonian paternalism was that it was 
 „equally demoralising to the rulers and the ruled. It ignores all the laws of 
human progress…political agitation there will always be…We prefer to…deal with 
them in the free light of open…because we have faith in the innate wisdom, 
beneficence and righteousness of the English people.‟19  
 
In short they wanted governmental patronage and guidance for their political 
ambitions, which the Government would not give inspite of their professed loyalty. 
The counter of the senior administrators to this was that the Congress was not 
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representative, based as it was in Bombay, and composed largely of Parsi intellectuals, 
thus not encompassing the representatives of the Hindu-Muslim heartland of 
Hindustan, where the colonial  presence most strongly engaged with India.  
But it would largely appear that popular reaction to Curzon in Western India 
was appreciative and hopeful, despite the fact that his most formidable opponents- 
R.C. Dutt and the Gaekwar of Baroda, were from the Bombay Presidency.  Western 
Indians wanted Curzon and other Englishmen to be reassured of their loyalty, but it 
would appear that Curzon‟s line of thought was that if they were loyal, they had better 
just shut up and get on with being loyal. Curzon‟s reward for loyalty, as borne out by 
his Coronation Salt Tax concessions, tended to be concrete financial remissions as 
opposed to political concessions.  
 All this was, of course, before the plans for the Partition of Bengal were 
announced and when in the north, Harcourt Butler was expressing the opinion, now 
universally elevated to the status of historical fact, that by opposing the Congress 
Curzon was in fact galvanizing it. As he wrote to H. Erle Richards, he felt that Curzon 
took things „much too seriously…Lord Dufferin, Sir A. Colvin and now Lord Curzon 
have shown that the only thing that can put life into the Congress party is denunciation 
by a Viceroy or a L.G. [sic]…‟20 For the Congress themselves, if not for the Bombay 
Presidency at large, this watershed denunciation came in 1905, with the Calcutta 
Convocation Speech and the  Partition of Bengal.  
This section  has focused heavily on particular strata from the Bombay 
Presidency, i.e. the educated urban section,  because of the future importance these 
sections of society were to wield. Curzon might have had fractious relations with the 
princes of Western India, but these princes did not have an influential voice in 
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forming the structure of the new nation forty-two years later, and their dissentience 
did not lead them to regard Curzon‟s Viceroyalty, and the reactions it engendered, as a 
crucial point in their political existence. The next two sections will look at the 
reactions Curzon inspired in less politically and economically sophisticated sections of 
Indian society, which were nevertheless to become participants in one of the biggest 
transfers of population in 1947 – Bengal and Punjab.  
 
Communalism, orientalism or efficient administration? Curzon and the Muslims 
of British India. 
 
While the relations between Curzon and the INC can be best described as 
characterised by contempt on one side (Curzon‟s) and wistful attempts for approval on 
the other, those between Curzon and the Muslims are infinitely more complex. Much 
of his legislation touched upon Muslim concerns, and evoked varying reactions from 
them, and there was his own attitude towards them, where traditional Tory pro-
Mohammedanism mingled with his contempt for all things Indian and a passionate 
desire to hold the scales even. In fact, this thesis contends that the Curzon Viceroyalty 
marked a political watershed for Indian Muslims, because it gave them –and the rest 
of India- a glimpse of the advantages affirmative and special legislation could accrue 
for them.  Two major pieces of legislation he passed: the Partition of Bengal, and the 
Punjab Land Alienation Act, became instruments of communalism in Indian politics; 
the first is yet perceived as the apogee of British tactics of „Divide and Rule,‟ the latter, 
while later helping the rise of the agrarian faction in Punjab politics, was marred at 
inception by allegations in the Indian press that it was merely communally biased 
affirmative action.   This section examines how these altered power balances in the 
countryside, as a counterpoint to the differences among the ICS thrown up by the 
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Land Alienation Act. It also contends that vigorous British rule leveraged change 
across Indian society. This section also deals with the claim that Curzon was being 
overtly communal in his interactions with Indians.  
Largely inspired by post-1947 readings of the Partition of Bengal, accusations of 
communalism stick because Curzon has received largely favourable appraisals from 
the sub-continent‟s Muslims, both contemporary and present day. Even as he states 
that Curzon never partitioned Bengal except on purely administrative grounds, K.K. 
Aziz tries to reclaim Curzon as a Muslim Viceroy, ranking him
21
 as the only 
competent Viceroy ever, and claiming that to „believe everything that the frustrated 
Hindus said or wrote about him is to judge a man by the word of his enemies.‟22 He 
further pays tribute to Curzon, „when he stood for the last time on the shores of 
India…alone amid the waters of Hindu hostility.‟23 Given that Aziz was chairman of 
Pakistan‟s national body for historical research, his account could be understood to be 
dictated by post-Independence dynamics, but what inference does the modern Indian 
reader draw from more contemporary comments that Curzon had “helped” the 
Muslims of British India? As will be seen below, Indian Muslims appear to have 
persuaded themselves that Curzon had their special interests at heart. An “Indian 
Mahomedan,” for example, devoted three chapters to Curzon in his British India From 
Queen Elizabeth to Lord Reading,
24
 in a descriptive account extensively filled with 
long passages from the Viceroy‟s own speeches. Its major distinguishing 
characteristic is its praise of Curzon for ignoring the Congress as it consisted mainly 
of Bengalis and Marathas, with whom the author does not expect the British to 
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identify after having come into close contact with „Mahomedan gentry…of ancient 
lineage,‟25 and the rulers of the princely states, who he states enjoy the support of the 
greatest part of India. According to the author, „perhaps the assurance of their 
existence gave Lord Curzon the strength to ignore the gibes and calumnies of the 
Congress.‟26 (!) There is an unfortunate grain of truth in this, that Curzon did ignore 
the Congress, and their claims to be the representative voice of India, on the grounds 
that they were precisely not that, and that he did aim to cultivate the Indian princes, 
and he did detest the „Bengali babu,‟ but it is preposterous to add up these elements 
into the kind of pro-Muslim sentiment that the author so obviously wishes to prove. 
The next section thus examines, in the light of charges of communalism, why 
Indian Muslims (though, in contemporary India, it was not solely they who returned 
favourable assessments of their ‘lat sahib’) gave their approbation to the Curzon 
Viceroyalty, and how this was received by Curzon.  
 
* 
  
When the Anjuman-i-Islamia, Punjab, sent Curzon a telegram deploring his 
resignation and styling themselves as being representative of Punjabi Muslims, he not 
only did not dispute this claim, but further stated that the society represented the „best 
element of the Mohammedan community in Punjab.‟27 He studiously stayed away 
from expressing any such sentiments towards the INC. It may have been an 
exemplification of the classical British attitude towards different types of Indians; and 
as noted, Curzon was very much in conformity with the societal norms of his own 
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time. Possibly Curzon was rather more sympathetic of Muslim pleading, because he 
viewed it as being rooted in ethnicity not politics; it is significant that during his 
rebuttal of the claims of the Madras Mahajan Sabha of „giving expression to the views 
of the Indian people‟, Curzon refers to the „Indian public‟ in the main instance as 
being „exclusive of Muhammadans.‟28 
Even if one accepts at face value Curzon‟s contention that he had „always taken 
a great interest in the welfare of [this] most important community,‟29 one needs to 
isolate the factors behind this.  In evaluating why Curzon paid rather more attention to 
Muslim special pleading, even if he did not ultimately accord it any more sympathy, 
one needs to examine the roots of the British attitude to Indian Islam. It was not just a 
matter of identifying with Muslims after finding Muslim mores and values closer to 
their own than Hindu ones; Robinson states that upto 1909, British policy, which 
viewed Muslims as an important part of the South Asia political firmament, was such 
that it was instrumental in enabling the establishment of a separate Muslim identity.
30
 
And Curzon more than most, would have known about their political importance, 
given his extensive pre-Viceregal travels across central Asia and Afghanistan. Finally, 
in Bengal, Muslims tended to lag behind Hindus in white collar professions.
31
 In 
Punjab, maintaining some kind of economic parity was the basis for the Land 
Alienation Act, and given the backwardness of eastern Bengal, giving it special 
attention would seem justified. 
But Curzon‟s actions may have had their explanation in a rather more 
contemporary phenomena; Muslim opinion in Curzon‟s time was not avowedly 
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political, whereas the Congress was a self-styled politically representative body.  
„Giving them hope,‟ would, thus, be construed by Curzon as sending out a signal that 
for Indians to have political aspirations was acceptable. Finally, Sayyid Ahmad 
Khan‟s loyalist legacy hung heavy on Indian Muslims, and may have conditioned 
them to mouth platitudes of their rulers, and Curzon benefited from the continuation 
of a policy laid down towards his predecessors. He would not, of course, have been 
averse to demonstrations of submissive loyalty.  Thus, extant dynamics between 
Curzon and the major emergent political factions in India cannot always be assessed 
using historically stereotypical modes of thought.  
As demonstrated, affirmative action was a prominent characteristic of Curzon‟s 
administration. In a reply to an address made to him by the Central National 
Mahomedan Association, the first pan-Indian association and also the first such 
Muslim association, the Viceroy stated that the object of British aid was 
 „not to create for you exceptional advantages in the struggle for life – for this 
your own sense of proportion and fairness has never led you to claim- but to remove 
the drawbacks under which you formerly laboured and to provide for you an open 
approach to a fair field.‟32  
 
In 1904, the Home Secretary, H.H. Risley, in note to which the Viceroy gave his 
full approval, supported the decision to abolish competitive examinations for the 
Provincial Civil Service in Bombay Madras and Bengal on the grounds that the 
existing system largely benefited only Hindus, whereas the new system would „leave 
us free to deal equitably with the claims of the representatives of different races, 
religions and localities.‟33 In 1901 the Punjab Government set aside 30 percent of civil 
service appointments for Muslims.  But he did not approve of people themselves 
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putting forward claims to such privileges, squashing the Anjunman-i-Mufid-i-Ahla-i-
Islam by stating that grumbling about the „patronage‟ shown to Hindus and requesting 
greater government backing for Muslims was the „inevitable concomitant of 
representations from Mahomedan bodies in these countries.‟34 
Yet inspite of this Muslim reaction to Curzon largely remains favourable, in part 
because Indian Muslims tended to feel he was „on their side.‟ According to K.K. Aziz 
again,  
„in India the Muslims were trusted and respected by their imperial rulers. It was 
a comforting thought that their aspirations were not disregarded and that their loyalty 
was appreciated. The Anglo-Muslim amity was as mutual as it was deep.‟35 
 
At a rough count, 22.1 percent of the condolatory telegrams received upon 
Curzon‟s resignation as Viceroy are from Muslims writing as Muslims; an astonishing 
proportion given that most of the other senders are either Indian princes or British 
officials. This may of course have something to do with bazaar rumours that Curzon 
had resigned over the issue of the partition of Bengal; in any case the partition may 
have fired Muslim sympathies; but in addition, many telegrams laud him for his 
efforts for Muslim education and preserving Muslim heritage, or the land alienation 
act. Henry Beveridge might grumble that „modern Indian Mohammedans do not care 
for history,‟ 36  and imply that they were obsessed only with theology, but Indian 
Muslims appreciated Curzon because of his efforts to preserve Indian monuments, 
visible reminders of their glorious past.  According to a Gaya notable, „the 
Mohammedans ever had praises and blessings for His Excellency whenever they 
heard of  the good work which he was doing for the renovations of their ancient 
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monuments and works of historical interest.‟ 37  It helped of course that Curzon‟s 
undertakings were largely centred among the Mughal edifices of northern India. 
The next section thus moves on to the event that is seen as the prelude to the 
Partition of 1947- the Partition of Bengal, 1905, and examines whether Curzon really 
did try to regulate appropriation of power between two communities to British liking 
by this measure.  
 
Territorial Redistribution in Bengal 
Curzon himself appears to have been well received not only by contemporary 
Muslims, but also by present Pakistani scholarship, largely because of the measure 
which has ensured he is so detested by modern Indian and postcolonial historians; the 
Partition of Bengal.  He may have stated that he had „not offered political concessions, 
because I do not regard it… in the interests of India to do so,‟38 but contemporary 
Muslim opinion, and modern Pakistani scholarship, less understandably, seem to have 
regarded the partition of Bengal as nothing short of a benevolent concession to 
Muslim concerns. As understandably, given that the reaction to the partition threw 
Muslims on the defensive, the Hindu historian Tara Chand in fact insinuates that 
Curzon started off the Pakistan Movement by giving concrete shape to a Muslim 
province.
39
  It makes sense for both parties to label Curzon as communal; in the 
meanwhile, did Curzon really seek to alter the power balance by a territorial 
redistribution?  
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The re-drawing of borders was a major administrative strategy in British India, 
especially under Curzon.  During his term in India he pushed through the creation of 
the NWFP, bought back the Berars from the Nizam of Hyderabad, renamed the North-
Western Provinces, and of course „partitioned Bengal‟, which was in fact an umbrella 
term for re-allocating territory between four major regions in eastern India- Bengal, 
Assam, Orissa and the Chota Nagpur tribal belt. But the partition of Bengal, or more 
precisely, the separation of the eastern part of the Bengali speaking area from 
Calcutta, was politically significant because it demonstrated the possible advantages  
that separate, politically and territorially autonomous regions could bring to their 
inhabitants and the bargaining power that would thus be afforded them vis-à-vis the 
government.  The plan for the Partition was not very enthusiastically received in 
London, nor by the incumbent Lieutenant-Governor, Sir John Bourdillon. Thus when 
the Partition at last took effect on 11 August 1905, just before Curzon‟s resignation, 
the Charu Mihir of Mymensingh attributed it to Brodrick‟s desire to appease Curzon 
after being compelled to thwart him over the Army and Tibet.
40
 The Sanjivani of 
Calcutta, which, like the Charu Mihir, opposed the Partition, noted that Curzon had 
specially replaced Bourdillon with Sir A.H.L. Fraser to effect this.
41
 This contention 
was true, but given that Fraser was one of the proponents of the Partition plan as it 
took shape,
42
 it made sense for Curzon to have him on board, rather than risk a repeat 
of the Mackworth Young episode in the Punjab in 1901, when the NWFP was created.  
Muslim sources universally laud Curzon‟s decision to re-draw the boundaries of 
Bengal, because of the perceived benefits it brought to the east Bengali Muslims. But 
it is apparent from Curzon‟s own speeches that initially he was more concerned about 
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reassuring the populace that there would be no adverse political ramifications arising 
from a readjustment of territory with Assam, rather than communalism arising out of 
the partition. It was only when it became apparent that the Calcutta-mofussil de-
coupling was being touted as a communally divisive scheme that he began playing to 
Muslim sentiments to drum up support for his scheme. It was one instance where he 
moulded his strategy in response to Indian public opinion, and it backfired horribly 
upon him.  
 Curzon‟s support for separate Muslim identity is most starkly brought out in his 
1904 speech to cheering Muslim landowners before the partition of Bengal, which he 
said endowed Bengali Muslims with „a unity…they had not enjoyed since the days of 
the Mussulman…kings,‟ 43  i.e. the Mughal emperors. He stated that this “Muslim 
unity” was beneficial because it would „develop local interests and trade to a degree 
that is impossible so long as you remain, to use your own words, the appange of 
another administration.” 44   This appeal to eastern Bengali (and therefore largely 
Muslim) sentiment is even more significant in view of the fact that the  „Other 
Administration‟ was the Calcutta based “babu” dominated administration, a largely 
Hindu edifice at loggerheads with Curzon.  In the same strain, he continued that the 
Muslim community, being backward in relation to Hindus, required „every stimulus 
and encouragement that we can provide.‟ 45 
Keay notes that this speech, however, was „presumably a reference to the heavily 
Persianised courts of the eighteenth century nawabs; it may not have had much 
resonance for east Bengal‟s mainly low caste converts to Islam. On the other hand it 
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was certainly offensive to the mainly Hindu zamindars…so well represented among 
the Anglophone agitators of Calcutta.‟46 This was something that Curzon, too, was 
aware of.  
While undoubtedly aware of Muslim euphoric sentiments, Curzon seems to have 
used them as a playing card to win more support from greater numbers of Indians for 
the administratively convenient manoeuvre.  Nevertheless, the partition of Bengal was 
most impressive in its impact on communal and British-Hindu-Muslim relations.  In 
fact, this „masterly British move…inaugurated a new era of Muslim politics in 
India.‟47 It probably highlighted the existence of Muslims as a separate political entity, 
which could be used to draw and re-draw political formations. Referring to the alleged 
Hindu Bengali parochialism in opposing the partition when it was touted as being of 
pan-Indian benefit, a Hyderabadi Muslim states that „Mahomedans are not likely to 
estimate a loyalty of this kind very highly.‟48 Thus at one stroke the writer aligns 
„Mahomedans,‟ not only with the British government, but also with the rest of 
supposedly loyalist India.  The same writer states that he is „voicing the feelings of 
…Mahomedans in particular, when….we tender [Lord and Lady Curzon] our humble 
and grateful thanks.‟49 
The fact that Curzon never even thought of separating Bengal by way of giving a fillip 
to east Bengali Muslims initially may be confirmed by the UP incidences. If he was 
really interested in taking affirmative action for Indian Muslims, he would never have 
acquiesced in legislation effectively  weakening the use of the Urdu (Arabic) script in 
its home ground, as this would have dealt a blow even to those Muslims already doing 
well in the services.  Therefore, this strengthens the theory that he played the 
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Mahomedan card only to drum up local support in east Bengal for his scheme to 
mitigate the risk of mass protests. When he protested in Parliament at the revocation 
of partition in 1912, it is true that his strongest protests were on the contention that 
such a reversal would again subject Muslims to merger in a „great Hindu province,‟ 
but by this time the communal situation had changed from his time as Viceroy, and 
also he viewed the reversal as a breach of trust to a people who had been promised 
certain advantages as a result of it.
50
 This was characteristic of his drive for good 
administration and fairness to all involved. But others put a communal spin on to it 
from the start; the Home Department‟s summary of Curzon‟s administration does 
seem to note with satisfaction the communal outcomes of the partition of Bengal.
51
 
Assuming that Curzon‟s account of the partition of Bengal was economic in rationale, 
i.e. he wanted to break the power of the Hindu dominated Calcutta big shots (cf. 
Calcutta Corporation Act) so, did he want to pull Muslims out of their economic 
morass? Or can one conclude that all this was merely a nascent form of pan-Islamism 
and that it was not overtly religious merely because people living in Victorian times 
and influenced by the enlightenment simply could not openly think of religion as a 
basis for pronouncing autonomy?  The suspicion that in extolling the communal 
virtues of Partition Curzon was trying win Muslim public support is heightened when 
he lists out all the educational advantages that would be made available to them and 
the subsequent aggrandisement of their career prospects- perhaps a response to their 
own cry that they were educationally backward and needed better facilities- as the 
masses never went around clamouring for education generally? 
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In fact, the communal angle of the Partition does not seem to have occurred to 
that „representative‟ of the Indian people, the Bombay based Indian National 
Congress. As late as August 1905, what made India’s front page was the Kitchener 
saga (in which Kitchener was vociferously condemned and the Viceroy upheld as the 
defender of the constitutional principle), and the Viceroy‟s speech at the Calcutta 
Convocation.  Bengal was only mentioned in the middle of July, when India reminded 
its readers that the 1903 session of the Congress had urged that an executive Council 
such as that of Bombay and Madras be appointed in Bengal to assist the Governor in 
the task of administrating the 78 millions under his charge- by implication, they 
believed the official justification of administrative efficiency necessitating the 
Partition of that province.
52
 In fact, the word Partition made its appearance for the first 
time on 11 August 1905. 
53
 3000 miles from Calcutta, the Indian Spectator 
commented that it was not possible to gauge the rights or otherwise of the Partition of 
Bengal at such a distance, and that as far as they could see, both the old and the new 
provinces would be large enough to be self-contained, and that the redistribution of 
territory was not skewed towards giving either bloc an unfair advantage.
54
  The 
Desabhimani of Guntur, much closer to the affected presidency, while refraining from 
comment on the Partition itself, noted that it was not creditable of the Government to 
turn a deaf ear to the strong protests currently ongoing in Bengal.
55
 But it was from 
the United Provinces that the most vociferous and coldly-reasoned protests against the 
Partition of Bengal originated. Allahabad‟s Indian People blamed it upon general 
Tory policy and called Curzon a despot, and first brought out the charge of „Divide 
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and Rule‟ on 23rd July 1905.56 The Citizen followed suit the next day.57  But it was 
Lucknow‟s Advocate that mounted what appear, in retrospective, the most rational 
arguments against the Partition.  It began by surmising that people were against the 
Partition because Curzon had not heeded their protests and followed it up with a 
critique of the redistribution of territory as it stood, which was incomprehensible to 
most Indians.
58
  
It must be noted, of course, that for educated Indians, opposition to the partition 
of Bengal was in part informed by their outrage over Curzon‟s infamous Calcutta 
Convocation speech the year before. A quick glance at most Indian folk-tales does in 
fact bear out Curzon‟s contention – and the general colonial contention- that cupidity 
is highly prized in the East.  The Indian press opposed the Partition of Bengal on the 
grounds that anything put forward by the man who had made that speech could not 
but be detrimental to the people‟s interests. Curiously the Partition of Bengal was also 
an occasion for the press to lampoon their fellow Indians for being too dispirited in 
challenging the Viceroy‟s handling of the Bengalis. Sections of the press had already 
bemoaned the lack of an active response to the convocation speech, and the initially 
solely verbal protests against the Partition confirmed their view that they were 
„lacking in manliness.‟ Calcutta‟s Sandhya thundered that 
 „One contemporary has even gone so far as to proclaim a war. And what sort 
of a war? - a war of words….When the Viceroy at the Convocation after inviting 
everybody to be present there indulged in abuse, why did you not on that occasion  
protest then and there by leaving the meeting hall?...Real spirit you do not 
possess…the only thing you do possess is the capacity of pouring forth torrents of 
words in public meetings….‟59 
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It is possible to conclude that some of the outrage over the partition was an 
overspill of the emotions stirred up by Curzon‟s Calcutta Convocation speech. Yet 
this speech was not taken into account when assessing Curzon against Kitchener, or 
his final departure. This is revealing of the complexities that caused Indians to make 
connections between the various proclamations and acts promulgated by the Viceroy. 
On the surface of it, there was no reason why that speech should have influenced the 
people‟s perception of the Partition of Bengal, especially as it did not negatively 
influence their decision to back Curzon over Kitchener in the simultaneously on-going 
power struggle, nor their overall assessment of him when he departed India. The 
location may have played a part; Curzon‟s other speech which has been deemed 
Orientalist, the 1901 speech at what would become the Aligarh Muslim University, 
where he stated that the tree of knowledge had shifted its habitat from the east to the 
west,
60
 does not seem to have been cited as an adjunct to the campaign opposing the 
partition. The press in that province lapped up the proconsul‟s words, calling it an 
„address without a single jarring note of disapproval or of discouragement.‟61 Even the 
infinitely more fiery Bengali press gave it grudging approval,
62
 restricting their 
grumbles to Curzon‟s apparent lack of such patronage to Hindu institutions of 
learning,
63
 and asking why he expected Indian students to eschew politics when he 
himself had „earned distinction in politics while yet a student.‟64  It does demonstrate 
that people could be selective about which facets of the Viceregal personality they 
wished to acknowledge and co-opt when forming an assessment of his actions. Part of 
the paradox of the Convocation speech and the Partition appears to be that in the first, 
Curzon outraged educated Indians by appearing to categorise them under the umbrella 
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term „liars‟  (their term) and six months later, sought to alienate them from each other. 
He may be said to have attempted to actively interfere in their sense of community 
and nationhood. At the convocation speech he made the very implicit distinction 
between the two types of public opinion that could be said to exist, or at least that he 
believed to exist, in the debate over the proposed Partition. While he never listened to 
any public opinion, he still thought that  
„It is a bad symptom when there is one public opinion that is vocal and noisy, 
and another that is subdued and silent. For the former assumes a prerogative that it 
does not deserve, while the latter does not exert the influence to which it is entitled. 
The true criteria of a public opinion that is to have weight are that it should be 
representative of many interests…‟65 
 
 It was thus that Curzon‟s Viceroyalty crystallised Indian nationalism, and 
provided the self-confidence the Indians needed to assert their voice once more in the 
sub-continent, mostly by means of the 1905 Partition of Bengal. For educated Hindus, 
the class most intellectually outraged by the events of February and August 1905, this 
meant forging an identity centred on resistance to the British and their legislation.  But 
while the Muslims „looked upon the Partition as a blessing,‟ 66  the revocation of 
Partition in 1911, while denounced as a betrayal of Muslim interests by the Aligarh 
intellectuals, does not seem to have aroused Muslim ebullition locally.  This in fact 
was the point put forth by the Marquess of Crewe in his rebuttal of Curzon‟s claim 
that un-doing the partition was a breach of promise to the East Bengal Muslims. 
67
 The 
Partition of Bengal might have forged a sense of unity among all Bengalis, and the 
encouragement to Muslim separatism it offered was felt among non-Bengali Muslims. 
Certainly, when the Hindu press outside of Calcutta (i.e. in Bombay) contemplated the 
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redrawing of the administrative map with detached indifference, the pan-Indian 
Muslim press went public about its support for Curzon as well as his schemes.
68
 
It is doubtful whether Curzon initially appreciated the social concerns that 
Indians raised about the Partition.  Curzon, going by his speeches addressing the 
concerns of the Bengalis, seemed to think that the masses were apprehensive about a 
part of Bengal being attached to the relatively backward province of Assam. Did they 
state this because associations might not, like the Congress in the case of the Punjab 
Land Alienation Act, give voice to the apprehensions about the communal angle 
involved for fear of damaging communal relations, or is it that the communalism 
angle, and the perceived protest against it, has been reified or invented by post-
independence Indian and Pakistani historians, both of whom thus serve their own 
interests? 
It has been suggested that Curzon‟s final blueprint for the partition was not too 
well received in London, with both the Secretary of State and the Prince of Wales 
being opposed to it, and that this, in turn, enabled the anti-partition agitators to gain 
the ear of the British establishment.
69
 If this is the case, it may be deduced that the 
Partition of Bengal actually served, in the long-term, to leverage Hindu interests.  
In conclusion, Curzon can be said to have played upon diverse, opposing Indian 
sentiments regarding the Partition of Bengal to gather Indian support for a scheme 
opposed by another, more vocal section of the local populace.  As will be seen below, 
he did something similar when he manoeuvred a complaisant Indian onto the 
committee appointed to discuss the Punjab Land Alienation Bill. The nature of the 
protests against the partition undoubtedly influenced the precise nature of his 
cartographic re-drawings. He was very obviously not interested in shifting the balance 
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of power from one section of Indians to another, but he was interested in 
concentrating power in the hands of his administration. If this required playing upon 
regional differences, then so be it. His primary aim in India was to overhaul the 
administration so that it functioned efficiently and gave the Indians no cause for 
discontent, and his counting the Muslims as a separate factor was of significance only 
insofar as he might have to take their differences into account in maintaining British 
power in India.  The cry of Indian nationalists that he encouraged communalism is 
nonsense, because for that a sense of collective self-identity would have to have been 
enforced among the Muslims, and this expression of politicised group consciousness 
was something he disliked very much in Indians so he would hardly have furthered it 
himself in any group. As a  Bengali Muslim acidly commented, „the assumption of 
power by either [Hindu or Muslim] is equally  against the interests of the British.  
Consequently, an ebb tide has set in in [sic] British affections for Muslims. On a visit 
to Mymensingh Lord Curzon used harsh words in reply to a Muslim petition for 
government jobs,‟70 this being the speech referred to above. 
But to what extent would Muslim society have become politicised if the Bengal 
Partition had not been mooted? As evidenced in the telegrams received by Curzon on 
his resignation, and as the Viceroy himself was aware, there were numerous small 
Muslim societies across India.  Would they not have at some point coalesced, or 
would not one have risen to pan-Indian „representative‟ status? The other interesting 
observation is that during Curzon‟s time, it was the Central National Mohammedan 
Association, Calcutta, that was the premier Muslim representative body, with 
branches across India, and appears to have come close to being a pan-Indian presence. 
However it seems to have died out for lack of patronage. The Partition of Bengal may 
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have provided the immediate impetus for the politicisation of Muslim associations, but 
given the numerous associations in which Muslims operated as Muslims across India, 
it cannot be said that the Partition of Bengal, and therefore Curzon, was directly 
responsible for the formation of a separatist movement. Maybe for Indians Curzon has 
become a convenient hanging peg to stick up charges of conservatism and divide et 
impera because of his imperialism and dislike of Indian nationalism, plus the Partition 
of Bengal. He has become the representative of the British identification with, and 
championship of, Muslims in Hindu eyes. This is exactly what is suggested by I. H. 
Qureshi; he posits that Curzon was innocent of communally divisive intentions, and 
that all ulterior motives regarding the Partition of Bengal were attributed to him by 
„the Hindus.‟71    
It is curious that Curzon did not consider the possibility of rising Muslim self-
identity and nationalism once the political implications of the partition of Bengal 
became clear. In Curzon‟s case, all his three major “communal pointers,” the Partition 
of Bengal, the creation of the NWFP, the Punjab Land Alienation Bill, things that 
would prove crucial for West Pakistan‟s formation, were a direct result of his attempt 
to improve law and order. But he never seems to have considered the logical outcome 
of burgeoning Muslim aspirations to a distinct identity. His main worry was that the 
people of the frontier could be bought over by the Russians to support a Russian 
attempt on India, not that these people might want to contend for India themselves.  
Of course one can easily attribute this to his combined Russophobia and his 
complacent imperialism, but the fact is he never raised the bogey of an internal 
rebellion by any part of Indian society. This curious naïveté may partly be ascribed to 
his not taking any Indian political  aspirations seriously, and this inability to recognise 
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emergent Indian political consciousness meant that when it came to garnering Indian 
support for the Partition, he played what was interpreted as the communal card to 
popularise his measure.  
The Partition of Bengal, thus, was a case where the communal theme overrode 
administrative convenience in the eyes of all parties debating the legislation. The next 
section looks at an instance where legislation, fully intended to be affirmative action, 
was not vociferously denounced as such, when it could have been, and examines why.  
 
The Punjab Land Alienation Act, 1900: Affirmative Action Communalised? 
Land revenue had been the major source of sustenance for Indian governments 
since Akbar, just as cultivation itself was the major source of sustenance for the vast 
majority of Indians, even before Akbar. Thus it was one area of reform which engaged 
with the populace at the most basic level. In the Punjab, Curzon in 1900 enabled the 
passing of the Punjab Land Alienation Act, a move that the Punjab ICS had been 
advocating for almost three decades that remedied the transfer of land from peasants 
into the hands of moneylenders to whom they were in debt. On the surface, this was 
affirmative action at its best, but it also threw up questions about how balances of 
power could be altered by proposed and actual legislation. Chapter 4 has explored the 
dynamics between Curzon and the Punjab cadre over the passing of the Act; this 
section concentrates on dynamics between Indian public opinion and the Government 
of India.  Firstly, the increasing regulation over the transfer of land undoubtedly 
played a part in the growing assertiveness and bargaining power of the Muslim 
cultivator, and created communally drawn political schisms. Secondly, as mentioned 
in Chapter 4, the Act also threw up deep divisions within the ICS over polity, as much 
of the Punjab cadre had very specific- and differing-  views about the exact provisions 
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of the Act. Thirdly, it brought about a schism between Curzon and Mackworth Young, 
the governor of the Punjab, as Curzon overrode his views, preferring to fall back upon 
the views of other senior officers from the Punjab cadre. Finally, it revealed Curzon‟s 
capacity for legislation that was appreciated by the people, and in tune with their 
aspirations of what constituted good governance. The mesh of all these relationships 
showed how balances of power between two individuals interplayed to swing a 
decision either way.   
The Punjab Land Alienation Act is also important because it was one of the few 
pieces of legislation during Curzon‟s time in the enactment of which the Viceroy did 
not have a leading part.  Like many others, the principle behind the act had been 
mooted long before Curzon came to India, but it was Curzon‟s contemporaries in the 
Punjab Government who endeavoured to give it shape. Therefore this is important in 
analysing the Viceroy‟s ability to weigh up and decide between the arguments of 
different factions. As a matter of fact Curzon can be said to have brought his over-
bearing personality and clout with the Secretary of State to override the objections of 
the section of the Punjab Government opposed to the Bill. Barrier notes that the 
passage of the Bill had been delayed thus far because successive Viceroys, and Elgin 
in particular, were unable to oppose the authoritarian Punjab cadre, which considered 
itself the best informed to tackle the problems of the province.
72
   While Curzon had 
not spent years in the Punjab, as the instigator of the successful Punjab Colonies 
Cultivation scheme, he was in a strong position to throw his support behind Charles 
Rivaz, one of the main proponents of the Bill. He was able to override Hamilton‟s 
urging that the Governor of Punjab be consulted before finalising the specifics of 
legislation by informing Hamilton that he did not care to consult Mackworth Young as 
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he was too quick to take offence. He was also able to ignore the Secretary of State‟s 
wishes that he adopt the plan which would apply the new Bill only to a part of the 
Punjab, and instead chose the all-Punjab plan he had wished to.
73
 Further he was able 
to use his excellent rapport with Hamilton to ensure that the Bill was passed through 
the Imperial Legislative Council as opposed to the Punjab Legislative Council, where 
Mackworth Young could potentially delay its passage until changes were made to his 
satisfaction.
74
 Finally, having won over Hamilton, he was able to get Hamilton to have 
the Bill passed through in record time through the India Council, where Alfred Lyall 
opposed its pan-Punjab reach.  
The land alienation act was the result of collaboration between Sir Denzil 
Ibbetson and Charles Rivaz, who pushed it through with Curzon‟s support, the 
concerned incumbent Governors of the Punjab, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick and Sir 
Mackworth Young, both opposing it, Fitzpatrick being more opposed to the form of 
legislation than legislation itself.  A vast body of largely well-balanced literature can 
be found with regard to the Land Alienation Act. S.S. Thorburn‟s Musalmans and 
Moneylenders in the Punjab
75
 is –and was- an influential backing of the rights of the 
„impoverished Muslim peasants‟ of the Western Punjab, but is now also an illustration 
of the background atmosphere- ICS and otherwise-  that may have prompted Curzon 
to pass the act. A work that deals extensively with the Viceroy‟s involvement in the 
Land Alienation Bill is Gerald Barrier‟s eponymous monograph.76 A modern study of 
the communal impact of the Land Alienation Act is to be found in works that study 
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the overall importance of Punjabi politics in the emergence of Pakistan,
77
 thus 
highlighting how many British moves gave an inadvertent edge to „separatism,‟ but 
most of them do not highlight the role of the Viceroy, as opposed to studies of the 
Bengal Partition, or those of the creation of the NWFP, which go to great lengths to 
emphasise Curzon‟s role in reviving these plans.  
At the basic, most intrinsic level, the Land Alienation Act became a communal 
flashpoint because the categories it worked within approximated to religious 
boundaries as well- the peasants were universally Muslim, and the moneylenders 
„alienating‟ their land, urban Hindus. The guiding motive behind the Punjab Land 
Alienation Act was, in fact, political- peasants, especially Muslim peasants, were the 
chief fodder for the Indian army and must therefore be kept happy.
78
  This was also 
the reason it was enacted in the Punjab (alienations were a pan-Indian fact of life) - it 
was the major recruiting ground for the army. As far as the British were concerned, 
backing Muslim political power served a dual purpose;  the „need for a  secure 
political base led  government to cultivate support of…landlords, for the same reason 
it sought the support of Muslims.‟79 The motive was not, however, communal, and the 
Bill was prompted by the debt situation in the Punjab, and not by any communal 
disaffection arising out of the supposed stranglehold of Hindu moneylenders upon 
suffering Muslim peasants. (That such measures were not extended to the rest of India 
was because there were perfectly good settlement systems in place elsewhere, and also 
because the rest of India did not supply the flower of the British Indian army). In spite 
of all this, and the fact that it was a genuine attempt, along with such things as co-
operative credit societies and irrigation programmes, to benefit the people of India (or 
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such sections as the British thought needed benefiting), the Punjab Land Alienation 
Act of 1900 „formed a link in a chain of measures interpreted by the various religious 
groups as indicating British favouritism.‟80 
Since revenue settlement was one of the major backbones of the Raj, the local 
structure of these settlements could not but affect local structures of power and 
ethnology. In the case of the Punjab Land Alienation Act, it resulted in an affirmation 
of local Punjabi patterns of inter-communal relations, and at the same time, 
dissociated these communal relations, at an apparent level, from the overt religious 
schism prevalent in the rest of India, by cloaking it within a political mould.
81
 This 
was because religious identity and the distinguishing effect it had upon people was co-
opted into British administration and so became a practical operative force 
politically
82
 (which meant it would be subsumed into politics).  Part of the reason the 
Punjab Land Alienation Act worked to emphasise Muslim identity in the Punjab was 
because the target beneficiaries of the act, the Muslims, constituted the „dominant 
social category with which the British had in large part identified their rule.‟83 The 
Muslim factor was incidental though unavoidable, but a bonus for the British because 
it consolidated and integrated the groups to which the British looked for support to 
extend their rule in India, i.e. rather feudalistic types.   Barrier also states that the Act 
is an illustration of the fact that British legislative and administrative policy shaped 
the growth of Indian nationalism;
84
 It may also be added that it also illustrates how it 
was the Indian interpretation of much British policy, and most of Curzon‟s policies, 
that dictated their effect on communal and Indo-British relations.  It is obvious that all 
these implications were not lost on Indians themselves, because while in 1909 Hindus 
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noted the Punjab Land Alienation Act‟s detrimental effects on themselves,85 in 1915, 
on the threshold of the Lucknow Pact, the press denounced the working of the act. 
86
 
But it was not possible to protest; a fallout of the debate over the economic suitability 
of the Punjab Land Alienation Act resulted in heightened awareness of communal 
identities. The Muslim press supported the bill; the Muslims of Karnal held a meeting 
to „thank the government for its “thoughtful” legislation;‟87 meanwhile, the Indian 
National Congress, criticising the Bill on the grounds that it was not transfer of land 
but British taxation that was pushing Punjabi peasants into debt, was forced to 
withdraw its protest after its Muslim members protested as they found the bill 
beneficial to them, and further protest would have alienated these members. 
88
 India, 
meanwhile, does not seem to have taken too strong a line against the Punjab Land 
Alienation Act, confining its remarks to a grumble about the fact that its 
implementation was confined to the Punjab, when there were comparable figures for 
alienated land in the other provinces. It reserved its strongest protests for the manner 
of its implementation; that Curzon and Hamilton had effectively colluded over the 
passing of the Act, bypassing the normal channels of governance. This, according to 
India, was an „illustration of the system of interference that is no interference and of 
the hopelessness of appeal in case Indian opinion proves adverse on any important 
point.‟89 
 As always, the Punjab Land Alienation Act too derived its communal 
importance from the manner in which it was perceived by Indians, perhaps more than 
from its actual content.  The Tribune commented that „people who are not intelligent 
enough to comprehend the scope of the Bill will surely attribute it to the policy of 
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„Divide and Rule‟ some years ago when the Government began rightly to shower 
favours on Mahomedans, the attitude of the authorities was misconstrued and there 
were constant riots and bloodshed between the two communities…the Bill if passed is 
destined to result in incalculable harm.
90
 While the Tribune and the Civil and Military 
Gazette appear to have been the first to inveigh against the bill, the Mahratta, the 
Hindu Patriot, the Paisa Akhbar all opposed the terms of the bill- what they called for 
was lower revenue assessments generally and the extension of the Permanent 
Settlement.
91
 In Madras, the papers paid it scant attention until it was actually passed, 
and then mentioned that since conditions in the Punjab were replicated across India, 
the government had better address the pan-Indian situation in like fashion. Like its 
counterparts in the Punjab, the Amritavachani of Trichinopoly questioned the ability 
of the ryots to raise money to meet the land revenue if they could not resort to the 
money-lenders
92
- but the Bill never prevented access to moneylenders for the ryots. 
Mysore‟s Vrittanta Patrika also lamented the fact that the government‟s benevolence 
would be inutile unless the peasants checked their tendency to extravagance and their 
like inclination to borrow money „sometimes without any intention of returning it at 
all.‟93 The Amritavachani suggested a rather more complex and sophisticated solution 
to the problem of peasant indebtedness:  
„the Government should pass a general Act extending to the whole of India by 
which the people may get loans from the Government on moderate terms. Although it 
is true that the Government is not rich enough to undertake this business, still it can 
easily raise loans from the rich capitalists  who may be anxious to invest their capital 
in Government loans, and these sums may be lent to the ryots.‟94 
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 The local press in Punjab did not feel inclined to put forth an alternative to 
Punjab Land Alienation Act, and was overwhelmingly in support of the Bill, with 
articles pouring in from all parts of the province. It was one of the most engaging 
topics throughout 1900, and in the run up to the passing of the legislation, 
Rawalpindi‟s Chaudhwin Sadi emerged as one of the strongest supporters of the Bill, 
being rather disposed to view it as government benevolence bestowed upon the 
feckless zamindars. Lahore‟s Rafiq-i-Hind also supported the Bill, citing it as the only 
course of legislation which would appease all sections of the populace: there were 
other ways to counter agricultural indebtedness, for example the setting up of co-
operative banks. But such a measure, the paper pointed out, would hurt the 
moneylenders, while the Punjab Land Alienation Act did not restrict them from 
carrying on their business per se, only restricted their repossessing land taken as 
collateral.
95
  The Dost-i-Hind and the Victoria Paper of Sialkot, meanwhile, were 
rather more censorious, the later urging the Viceroy not to be misled by the Rafiq-i-
Hind, and to uphold his impartiality by appointing an independent committee to assess 
public opinion – which in fact Curzon did- and not to make the Bill retrospective 
(there was talk of this). 
96
  
The deliberations of the Indian press formed a parallel to the notes circulating 
around the Punjab secretariat, as the minutiae of the Bill took shape. Delhi‟s Curzon 
Gazette expressed the view on 23 March 1900 that peasants might now find it difficult 
to borrow money to pay land revenue, and would have to auction off their lands to 
fellow small farmers to do so, but it later advanced the view, on 01 June 1900, that the 
Bill should be passed into law anyway. 
97
 Contrarily, Lahore‟s Akhbar-i-‘Am initially 
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had no reservations about the Bill save that it wanted a tighter definition of 
„agriculturist‟  in April 1900, but by August it was denouncing the Bill‟s supporters as 
government flatterers, yet paradoxically continuing to state its faith in Curzon‟s 
„impartiality.‟98 It was at this stage that the Rafiq-i-Hind called for a widening of the 
term „agriculturist.‟99 By the end of September, however, the Taj-ul-Akhbar went so 
far as to state the new legislation would „end emigration, banish famines and usher in 
a reign of contentment and prosperity in the province.‟100 
This slow reversal of the initial suspicion that had greeted the bill was also to be 
found in official echelons, where resistance was being worn down. In early 1900 a 
Select Committee formed of six Englishmen and one Indian had been formed. Sir 
Harnam Singh represented Mackworth Young‟s opposition to the Bill, as Curzon had 
not seen fit include the governor on the committee, arguing that his opposition would 
slow the passage of the bill. Singh had been heir to the gaddi of Kapurthala before 
converting to Christianity, and as noted, opposed the Bill, but he did not just represent 
the Indian counterpoint to British power. He was Mackworth‟s protégé, and thus a 
means for the governor to have his say in the bill even when Curzon had contrived to 
exclude him. Certainly he made valid points of dissent and in July 1900 a Muslim ex-
soldier, retired judge and farmer, the Nawab Mohammed Hyat Khan, was added to the 
committee, and he happened to be pro-Bill,
 101
 noting that „the lawlessness that has 
generally resulted from expropriation…is a grave political danger…dacoits have been 
known to say that [they] only wanted to avenge their wrongs on the moneylenders.‟102 
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Others went further in elaborating the political danger caused by alienations to non-
peasants holders. Even  Harnam Singh, though writing for purposes entirely contrary 
to the Nawab‟s, opined that the 
 „Land Alienation Bill is much resented by money-lenders…people were in 
difficulties and there were not wanting persons to stir them up and to tell them that 
now was the time to avenge themselves on their tyrants, and so dacoities 
began…committed by Muhammadan zamindars…and the persons robbed were 
money-lenders.‟103 
 
It is true that that Punjab Land Alienation Act was a response to the political 
danger of alienation; this aspect of land economy in fact was a direct result of the 
dynamics of the Mutiny, in which it was observed that perceived neglect of a religion 
(s) could spark off revolts, and locally, that the Punjabis stood behind the British. 
104
 
The Punjab Land Alienation Act was experimental legislation,
105
 and 
extraordinary in view of the previous attitude of laissez-faire adopted by the British in 
India. Barrier thus argues that only a Viceroy like Curzon, whose preferred mode of 
governance was paternal –and despotic-benevolence towards the people, could have 
pushed it through.
106
   In fact,  the Punjab Land Alienation Act, like most of Curzon‟s 
other measures which were designed to that aim, succeeded in binding the authority of 
the state to the structure of indigenous society itself. 
107
 As the twentieth century wore 
on, it became the means of keeping the Punjab loyal.  
In hindsight therefore, Curzon‟s „interest in the peasantry was suspected; 
national leaders saw in it a subtle attempt to attach [them] to the British Regime and to 
withdraw them from Indian political influence.‟108 It was not as though the Act had 
even originated from the Viceroy; as seen above and in Chapter 4, it was being 
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debated by the ICS for two and a half decades before Curzon came to India.  But as 
Ampthill had once noted, in India all acts were seen as originating in the person of the 
Viceroy and it was widely believed that he had the powers to modify any piece of 
legislation if he so chose. Curzon thus far had done nothing to dispel that impression. 
And  so strong was Curzon‟s reputation as an even-handed Viceroy that in the early 
stages of the discussion of the bill, the press felt he could not but withdraw it once its 
deleterious effects upon the peasants were made manifest to him, as also the fact that 
certain sections of Indians did not approve of the proposed legislation. The Tribune 
made the facile suggestion that 
 „Lord Curzon…has the great gift of being able to put himself in the position of 
the governed. If we proceed in the proper manner, lay the pros and cons of the case 
clearly before him, let it be evident to him that the proposed piece of legislation will 
do a vast deal more harm than good…we are sure the bill…will be sufficiently 
modified to render it innocuous.‟109 
  
This was very much in keeping with the role that the Punjab press appeared to 
have assigned to Curzon- that of maa-baap of the people.  This province offered 
minimal political analysis of Curzon‟s assumption of office in 1899. For almost a 
month after he landed in India, the Punjab press had nothing to say about the new 
Viceroy - or indeed the outgoing one- until Lahore‟s Wafadar expressed the hope that 
the he might do something to alleviate the miserable financial [sic] condition of the 
people. 
110
  
But Curzon was self-confessedly insensitive to Indian appeals to his „good 
nature‟ and particularly disliked  the sort of harping on constitutionalisms that 
contemporary Indians were wont to employ in the appeals, and over the case of the 
Punjab Land Alienation Act, he appears to have been strongly convinced by Rivaz to 
push it through without modification. His stance over the passing of the Punjab Land 
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Alienation Bill demonstrates Curzon‟s disregard of Indian opinion even when it was 
not aligned in opposition to his plans.  Of course, the inclusion of Sir Harnam Singh, 
and indeed the constitution of the Select Committee itself, was in deference to critical 
opinion that Indian public opinion must be taken into account before passing the 
legislation through, but as seen above, Curzon managed to counter this by putting his 
own Indians on the committee as well, and in any case the press accorded the Bill its 
cautious approbation as it passed into law.  
                                            
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have gone against the grain by looking at two sections of 
Indian society that accorded Curzon a simultaneous mix of approbation and regretful 
condemnation, as opposed to the universal post-colonial condemnation of him. Thus 
we can see how perceptions of the figurehead of imperial authority were by no means 
uniform across India. The second section shows how attempts to redress existing 
inequalities and hold the balance even between different strata of Indians backfired 
horribly. This would assume that British interference re-set the existing balance of 
power across the mofussil. As Anil Seal has noted, the power structure of the Raj gave 
rise to an Indian counterpart that took its character from its engagements with the 
original.
111
  We have also seen how Indians were able to appropriate Curzon‟s actions 
to whatever mood suited them.  
 Reactions to Curzon‟s resignation, then, were understandably coloured by the 
very recent Partition of Bengal, especially as it was one measure which was perceived 
by the Indians as directly affecting them. Bengali papers- at least those that had 
opposed the Partition- expressed a certain amount of rejoicing. The Amrita Bazar 
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Patrika, however, noted with sympathy that Curzon „had been made to suffer a 
serious humiliation in the eyes of the world,‟ but also forbore to point out that they 
saw in this „the hand of justice for His Excellency‟s series of repressive acts towards a 
people who were prepared to honour and love him.‟112 
This did not mean a total repudiation of all that Curzon stood for. When he 
resigned India proclaimed him to be „a victim of Lord Kitchener‟s ruthlessness, or to 
Mr. Chamberlain‟s pushfulness [sic], or to both, operating upon the amazing weakness 
and instability of the Secretary of State for India and the Home Government.‟ 113 In 
Madras, public opinion offered yet more unequivocal support, the Hindu Nesan using 
the opportunity to ask how it was possible for Indians to enjoy privileges, when the 
Governor-General himself, responsible for the proper administration of the whole 
country, was not accorded full powers.
114
  
But, ICS opinion tends to the view that ultimately whatever Curzon did in India 
did not matter in the long run, nor did it greatly affect the country. As hypothesised at 
the start of this thesis, ultimately Curzon did not have any direct influence upon the 
development of Indian national consciousness. As Evan Maconochie, Denzil 
Ibbetson‟s son-in-law, put it,  
„it may be admitted that he set the brains of all communities working with a 
new vigour and, to that extent, may have given an impetus to certain developments. 
But the growth of the nationalist sense and of the desire for self-determination is not 
the work of one man,  and he a foreigner, however dominant his personality…He 
came at a period when the old order was changing, and left India different in outlook 
and temper to that which he found… [but] in the conditions of our Indian Empire the 
coming of unrest was inevitable…‟115 
 
This thesis has shown how much Curzon tried to do, and get others to do, 
according to what he judged best, so that unrest, even if inevitable, could not be said 
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to have been provoked by British actions.  The next chapter, the final one of the thesis, 
examines the barriers to Curzon‟s exercise of unfettered power in India. 
263 
 
Chapter Seven  
The Constraints on the Free Exercise of Viceregal Power. 
 
The clamour of the arrogant accuser 
 Wastes that one hour we needed to make good. 
 This was foretold of old at our outgoing; 
 This we accepted who have squandered, knowing, 
The strength and glory of our reputations, 
At the day's need, as it were dross, to guard 
The tender and new-delicate foundations… 
 
-Rudyard Kipling, The Pro-Consuls. 
 
 
 
  Curzon‟s Indian Viceroyalty, as noted, has attained legendary status; his 
towering personality easily lends itself to biographic studies, often verging on the 
hagiographic in the case of his many admirers and contemporaries, of the „Great Man‟ 
school of historiography. Yet, as the thesis, Curzon and the Limits of Viceregal 
Power: India, 1899-1905, states, neither Curzon nor any other Viceroy in the colonies 
ever functioned as autonomous kings in their realms. The Viceroy was not a 
figurehead; rather, in India he was „located in an interconnected network of people 
whose careers were also spent in carving Britain‟s imperial interests,‟1 incorporating 
varying levels of authority and power. The structure of colonial governance was not 
peopled by like-minded officials striving for a common aim. 
As the thesis progressed, the ways in which Curzon‟s potential, seemingly 
limitless at the outset of his Viceroyalty, and  bolstered by the factors identified, was 
constrained by the realities of the networks of colonial governance, have been made 
manifest. Most of Curzon‟s actions brought about counter-reactions from his 
colleagues, who had views and motives that differed from his. As was pointed out in 
Chapter One, Curzon‟s exercise of Viceregal authority to achieve his stated ends for 
                                                          
1
 Nicola J. Thomas, “Mary Curzon: „American Queen of India,‟” in Colonial Lives Across the British 
Empire: Imperial Careering in the Long Nineteenth Century, eds David Lambert & Allan Lester 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 307.  
264 
 
Indian administration was aided considerably by some of his colleagues. But if friends 
in high places were an asset, it is equally evident from Chapter Seven that other 
equally highly placed friends were in fact responsible for the acrimony that was the 
hallmark of the later stages of Curzon‟s time in office. This is just one illustration of 
the ways in which the structure of power surrounding Curzon operated to suffocate his 
autonomy of action and reduced his impact on Indian administration.  Curzon‟s efforts 
to impose his will on the Indian administrative machine, to give it strong leadership, 
were tempered by wider political, social and economic constraints.
2
 Obviously, some 
of the very factors which served to constrain him had also helped him under certain 
circumstances and certain points of his term; „different aspects of the personal 
equation will condition the individual actor‟s potential effectiveness in different 
leadership situations.‟3 As always there are extrinsic and intrinsic factors; ones that 
stemmed from Curzon‟s own handling of the situation as he analysed it, and ones that 
he had relatively less control over- people‟s reactions to him.  
Curzon’s Temperament: Curzon‟s own lack of people skills led him to get into 
snarls with his  governors and other officials and they then complained about him to 
London with the result he got rather less co-operation than he would otherwise have 
got. In this case the policy of permitting the Presidency Governors to correspond 
direct with London worked to Curzon‟s disadvantage, especially in the early days of  
his term, when Havelock was in office at Madras. Of course, that they wrote about 
their wrongs at the hands of Curzon was not something that could have been 
forecasted. As Burns notes in his seminal work, „leaders…are cognitive, fact-
gathering, calculating creatures who link their goals- and even subordinate them- to 
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the realities of the structures of political opportunity.‟4  Curzon was definitely a fact-
gathering and cognitive individual, but he could not dissimulate and sublimate his 
goals to the extant climate; rather, the extant climate, if it hindered the achievement of 
his goals, had to be worked around. Curzon could not, or would not, perceive the 
necessity of biding his time before springing any action upon his colleagues. When he 
did try to do so, notably over the creation of the NWFP, it resulted in the concerned 
party being more than usually offended. Obviously, when it came to matters of 
administration, it did not really matter, as he was the Viceroy and as long as he was 
able to produce concrete justification for a move, it was usually accepted by the rest of 
the Government of India. But this lack of a sense of timing and diplomacy let him 
down in the political realm, especially in his relations with London. Kitchener knew 
how to pace himself- he was willing to bide his time until Curzon served out a second 
term to put his plans for Army reform into operation. This Curzon did not know how 
to do.  
Of course, this was tied in to other aspects of Curzon‟s personality. The fact that 
he was obsessed by the worry that he would not have enough time to complete his 
work in India also suggests that he did not think he would be able to hand over power 
to a suitable successor. He does not seem to have made any attempt at grooming a 
potential successor, or discussing one with the India Office, at least during his very 
affable relationship with George Hamilton. The most he did was express horror that 
Brodrick, or Kitchener, might succeed him. Nor did he appear to think that any 
potential successor could run India properly; his remark about Kitchener just waiting 
for him to depart shows that he did not think anyone else capable of controlling India.
5
 
Obviously this was a power vacuum, one created through omission? Of course, 
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Curzon was merely following historical precedent; there was no tradition of grooming 
one‟s successor for the Indian Viceroyalty. Curzon may have observed how the 
process of choosing a governor for a province almost operated automatically
6
 but the 
process of choosing a Viceroy seems to have been deliberately lackadaisical by 
contrast. There was no convention even of choosing a Viceroy who belonged to the 
party in power in England. But the lack of continuity coupled with the fact that the 
incumbent Viceroy was not usually involved in the choosing of his successor, ensured 
that policies could be undone at the end of five years by the expedient of choosing a 
more complaisant Viceroy.  
Curzon‟s abrasiveness has been cited, both by contemporary observers and later 
historians, as a key reason why he alienated people and could not create a loyalist 
clique. But there is not much evidence to support this charge- Ampthill, Northcote, 
Hamilton, Ibbetson and Mary- self-professed admirers- all suffered his cutting 
sarcasm and remained, or became, supporters of his policies. In the opinion of this 
historian, Curzon himself rightly identified the factors that alienated people- his 
insistence on action.  It is possible that the bureaucracy would have put up with his 
outbursts had they not been accompanied by spot checks on the state of the various 
projects he insisted they work on. This not only upset them, but made them feel he 
was straying out of his sphere and infringing their autonomy of action by taking away 
effective control of their various departments from them. It is significant that Curzon 
confided his troubles over the recalcitrant bureaucracy solely to Lawrence, who also 
advocated the above viewpoint.  
Excessive championing of Indian Affairs: While Curzon‟s obsession with 
streamlining Indian administration aroused irritation in India, his excessive 
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championing of Indian affairs  caused more serious political problems at Home, 
especially in three quarters, the British Cabinet, the Conservative Party and the India 
Office. As observed throughout this thesis, Imperial and Indian interests, and the 
interests of their respective administrators, were often at variance with the other.  
Attempting to reconcile both, because this was his self-professed justification for 
being in India- laid Curzon open to charges of ignoring both the British interests – 
trade- which were the raison d’etre for Britain‟s presence in India and the  larger 
imperial interests, of which India, according to London, formed only a proportion.  
Given that Britain‟s enormous investments in India were expected to benefit –or at 
least aggrandise- the English, one cannot really fault Whitehall for their line. Curzon 
could, of course, have argued that fair play would ensure that Indians would not end 
up disenchanted with the British presence, which would enable the objective of 
prolonging their rule in India. The primary reason Curzon‟s championing of India ran 
into trouble was his justification for it- he talked about the fairness (or otherwise) of a 
particular line of policy to the Government of India- as in the case of them paying for 
the South African war- which was supposed, according to London, to be an agency 
acting in tandem with it to further British interests in India, not to represent India. But 
the Government of India could not under any circumstances be said to represent India. 
Had Curzon argued that his proposals were best for Great Britain, or Great Britain‟s 
imperial interests, they would not have been so difficult to comprehend in Whitehall. 
Not that his enthusiasm for securing a better deal for India was well-received in India 
either. In 1899, he compelled the Sultan of Muscat, despite reservations in London, to 
annul a concession made to the French, which had given them the right to establish a 
coaling depot there. India scathingly reviewed the case Curzon made out to London:  
„Mr. Curzon… used the common dialect of Jingoism. “We subsidise its 
[Muscat‟s] ruler. We dictate its policy.” When did Mr. Curzon become an 
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Indian? What we do is to make the poverty-stricken tax payer of India give 
the Sultan of Muscat  a subsidy of £ 40 000 a year, in order that we may add 
to the dominions of British India…‟7 
 
In a sense Curzon and his sense of fair play and natural justice can be said to 
have been hampered by his race and background. Contemporary nationalist Indians 
did not greatly question the benefits of British presence; it was something they took 
for granted. But like Curzon, they wanted a better deal for India. Their concerns, even 
when not addressed, were seen as legitimate on account of their ethnic identities. 
Curzon‟s were not because of his ethnic identity. 
In any case, championing Indian interests against British and/or Imperial 
interests did not convince his detractors, because his encyclopaedic knowledge of 
Indian affairs did not necessarily mean he knew as much about other kinds of politics. 
It may be said that Curzon‟s very expertise went against him; he possessed what may 
be said to be „expert power,‟ derived from his specialist, but stand-alone, knowledge 
of India; it did not further that he was just as knowledgeable about the web of Empire 
and domestic polity. As Raven and French‟s seminal study notes, expert power is 
„restricted to cognitive systems- in Curzon‟s case, India- „the expert is seen as having 
superior knowledge or ability in very specific areas, and his power (or the 
acknowledgement of it) will be limited to these areas, though some “halo effect” 
might occur…the attempted exertion of expert power outside the range of expert 
power will reduce that expert power.‟ 8  Thus, Curzon was perceived by Balfour, 
Brodrick and Godley as a monomaniac incapable of taking a more integrated, all –
round view of state policy. And this caused them to examine his Indian legislation, too, 
with much more circumspection than they otherwise might have, fearing the impact it 
would have on the frontiers.  
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Curzon‟s championing of India had a wider ramification than the India- England 
tussle. There were imperial aspects to this debate. Events happening in the rest of the 
Empire- the Gulf, the White Dominions, the Straits Settlements- also worked their 
influence on Curzon‟s India. In 1903, Curzon considered abandoning his plans for an 
English furlough because his acting-Viceroy designate, Lord Northcote, accepted the 
post of Governor-General of Australia, which meant that he could not take over. He 
continued in part with the Viceregal office after his return, inspite of its „having 
become a burden,‟ because the only – in his eyes- worthy successor, the Earl of 
Selborne, chose instead to succeed Milner in South Africa. This could be described as 
a leadership crisis. Beyond the poaching of proconsuls, imperial constraints extended 
to the realm of domestic politics. Curzon‟s   argument that India was rather more 
important than any other space occupied by the British was an observation that failed 
to take into account the growing importance of the ballot box, with the ever-widening 
enfranchisement of England; they did not always agree with Curzon‟s notion that 
England‟s greatness was built upon her foreign possessions and that the securing of 
those should be any government‟s primary priority.  
The Conservative Party and Domestic Politics: As noted above, both 
Hamilton and Brodrick protested when they felt Curzon was placing Indian interests 
above British or imperial ones; but their protests were limited to the realms of state 
politics. For the Conservative party, Curzon‟s Indian policies hurt where it counted the 
most-at the ballot box. This would appear to be paradoxical, given that Curzon‟s 
views about Empire were those normally ascribed to dyed-in-the-wool Tories. But as 
noted by Niall Ferguson, the Empire was not something that concerned the large mass 
of the British public. In a reflection of modern day concerns over outsourcing and off-
shoring jobs, Curzon‟s decisions to impose a duty on cotton imports from Britain 
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angered the Lancashire cotton lobby, and, by extension, the local politicians. After all, 
the primary theory advanced for Britain‟s continued presence in India was that India 
afforded a market for Britain‟s industrial surplus. The Conservative party naturally felt 
that Indian interests should ultimately be subsumed to those of Empire. This feeling 
was all the more enhanced in the opening years of the twentieth century as the 
Conservative party had one eye on the polls due to the then political instability, itself 
one of the factors that militated against Curzon. This illustrates how imperial and 
domestic concerns intermingled and converged within the confines of the political 
world. 
The respective merits of Lancashire vs. Ahmedabad cotton did not disrupt 
Curzon‟s Viceroyalty, though it raised questions about his championing of India over 
Britain. The Viceroyalty thus became an issue linked to British politics, which 
justified increasing surveillance by the British Government over the Government of 
India.  A more direct- and significant- way in which domestic politics altered the 
course of Curzon‟s Viceroyalty was the resignation of the free-trader George 
Hamilton, and the subsequent elevation of  St. John Brodrick to Secretary of State for 
India. It is thus possible to trace a long line of events that contributed to Curzon‟s 
ultimate resignation.   
India Office: The India Office, with the Permanent Under-Secretary for India 
and – after 1903- the Secretary of State for India, were the most visible and influential 
factors in curbing Curzon‟s power. This is perfectly understandable because the 
Secretary of State, at least, was Curzon‟s constitutional chief, and Arthur Godley‟s 
long entrenchment as the Under-Secretary gave him a hold over every incoming 
Secretary of State- and possibly led him to regard every incoming Viceroy as  merely 
a transient tenant. The individual roles of both Godley and Hamilton have been 
271 
 
discussed in Chapter 2; what is also of importance is how they themselves were 
affected by the atmosphere in the India Office at large. For example, it is noted in 
Chapter 2 that Hamilton was obliged to weigh Parliament‟s reactions before assenting 
to any of Curzon‟s schemes, as he was terrified of an inquiry into the India Office. 
Similarly, while Godley has been held to have enjoyed unfettered freedom within the 
India Office by Kaminsky,
9
 the same historian contradicts that notion while 
demonstrating how Godley‟s differences with the „centralizing‟ Morley drove him to 
tender an offer of resignation.
10
  
The Council of India‟s rejections of many of Curzon‟s proposals also had 
ramifications beyond any one piece of legislation. As noted, the rejections in 
themselves were not of the type to ruin the defining themes of any Viceroyalty, the 
Council happily passing major acts such as the Partition of Bengal and the Punjab 
Land Alienation Act. But Curzon‟s protests at having the redevelopment of the 
Viceregal gardens blocked – precisely because it was such a relatively unimportant 
matter- damaged his stock with Whitehall. His differences with the Council also found 
their way into the press.  
But the India Office did not function as a check on Curzon‟s power solely 
because of the presence of one Under-Secretary (however permanent) with a will-to-
power beyond the confines of his office and one Secretary of State desperate to prove 
himself; as Galbraith notes, „the modern state unites within its structure all three 
sources of power: the political personality, property in the form of the resources it 
commands and dispenses, and organisation.‟ 11  In the case of India, the political 
personality was held to be missing by those in London- they sought to vest it in 
themselves. By this logic Curzon was reduced to the status of a functionary, part of 
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the „resources commanded‟ and held limited power of his own. The India Office 
seemed to think that „the creation and maintenance of collective resources is vastly 
more significant than the distribution of individual resources in determining the 
structure of power in a society.‟12 
And as can be noted above, the structure and tenor of the India Office did not 
take shape in isolation. It was influenced by events in the wider political sphere, and 
these, conflated, served to present unique situations to the Viceroy in India. The office 
of the Secretary of State became irksome to Curzon only after Brodrick assumed the 
post; but he did so because the above mentioned events brought about the resignation 
of Hamilton. And had it not been for Balfour‟s predilection for filling the government 
with old friends, Brodrick might not have been in the list of contenders for the post. 
And then again, even Brodrick‟s critics have taken the view that he would not have 
been quite to eager to stamp his authority on the Indian administration were he not 
desperate to redeem himself after the War Office. Thus, events happening in one part 
of the political sphere might in themselves have posed problems for Curzon, but when 
worked into a inter-linked chain of office, they combined to creation a situation 
wherein it was not surprising that Curzon should feel that every man‟s hand was 
against him. The problem of course lay in the isolation, and yet, connectedness of 
India. Given that London was the capital of the British Empire, the various strands of 
information merged and coalesced there into mutually influential patterns, to be used 
by those administrators based in London for running the Empire as a coherent whole. 
The advent of telegraph- its feasibility coinciding with Curzon‟s Viceroyalty, meant 
that the Viceroy of India could thus be told what to do as soon as relevant information 
became available. Sitting in India with the mail two weeks away, it was just not 
                                                          
12
 D. H. Wrong, Power, 144.  
273 
 
possible for an Indian colonial administrator to command the same kind of 
information. While links between the various colonies may have been much stronger 
than has been allowed by most historians barring a few exceptions,
13
 most political 
information still passed via London, in part because the colonies did not have a 
common aim in terms of foreign policy. Only where the administrators were known to 
each other, as in the case of Curzon and Charles Hardinge (later Viceroy of India, 
1910-1916) in Persia, could there be exchange of information between two colonial 
capitals along the lines of London- colonial capital. This disjuncture put him at a 
disadvantage when it came to negotiating with London. He could not use extra-Indian 
information to leverage his justification for any stand he might care to take.  This was 
all the more pronounced in a colony like India, where metropole-periphery 
connections were much more limited than in the white dominions.  
Also, as seen in the case of St. John Brodrick, the mechanics of the India Office 
and the other departments of the British Government were inter-related, which put 
further pressure on any incumbent to reconcile various disparate interests. For Curzon 
to insist that any given Indian interest take priority was merely interpreted as a lack of 
pan-Empire vision by the India Office, not commendable enthusiasm. For instance, 
Curzon‟s objections to India having to bear the costs of the Boer War did not suggest 
he was a dedicated Viceroy and thus raise him in the estimation of the Secretary of 
State; it only put Hamilton in the delicate position of having to negotiate a 
compromise between the War Office and Curzon. Curzon always protested violently 
at such moments that he merely had India‟s best interests at heart, and was not after 
personal glory, but this fact had never been in dispute among the mandarins in 
London- it was because of his avowed dedication to Indian affairs that he had been 
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appointed Viceroy. What he needed to do after the appointment was integrate the 
running of Indian administration with the various departments in London- and this is 
what he was reluctant to do- whether this stand served India better or not is out of the 
scope of this thesis. It is possible that, in fact, the A. J. Balfour led Cabinet Curzon 
served under was beginning to shift away from the view that empire should be the 
paramount concern of British politicians and towards the view that the domestic ballot 
box should replace it. And the India Office increasingly worked in tandem with the 
rest of the British Government. In addition, what Curzon saw as the India Office‟s 
deliberately putting obstacles in his path might have arisen from a genuine concern to 
prevent local autonomy from evolving to a degree where it would be difficult to check 
the running of India from London, which would have made governance under a 
Viceroy less efficient than himself problematic.
14
 And, essentially, for contemporary 
policy-makers, the purpose of imperial power was stable economic ascendancy. This 
„dictated that the Indian empire was meant to be indivisible. Hence, it was ruled 
through a chain of command stretching from London…to India…the control of the 
Raj as a system of profit and power had to lie in London;‟15 Curzon‟s wishing to alter 
the strength of  particular links went against the grain of official imperial thought at 
the time; Chapter 2  illustrated the extent to which Curzon‟s personal links helped him 
over-ride the official trend, but  his solitary will failed to hold sway once his lone 
supporter, George Hamilton, resigned office, and he was unable to convince his new 
superior.  
Compliant/Co-operative colleagues: As the sections above have largely made 
the point that Curzon‟s failure to forge harmonious relationships with a large part of 
the official population kept him from optimising his influence over them, it may 
                                                          
14
 D.B. Swinfen, Imperial Control of Colonial Legislation, 1813-1865: A Study of British Policy 
towards Colonial Legislative Powers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 3-4. 
15
 Anil Seal, “Imperialism and Nationalism in India,”  Modern Asian Studies 7:3, (1973),  326-327. 
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appear incongruous to state that forming mutually appreciative relationships also 
worked to his detriment; but this was indeed the case. The obvious argument to 
support this is that appreciation of Curzon‟s qualities blinded his colleagues to his 
weak spots, as was the case with his wife. But a more significant effect was that 
loyalist sentiments were taken in London to be evidence of Curzon‟s authoritarianism, 
because they seemed to fly in the face of the accepted convention that Curzon was 
difficult to get along with. Chapter 5 has illustrated how Ampthill‟s „Curzonian‟ 
stance was received by the India Office, and cost him the succession to the 
Viceroyalty (and therefore a possible chance for Curzon to see his stance on the 
military issue triumph). This was only one of many such instances. It was a standard 
complaint from Godley and Brodrick that Curzon‟s Council was much too 
complaisant to his wishes- the assumption was that he domineered over them. Not 
only did this impression make Brodrick and Godley inclined to disparage the 
credibility of the Council, but it also provided further proof for their contention that 
Curzon ran the administration much too high-handedly, and cowed his Council into 
agreement by coercive methods. This in turn heightened their attempts to curb what 
influence they thought he possessed. They can hardly be faulted. The lack of dissent 
may indicate complaisance, sycophancy, (which does not bolster the credibility of the 
alleged sycophant) or the overwhelming presence of an authoritarian boss, the latter 
being Balfour and Brodrick‟s assessment. 
This turn of affairs, obviously, also rendered unhelpful those elements who 
would have done the most to support Curzon. It would seem paradoxical that they 
were unhelpful precisely because they never showed any dissent, but that was indeed 
the case. And finally, as noticed in Chapter 5, Curzon‟s supporters were just not as 
committed – or numerous- as, say, Kitchener‟s or Balfour‟s. His Council, for example, 
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held by Brodrick to be his sycophants, did not actually resign over the Kitchener affair 
after protesting to the Viceroy that they would, if he did. At the crucial moment they 
failed to demonstrate their support, even though, as Curzon said, he believed himself 
to have possessed their united adherence.
16
 It may be hazarded that they tended to 
indifference over issues which the Viceroy might be passionate about. For example, 
they initially opposed Ampthill when he opposed Kitchener over the military reforms,  
and then swung round to back him. Paradoxically, it must also be emphasised that by 
not putting up opposition over major legislation, they were helpful, even if only in a 
negative way.  But the fact remains that he failed to engage with his Council; certainly 
not to the level he did with some of his Governors. In addition, the fact that some of 
his most vocal supporters did not possess political suavity worked against him. A case 
in point is that of Lovat Fraser, a contemporary Times of India editor and author of the 
hagiographic 1911 work India Under Curzon and After.
17
 Fraser was a keen 
Curzonian who even ran an anti-Minto campaign in the Times,  but its- and the 
monograph‟s- emphasis on Curzon as a solitary, wronged genius only served to 
support the modern historian‟s critique that the Viceroy was incapable of building a 
team, apart from attracting unfavourable attention from the Balfour-Brodrick camp.  
All this, again, may have had something to do with Curzon‟s early life. While 
the friendships he formed at school and university certainly carried over into his adult 
life, he does not seem to have made much effort to cultivate them in a political 
context. His one political mentor was the ageing Salisbury; he was not part of the 
governing clique of Balfour‟s cabinet. This may have been because he did not feel the 
need to lobby for domestic positions of power, as he devoted his youth to that part of 
his career which lay outside Britain.  
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 Curzon to Viceroy‟s Council, 20 August 1905, Curzon Papers, Mss Eur F111/211.  
17
 Lovat Fraser, India Under Curzon and After (London: William Heinemann, 1911).  
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Paradoxically, those colleagues who actually had differing views from the 
Viceroy- eg. Mackworth Young- did not really affect public perception, or the actual 
course, of Curzon‟s Viceroyalty. It was true that Mackworth Young ran a series of 
vilifying articles in the Times against Curzon after they both resigned, but in the 
meantime much more damage was being done by Francis Younghusband extolling 
Curzon‟s virtues to a puzzled Brodrick, who seems to have come to the conclusion 
that Curzon was trying to build up an influential coterie. This was in part because 
Curzon‟s followers tended to be largely those with the same world view as himself, or 
those who shared certain similarities. He could not be said to have surrounded himself 
with a coterie, but many of his associates in India were friends from pre-Viceregal 
days: Younghusband and Lawrence in particular. Or those he befriended occupied 
marginal or anomalous positions in the power structure, such as the Home Rule 
advocate MacDonnell, Northcote in Australia (where he became dissociated from 
Indian affairs), Ampthill whose comparative youth did put him at a disadvantage in 
terms of making connections and forging relationships, Hamilton. With the exception 
of Hamilton, they were all his official juniors as well.  On the other hand, the people 
he ended up alienating were the power structure- Balfour, Brodrick, Godley, Lee-
Warner. This might suggest that Curzon was innocent of realpolitik and did not know 
how to pick and choose his allies and enemies. As a matter of fact he had relatively 
little political or administrative experience when he was appointed Viceroy. He had 
been Undersecretary for Indian affairs. By contrast, Elgin had been Treasurer of the 
Household and First Commissioner of Works under Gladstone, as well as Convener of 
the Fife County Council (this much derided office would, in actual fact, have given 
him some experience in dealing with dissenting colleagues who had dissimilar views 
over any questions) and Lansdowne (and later, Minto) had come out to India straight 
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from the Governor-General- ship of Canada. Admittedly Curzon was younger than 
either of the two when appointed, but a great part of his career had been spent in 
solitary wanderings, from which he emerged only to unveil a universally lauded tome. 
This was hardly the setting to inculcate the qualities requisite for a good head of 
government, required to constantly deal with queries from many different officials 
each day.  It must be remembered that Curzon‟s compatriot Cromer, with whom he is 
almost always (and unfavourably) compared, was trained in colonial administration by 
his cousin Lord Northbrook, in India.  In any case,  English political reaction to 
Curzon‟s  appointment was that of alarm- his past explorations did not engender a 
sense of security in those who had to hand over the administration of India to him. His 
classics, Russia in Central Asia and Persia and the Persian Question
18
, published 
during his pre-Viceregal travels, had the effect of alerting his then acquaintances and 
the British government (which two bodies were much the same) as to the direction his 
Viceroyalty‟s foreign policy could take, especially since the stated aim of his travels 
was to be a fit Viceroy for India. It is possible that the British Cabinet was reluctant to 
endorse his plans without extensive scrutiny precisely because they were formed after 
extensive personal experience and therefore liable to be, if not prejudiced, subjective.  
The appointment of Francis Younghusband (whom Curzon had struck up a friendship 
with during his 1894 trek through the Pamirs) to the mission to Tibet in 1904 and 
Curzon and Younghusband‟s subsequent vocal support of each other did indeed 
appear to vindicate the India Office‟s apparent view that Curzon, if given total 
autonomy, tended to appoint his own men to ensure that things were done his own 
way, and assiduously shield them from official censure thereafter. Of course, this 
could be alleged only in the realm of frontier policy as Curzon had minimal 
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acquaintance with internal Indian administration prior to assuming office; and in fact, 
his grumbling over the appointment of an old friend to the Bombay governorship 
should have negated any suspicions that he tended to favour rubber-stamp 
appointments, but such was not the case.  
But, while systems in London converged and commingled to produce a set of 
circumstances that pretty much controlled the options available to an Indian Viceroy, 
they  were not the only factors which acted as barriers to Curzon  having his own way 
over administrative issues.  It is true that because London was the source of all power, 
the perception of Curzon in London was vital to shaping perceptions of him elsewhere; 
however, there were also issues within the Indian domestic set up that contributed to 
this.  
The communal equation in India: Even the fiercest critics of the “partition” of 
Bengal concede that, as a purely administrative move, it was eminently pragmatic. 
The move only soured when its communal implications became clear. Thus, it may be 
inferred that already tense inter-communal relations in India caused unnecessary 
debate about Curzon‟s actions.  It did not prevent him from doing what he wanted by 
way of palliative action, but the aftermath was always nastier than it should have been. 
It will therefore be illustrative to quote a long passage from a review in the Natal 
Witness of the second volume of Lord Ronaldshay‟s authorised biography of Curzon, 
by the Hon.  S.V. Srinivasa Sastri. Sastri notes that in the case of the Partition of 
Bengal, wherein, according to the author, 
 „the main motive was the erection of a Muhammadan province to serve as a 
counterpoise. Your inveterate Tory is a firm believer in the Divide and Rule 
Policy and when driven to it, is ready to acknowledge his belief and even parade 
it…Since the Curzonian regime many another costly blunder has been committed 
under the influence of the policy and before the full consequences of the 
parliamentary vote are realised and the national leaders of the people come into 
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their own, the bureaucracy is bound to err again and again in defence of the 
citadel…‟19  
 
If the British began to be perceived as the political equivalent of communal 
rabble rousers, the natural corollary for nationalistic Indians would be to want to get 
rid of them. Curzon‟s territorial redistribution was perceived as perpetuating an extant 
division, which impelled the nationalists to protest and damaged his credibility in the 
eyes of the Indians who had previously lauded him as an exemplary Viceroy. When  
he resigned, it was bruited about in the bazaars of Bengal that he had done so because 
of censure from Whitehall over his „partition.‟20 Indian outrage legitimised the efforts 
of his successors to stamp out „Curzonization,‟ with full approval from the India 
Office, because they could argue that the Indians themselves did not want such and 
such a measure, and it would thus inflame public opinion to press ahead with it.  
Consciously, Curzon never let Indian pubic opinion interfere with what he 
thought were rightful measures. Nor would he modify legislation solely because of 
negative feedback from Indians. But this only illustrates how dialogues and struggles 
for power between various types of Indians (a struggle firmly subordinated to, and not 
normally allowed to participate in the dialogue between the British administrators of 
India) thrust itself into the relationships of the ruling hierarchy. 
Mary Leiter: Historians of the Kitchener affair often quote the Mary-Kitchener 
correspondence to illustrate Kitchener‟s duplicity; he was writing affable letters to the 
Curzons while simultaneously plotting to negate any influence Curzon might possess 
in London with regard to Army issues. What they overlook, however, is that Mary 
Curzon, who conducted the whole of this correspondence, was taken in by Kitchener‟s 
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  “Lord Curzon: A Great Viceroy,” Natal Witness, 11 August 1928., Mss Eur D609/73. Italics mine.  
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 Cf. Chapter 5, page 191. The attempt- by both British governmental and popular Indian parties-to 
attribute Curzon‟s resignation to  the furore over passing  legislation not accepted by the people is also 
an attempt to deny him legitimacy as a head of government, as it implies an inability to either be 
convinced by popular opinion, or persuade it to swing in his favour.  
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façade. Her attempts to be an unofficial mediator for Curzon did not result in success. 
Rather, her attempt at boudoir diplomacy backfired heavily, because it caused even 
Curzon to be deceived about the true nature of Kitchener‟s intentions. As an aide, 
Mary was a constraint. As her biographer notes, while the Vicereine did not have any 
formal role to play in the Indian administration, Mary carved out her own role, taking 
over social duties and functioning as a liaising agent between Curzon and the 
Conservative big-wigs while in England. As part of the Viceregal team, therefore, she 
was active, but she was a sycophant, the sort of follower who clouds the true picture 
from the leader. As noted in Chapter 1, she was an asset because her lack of formal 
office made her approachable, but increasingly, as ill-health and prolonged absence 
distanced her from the Indian scene, this role seems to have devolved to Lawrence. 
Further, different spheres- Indian and British governing circles- did not often overlap, 
so Mary‟s Simla charm offensive might not have won her any points among the 
governing elite back in England. It is also possible that Mary over-estimated the 
amount of confidences she might generate from Curzon‟s colleagues; she openly 
acknowledged her pride at filling a high position in the Empire, and by default, 
possibly expected people to like her because she was the Viceroy’s wife.  Mary‟s role 
is an ambiguity not yet resolved by her biographers; generally, comments on Mary are 
curious productions, emphasising on the one hand how little influence she was 
allowed to have on „George‟s will‟ and on the other how much she fanned his political 
sensitivity while in London in 1901 and 1904, which one would suppose to be 
impossible if George really did not listen to her opinions.
21
 
          It is thus difficult to identify and isolate any one set of factors as having 
acted as limiting agents to Curzon‟s drive for a one-man overhaul of the Indian 
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administration. The single-minded dedication towards acquiring encyclopaedic 
knowledge of Indian affairs that propelled him to the Viceregal office was impeded by 
a nebulous haze of systemic flaws and checks, the changing dynamics of the balance 
of power between the rulers and the ruled, and inter-personal relationships re-
contextualised from the club to the Cabinet. 
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Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis was twofold; to explore and highlight the unused depths 
of the Curzon Papers and thus to put an new interpretation to Curzon‟s time in India, 
exploring the degree of autonomy he managed – or chose- to exercise in India.  This 
was achieved by taking into account theories of corporate leadership, management and 
the exercise of power.  The thesis has been an ideological counterpoint to the 
increasingly patronising analyses of colonial governance and colonial administrators 
favoured by historians today, in that it takes for granted that Curzon‟s Indian 
Viceroyalty was, as such, a good thing.  Methodologically, it is also a throwback to 
the times when the private papers, diaries and correspondence of proconsuls made up 
the primary source material for studies of their terms in office. This approach holds 
particular relevance for this thesis, which examines inter-personal relationships 
between different individuals in the British Government of India, as many of them 
stuck to personal correspondence to express their unvarnished views on any given 
subject. Scholars like Zoë Laidlaw have recently highlighted the prominent role that 
the personal connection played in colonial networks of power and influence, 
governance and authority. In the case of the Curzon Viceroyalty, the thesis utilises the 
private papers from angles hitherto unexamined. Contemporary biographers like 
David Gilmour do utilise the private papers, but usually only to provide anecdotal 
evidence and amusing vignettes. I have, instead, by focusing on the private papers, 
constructed my analyses of inter-personal relationships in the Government of India 
using the issues the protagonists themselves felt were important enough to warrant 
personal communication. In fact, while Curzon‟s relationships –or lack thereof- with 
people have always been a central yet unelaborated theme in biographies. Frictional 
relationships have been singled out as the root cause of the failure of the Viceroyalty 
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by more than one biographer. But with the exception of the breaking of Curzon‟s 
lifelong acquaintance with Brodrick, the course of these relationships has not been 
charted.  
The central conclusion of this thesis is that Curzon‟s personal relationships with 
the rest of the Government of India determined his actions and consequently the 
outcome of many a legislative move. The first and the last chapters set the boundaries-
and in some cases, demonstrated the fluidity of the boundaries- of the camps with 
which Curzon interacted and negotiated with. These themes were reiterated and 
developed further in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Chapter 2 further explored the effect of 
Curzon‟s lobbying skills- previously dismissed as being too heavy-handed to be 
effective- and showed how undercurrents between individuals affected Curzon and 
how Curzon in office (i.e. the fact of him being there) affected individuals‟ relations 
with each other. For example, Godley was constrained by Hamilton, as long as he 
(Hamilton) was in office, from expressing his dislike of Curzon. That a need was felt 
to develop a counter-weapon to Curzon‟s influence in India, itself demonstrates, in the 
opinion of this thesis, that Curzon was not quite so inept at persuasion and negotiation 
as has previously been hypothesised.  Chapters 2, 3 and 4 also showed that just 
because an individual was pro-Curzon, or even the sort of administrator he approved 
of in theory, they did not necessarily make his Viceroyalty easier. This is most starkly 
evident in the case of Mary, as discussed in Chapter 7, and is also a theme reflected in 
Chapter 5; Curzon‟s supporters did not possess the same degree of subtlety his 
detractors did, a lack most evident in Francis Younghusband‟s enthusiastic, if rash and 
counterproductive, campaign in defence of Curzon in the Times after his resignation.  
The perception of the  inter-personal relationship between two individuals as 
interpreted by a third party, often determined their reactions to, and attempted 
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manoeuvring of, those individuals. This was reflected in the core theme of the thesis- 
Centre-Provincial and Inter-Departmental relationships. The thesis endeavoured to 
advance the subject through its in-depth examination of the centre-presidency 
relationships (between an individual province and the centre) from angles hitherto 
unexamined i.e. the individual level, and demonstrating how this relationship was 
used by those involved , and by the Government of India, to have a bearing on  pan-
Indian governance.  Following on from this, chapters 2, 3 and 5 explored another 
aspect of the Curzon Viceroyalty for the first time- the process and manner in which 
Lord Ampthill became a consensual locum and highlights Ampthill‟s role in 
supporting Curzon‟s line against London, but for which it is entirely possible that the 
Kitchener affair would have come to a head much earlier than the summer of 1905.  It 
is also important to note that to date Ampthill‟s role in the Kitchener affair has not 
been analysed by any historian. The emphasis has always been on Curzon‟s conduct 
while in England, but this was largely informed by what he knew his locum to be 
doing in India. This in turn emphasises how much of Curzon‟s reactions were 
informed through collaboration and discussion with his fellow administrators, an 
aspect of his administration denied by most historians. But as the thesis shows, 
collaboration, and not just with Lawrence, was one of the strong points of Curzon‟s 
Viceroyalty. In the case of the Punjab Land Alienation Act, for example, his views 
about the most appropriate legislation evolved as he worked in conjunction with 
Charles Rivaz. In order to pass legislation, he managed to persuade the then Secretary 
of State, George Hamilton, not only to accept his methods, but also seek out ways to 
ensure the passage of the bills concerned through the Council of India. That he was 
unable to replicate this with Brodrick does not negate his earlier achievement, one 
which had frustrated Elgin, who had been unable to put through the creation of the 
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NWFP and the Punjab Land Alienation Act in part because of his inability to convince 
Hamilton.  Chapter 6 also demonstrated how he worked to co-opt Indian opinion for 
the above move, thus making the point that Curzon did in fact think it necessary to 
engage with Indians when political expediency called for it, and, more importantly, 
could do so to achieve the outcome he desired.  
Thus one of the major contentions of this thesis is that much of what has been 
written about Curzon‟s Viceroyalty, and the shape and form of popular and 
government networks of the time, takes its tone from the later stages of his term of 
office. Chapter 6 demonstrated most starkly how hindsight tends to reify events and 
distort historical assessments- Indians, right up the close of Curzon‟s term, were really 
quite appreciative of him and certainly did not have a nationally homogeneous opinion 
about him or about colonial rule. Curzon‟s ability to elicit diverse opinions, not just in 
a static fashion but evolving in response to the acts he undertook, among the people he 
interacted with, most notably the Council of India, and also the Indians, is discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 6, a theme that has been hitherto overlooked by historians   who often 
present the results of his engagement with people at only a single point in time. 
* 
The fact that when, in 1905, Curzon sent in his resignation as Viceroy, the 
Indians press did not unanimously attribute it to the Kitchener affair, is a testament to 
how far removed the high (and sneaky) backstairs politics practised in the India Office 
were from the processes of Indian administration that the full story of the Kitchener 
affair never became commonplace knowledge until Kitchener‟s policy collapsed in the 
Great War. That is not to suggest that the administration of India was carried out by 
the ICS, the provincial governors and Curzon colluding in rosy harmony; but there 
were two very distinct streams of power, administrative and political, flowing through 
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the India Office and the Government of India. Curzon, being a parliamentarian, as 
opposed to a career colonial administrator, attempted, with a remarkable degree of 
success, to fuse these two in his persona, and succeeded to a remarkable degree before 
finally failing to overcome growing opposition from an increasingly insecure Cabinet.  
By examining these hitherto unexplored themes, the thesis looked at what may 
be termed the underbelly of the Viceroyalty; the unexplored counterpoint to the 
conventional portrait of Curzon as an individual possessing too much hubris. While 
the thesis has shown that Curzon in fact collaborated extensively with other 
administrators to give his Viceroyalty the particular shape it took, his famed self-
reliance was not without justification; a great many of Curzon‟s achievements in India 
were the result of individual attention and perseverance in the face of official 
indifference: the establishment of the Archaeological Survey of India being one such. 
Many more were the result of tackling bureaucratic impasses that had frustrated his 
predecessors, which involved engaging with various experts with differing views, for 
instance the creation of the NWFP, the Punjab Land Alienation Act, and the Partition 
of Bengal. In one form or another, these reforms exist as he made them, despite 
multiple changes of government.  
This thesis has thus demonstrated that the Curzon Viceroyalty was neither 
ineffectual nor authoritarian. It has explained, using evidence gleaned from the 
writings of his contemporaries, that Curzon was not a bad negotiator, nor a poor team 
player. Because of his dual identity, as demonstrated throughout the thesis, Curzon 
had two goals; reinforcing the Empire and overhauling the Indian administration, the 
latter helping to achieve the former goal. Presenting an integrated version of these to 
different bodies used to pursuing one ideal, required, as the thesis demonstrates, a 
skilled networker. Having occupied multiple spheres of political life, he possessed the 
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awareness to criticise and challenge the contradiction of being expected to be, 
simultaneously, „independent colonial autocrat and the metropole government‟s 
puppet.‟1 Even this binary, being a juxtaposition derived with reference to the imperial 
metropole, does not cover the „complexity of colonial relations in situ,‟2 where, as the 
preceding chapters demonstrated, the differing situational circumstances of the many 
different people in different offices Curzon came into contact with, necessarily 
affected their reactions to him, and therefore the degree of success he had in engaging 
with them (even supposing that his very approaches to different issues and persons 
possessed a degree of sameness). Thus this thesis also negates the reading that Curzon 
was an autocrat who did not have the influence he sought precisely because of his 
autocracy; the individual‟s own identity in isolation is not always responsible for 
determining his influence over others. 
Curzon‟s Indian Viceroyalty, therefore,  offers a fascinating study as to how one 
man sought to revitalise the ideal of Empire through the strength of his ideas and his 
determined efforts to superimpose them upon the administration of the premier Crown 
possession.  What he attempted to do, was, definitely, a do-able task.
3
 As noted above, 
whether he succeeded is immaterial, because the Indian Empire no longer endures. 
But in late Victorian Britain, given a government stripped of extra-Indian concerns, 
Curzon‟s Viceroyalty stands out as the most concerted attempt to wield together a 
cohesive Empire. Had the situational settings in India and England been different, he 
might have attained the status Cromer did in Egypt.
4
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 But he did not want to, in fact, become a „permanent proconsul.‟ The Empire for him was not a 
romantic Boy’s Own field of adventure, but bound by cords to England.  
289 
 
From this it may be concluded that Curzon‟s influence on India, and the degree 
of power he exercised there, cannot be weighed in isolation, or solely on the strength 
of his personal traits. It should not be a series of examining multiple but individual 
strands from the web of relationships that surrounded the Viceroy of India.  Rather, as 
this thesis has done, it should be an examination of „multiple meanings, projects, 
material practices, performances, and experiences of colonial relations‟ 5  and how 
these reflect the nature of the personal and official relationships forged between the 
principal actors. Curzon is widely supposed, even by his contemporaries, to have 
assumed the Viceroyalty in an era of transition; „he came at a period when the old 
order was changing‟6- but what must be assessed is how much his time in office 
contributed to that transition, taking the Viceroyalty of India from being a romantic, 
exotic, colonial posting to an appointment deeply influenced by the English political 
scene, that also had a bearing on that same political scene. In negotiating for 
administrative autonomy, Curzon was instrumental in making manifest the ways by 
which English and Indian politics were irretrievably linked together and the 
consequent scope and restrictions afforded an Indian proconsul.  
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